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FOREWORD
We are pleased to introduce this volume, which summarizes the
proceedings of an important and timely conference on the key policy
challenge of reinvigorating credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern
European Economies (CESEE).1 The need to act decisively and remove
structural barriers to a high and sustainable credit expansion has been a
core preoccupation of policymakers in the region and the IMF since the
onset of the Global Financial Crisis, and is widely recognized as a critical
prerequisite to establishing a new growth momentum.
Indeed, even seven years after the onset of the crisis, and after experiencing
a sharp contraction in both credit and economic activity, much of the
CESEE region still suffers from low credit and economic growth. And the
worry is that, without a reinvigoration of the reform momentum, this “low
growth” performance could become the “new normal.”
The fact that this conference was able to attract such an impressive group
of senior European policymakers—including 15 governors and
vice-governors of central banks—provides both a testament to the
commitment of policymakers to engaging on these issues and recognition
of the importance of continued efforts. The two-day event provided an
encouraging degree of consensus on where these efforts need to be
concentrated.
It is our sincere hope that this event, and the summary of the discussions
that have been compiled here, will provide a useful springboard for moving
forward with bolder actions and reforms that will help put the region on a
solid growth path.
José Viñals
Financial Counsellor
Director of the Monetary and Capital
Markets Department
International Monetary Fund

Boštjan Jazbec
Governor
Bank of Slovenia

1 The conference was held in Portorož, Slovenia on September 25–26, 2014.

11

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
__________________________________________________
Marco Piñón, Advisor, Monetary and Capital Markets
Department, IMF
The IMF-Bank of Slovenia high-level conference2 on
“Reinvigorating Credit Growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern
European
Economies
(CESEE)”
attracted
prominent
policymakers in the CESEE region, as well as from the rest of
Europe and elsewhere. This participation testified to the
importance that was attached to the opportunity to come together
and discuss the issues weighing on the region’s recovery.
Indeed, reactivating credit in the CESEE represents one of the
most important challenges to improving the economic prospects
of the region in the years ahead. Recoveries without the support
of healthy levels of credit, so called “creditless recoveries,” tend
to be subpar and less sustainable. In the case of the CESEE,
seven years after the onset of the global financial crisis, and the
ensuing collapse in credit, lending and broader economic growth
remain anemic in most countries.
Although policymakers have placed an appropriate emphasis on
the need to jump-start credit, the design of effective policy
responses has been elusive. What is often required are difficult
institutional changes and deep reforms that can threaten deeply
rooted practices or vested interests, or have costs that are
difficult to bear given the difficult fiscal situation in most
CESEE countries. Instead, the focus has often been on easier
measures to boost credit that may have only a temporary or

2 Held in Portorož, Slovenia on September 25–26, 2014.
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palliative effect, or unintended and undesirable macroeconomic
consequences.
Background
The 2008 global financial crisis was markedly different from
several previous crises. In contrast with other episodes, when
weak credit growth was associated with emerging and
developing economies, this time the epicenter of the crisis was
the advanced countries of the world. And, while many of these
countries still suffer from the after-effects of the crisis, emerging
market economies have been generally resilient.
However, the experience of the CESEE region differs markedly
from that of other emerging markets. Not only did the CESEE
region experience a more abrupt and severe drop in credit levels
during 2008–09 (albeit following an equally striking rally in the
preceding years) but, with very few exceptions, CESEE
countries continue to face depressed credit levels and uncertain
credit growth prospects.
Recent studies and surveys point to a range of factors as likely
drivers of credit developments in the CESEE region.
Econometric estimates indicate that global factors, domestic
macroeconomic conditions, and domestic and parent bank
fundamentals all played a role. Interestingly, the results suggest
that while macroeconomic factors were important, particularly in
the early phases of the crisis, bank fundamentals gained
relevance over time. In particular, depressed credit levels appear
to be related to an important extent to domestic banks’ asset
quality, liquidity constraints, and capital reserves, as well as to
parent banks’ funding costs and capitalization.
A survey conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in
the context of the Vienna Initiative 2 confirms the key
econometric findings. The survey, which was completed by a
large sample of bankers operating in the CESEE area, points to
local nonperforming loans (NPLs) as well as group NPL figures
as the most important factors explaining weak credit
performance in the CESEE region. It also finds that the local and
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global market outlook and the local and global funding outlook
have become less binding constraints and, in some instances, are
already helping to reactivate credit growth. Beyond the factors
identified by the econometric studies, the survey indicates that,
to a lesser but still important extent, changes in local and global
regulations have also affected credit growth negatively.
A survey conducted by the IMF on measures to promote credit
growth adopted around the world, including in the CESEE
region, offers further insights. The survey was applied to
42 countries, covering 50 policy categories. The results were
then used to identify policy gaps with significant potential
impact for the CESEE region, by comparing the measures
adopted (or not) with the factors identified as driving credit
conditions in the same countries.
A key finding is that the CESEE region lags behind considerably
in terms of bank restructuring efforts with respect to other parts
of the world, including the advanced economies. This is a
meaningful finding considering that NPLs and, more generally,
bank fundamentals, both domestic and foreign, appear to be the
key drivers of slow credit growth. It also finds that there is
significant room for further corporate and household debt
restructuring efforts, although in this case lagging efforts appear
to be widespread also outside the CESEE region. The survey
also finds that virtually no capital market measures have been
adopted in the region, suggesting that this could also be a fertile
ground to activate nonbank credit.
Against this background, the conference’s discussions were
centered on four high-level panels covering a wide range of
relevant issues.
Panel 1—Repairing balance sheets and other challenges
During the discussions, there was broad consensus that
strengthening banks’ weak balance sheets should be at the core
of any efforts to reactivate credit growth on a sustainable basis,
and that more decisive efforts in this regard are needed in most
CESEE countries. Capital injections had often not been
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sufficient or timely, and efforts to address high NPLs had not
gone far enough in most cases. At the same time, the general
view was that improvements are not only needed for banks’
balance sheets, but also for corporations and households, where
efforts are lagging even further.
Panelists generally expressed the view that efforts on multiple
fronts were needed, involving a coordinated approach that calls
for actions that go well beyond the purview of the central bank
and supervisory authorities. Going forward, the primary focus
should be on forceful measures to improve the quality of
institutions, legislation, and regulations. The priority should be
on removing barriers that hinder NPL resolution, such as
inappropriate and inefficient insolvency and tax legislation. But
efforts are also needed on other fronts, including to improve and
reinforce risk management strategies and corporate governance.
Some panelists called for more coordinated macroeconomic
policies, where fiscal policies are more supportive of monetary
and structural policies. Others, however, emphasized the limited
fiscal space in many CESEE countries, and that an unintended
consequence of monetary easing could be further delays in
identifying and correcting the underlying imbalances.
Panel 2—Prospects for credit growth and for foreign bank
engagement in the region
The discussions focused on the role played by foreign banks in
explaining credit developments in CESEE countries, particularly
in the context of the global crisis and the subsequent regulatory
reforms. Several panelists pointed out that a more appropriate
distinction between banks would be in terms of management
practices instead of ownership. In their view, many foreign
banks had displayed lower levels of NPLs and managed to
maintain higher levels of credit. Furthermore, foreign banks had
brought considerable benefits to the CESEE before the crisis,
including more efficient intermediation and improved access to
credit by the corporate sector. Nevertheless, participants agreed
that foreign banks have an ongoing role to play and that it will be
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important to ensure their long-term commitment to their host
country.
Regarding the causes of foreign banks’ weak credit growth, the
diversity of experiences within the CESEE region illustrated
that, while deleveraging was an important driver of credit
developments, this was a needed correction to earlier credit
excesses; and that macroeconomic fundamentals were an
important determinant of credit developments in specific
countries. With respect to regulatory reforms, at both the
European Union (EU) and international levels, there was
agreement that stricter capital and liquidity requirements may
have dampened credit, but also that in the long run this would be
offset by the benefits of a more stable financial system,
improved confidence, and lower costs of bank financing.
Panel 3—Measures to revive credit markets: best practices and
pitfalls
The panel acknowledged that the continued weakness in credit is
partly a correction that still needs to run its course. Several
panelists mentioned that confidence needs to be restored before
credit growth can be expected and saw the recent asset quality
review and stress tests as helping to restore confidence and credit
growth in the medium run. Still, credit growth may continue to
be weak in the short run, especially in banks that are short of
capital. Moreover, panelists stressed that structural reforms have
stalled and need to be reinvigorated if sustained credit and
economic growth are to return anytime soon.
The panel discussed alternatives to bank funding, especially for
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The consensus
view was that alternatives to bank financing should be
developed, and that financial markets should play a greater role.
Securitization and further development of ABS markets were
seen as plausible alternatives to bank lending. Other alternatives
included venture capital funds, joint venture funds, and
development of mini-bond markets.
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Regarding central bank schemes, panelists observed that these
have a role to play in creating the necessary conditions for
liquidity to be channeled to the real economy, but cautioned that
in the past they have not always been successful. In particular,
they stressed that central banks’ direct credit or subsidies to
SMEs pose risks, such as political interference. To minimize
political interference, some panelists suggested that multilateral
institutions could play a greater role as intermediaries.
Panel 4—Risks of a new financial crisis affecting the CESEE
region
The panel discussed the vulnerability of the CESEE region to a
new financial crisis. Encouragingly, most felt that the near-term
risks were relatively modest, especially since many countries had
reduced their reliance on parent or wholesale funding, and
dollarization/euroization had diminished. However, they also
warned that medium-term risks remained, which called for
sustained reform efforts.
Panelists discussed vulnerabilities resulting from market
rigidities in Europe, debt overhangs, and weak balance sheets in
the CESEE region and more broadly in Europe. While these
factors were not seen as posing near-term risks, they tended to
depress demand and growth, and therefore prevented institutions
from rebuilding their capital and other buffers, leaving them
exposed to future shocks.
The panel also discussed risks resulting from geopolitical
developments outside the CESEE region, protracted low growth
in Europe, and the normalization of global monetary conditions.
It was acknowledged that the region was already feeling the
impact of economic developments in Russia, and panelists
warned that a slowdown in emerging markets could have a
significant impact on Europe and, in particular, on the CESEE
area, given that its exports have been one of the most dynamic
sectors. The prospective tightening of U.S. (and U.K.) monetary
policy could potentially lead to a large re-pricing of assets and a
return to higher risk premiums, which could also put strains on
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the region given the aforementioned lack of buffers and the lack
of progress in balance sheet repair.
Panelists agreed that the current period of relative calm
represents a window of opportunity to reduce the risk of a
renewed crisis by tackling the underlying vulnerabilities. With
high and rising NPLs, action is needed to address the issue of
debt overhang, including at the level of corporates and
sovereigns. Buffers need to be rebuilt, and this will require steps
to promote orderly balance sheet restructuring and the restoration
of sustained bank profitability. But addressing underlying
weaknesses—especially the low long-term trend growth rate—
will require structural measures that go beyond the financial
system and encompass labor markets, education systems, and
new and innovative European financing vehicles.
Conclusions
While weak credit reflects a natural response to the
overleveraging that occurred prior to the crisis, and will need to
run its course, in much of the CESEE region this process still
needs to be supported by decisive structural and other reforms to
avoid more permanent damage to the credit channel and output
growth. What appears to be weighing on the region is a legacy of
inadequate or incomplete efforts to address the weak balance
sheets not only of banks, but also of corporations and
households.
The role of foreign banks in this recovery process also needs
careful thought. Deleveraging by foreign banks has dampened
credit in the region, but at the same time foreign banks have
contributed to significant efficiency gains in most countries and
have had a positive impact on credit growth in countries with
stronger macroeconomic policies and market outlook. While
regulatory reforms at both national and global levels have
weighed on credit, such measures offer the eventual promise of a
more stable financial system.
A further lesson for the region from the crisis is the importance
of developing more diversified sources of investment financing,
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especially for SMEs, including through securitization and further
development of ABS markets, venture capital funds, and the
development of mini-bond markets. While direct credit by
central banks or credit subsidies to SMEs can help jump-start the
credit channel, such schemes are not always effective, can distort
credit allocation in ways that are not growth friendly, and are
prone to political interference. But, more generally, the panels
agreed that there could be a role for multilateral institutions in
assisting in the development of credit diversification.
The core conclusion of the event was the importance of injecting
a new momentum to the implementation of structural reforms.
These measures need to go beyond merely reactivating credit,
and should be geared toward addressing the weak balance sheets
of financial institutions, the corporate sector, and households.
They also need to extend beyond financial issues and address the
more fundamental impediments to strong and sustained growth,
especially those in the labor markets and education systems.
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II. OPENING REMARKS

A. Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of Slovenia
It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to the high-level seminar
on reinvigorating credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern
European Economies (CESEE), organized jointly by the Bank of
Slovenia and International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is indeed a
great honor to have a very distinguished gathering of central
bank governors and vice governors, senior officials of other
international financial institutions, former public officials and
leading academics to discuss a very critical issue that occupies
the minds of policymakers in the region and elsewhere.
The objectives of the seminar are to learn about the diverse
experiences of different countries in the region and to exchange
views on the policy challenges and possible responses. The
appropriate policy responses necessarily are country-specific and
must take into account the heterogeneity within the various
sectors of the economy and the role of idiosyncratic and
institutional factors. Still, important lessons can be drawn from
cross-country comparisons.
The presentations and discussion in the seminar will focus on
four main themes: (1) repairing balance sheets in the financial
system and the corporate and household sectors; (2) the role of
foreign banks in fostering credit growth; (3) best practices for
reviving credit markets and the pitfalls; and (4) risks of a new
financial crisis. I will now briefly touch on these themes in
general terms.
How the situation has changed! Not that long ago, policymakers
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were concerned about the
issue of rapid credit growth. A key question then was whether
rapid credit growth should be seen as an endless boom or as an
early warning.
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As we all know very well, the boom turned to bust abruptly in
2008. The turmoil in international financial markets and the
consequent collapse in output in major developed economies
also adversely impacted the countries in Central, Eastern and
Southern Europe in varying degrees through a combination of
the trade, financial and domestic demand channels.
A fallout of the global financial crisis was balance sheet
recession in the region. The rapid credit growth during the precrisis boom period was grounded in excessive borrowing and
risk-taking by banks and enterprises. Banks relied heavily on
external wholesale funding, and the rapid credit expansion took
place against very limited equity capital in the corporate sector.
The global financial crisis exposed these balance sheet
vulnerabilities. The onset of the crisis caused a sudden stop in
external financing, and countries in the region were caught in a
vicious cycle of reduced credit availability, deleveraging, rising
NPLs, and a cutback in corporate investment and output.
Much of the region is still suffering from the fallout of the global
crisis. In a large number of countries, economic recovery
remains feeble and bank credit is still contracting. For these
countries, reviving credit growth is considered essential to
achieving a strong and durable output expansion. However, the
task is complex.
Boosting credit growth, without addressing the large sectoral and
aggregate imbalances in the economy that had built up during the
credit boom years, can be risky. Matters may become worse if
additional credit availability enables enterprises to postpone
balance sheet adjustment. In the wake of a balance sheet
recession, the allocation of credit matters more than its aggregate
amount. It is important that good borrowers rather than the bad
ones are the main beneficiaries of credit growth.
It is not surprising that much of the CESEE region is
experiencing a slow so-called creditless recovery. Balance sheet
recessions are typically not very responsive to traditional
demand management measures. This is because the monetary
policy transmission channel is impaired by the weak balance
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sheets of banks and the corporate sector. As long as asset quality
is poor and capital is inadequate, banks will tend to restrict
overall credit supply. Liquidity may not be a binding constraint
in such a situation. As has been argued by some analysts in the
context of an unexpectedly low take-up in the recent first auction
of liquidity under the European Central Bank's (ECB) targeted
longer-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) program, the
profitability of borrowing very cheaply from the central bank to
lend to the private sector (especially (SMEs)) is not guaranteed if
NPLs are high and banks need to allow for high expected default
rates, and if lending to SMEs implies high risk weights and,
consequently, capital charges.
Credit demand also is weak in a balance sheet recession. Bank
lending surveys in the region indicate that credit demand has
decreased since the onset of the global crisis. An important
factor weighing down credit demand is the corporate debt
overhang. The easing of monetary conditions will not necessarily
induce higher borrowing while highly indebted companies are
focused on deleveraging.
Thus, repairing the balance sheets of both the banking sector and
corporate sector is a priority for unlocking credit growth. A
complicating factor here is that the maximum possible speed for
completing bank restructuring is typically faster than that for
corporate restructuring, even if all the enabling legislative and
institutional frameworks for the latter are in place. So, the
resumption of credit growth may take a while. There also is a
worrisome aspect of the different restructuring speeds of the two
sectors. Experience shows that, when enterprise restructuring is
lagging, NPLs continue to accumulate and erode the capital
buffer of banks created by their recapitalization, creating a likely
need for another round of capital injection.
Revival of credit growth is also difficult because of the tensions
between monetary policy considerations and financial stability
considerations. The global crisis has demonstrated very clearly
the importance of having adequate safeguards in place to prevent
unhealthy risk taking and the creation of credit bubbles. All
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central banks in the region are now in the process of putting in
place frameworks to strengthen bank supervision, enhance risk
management and governance standards, and increase
transparency and statistical disclosure. National authorities also
are establishing the institutional framework for macroprudential
oversight of the financial system. These prudential aspects of the
financial policy framework are meant to reduce the amplitude of
financial cycles. However, they also are likely to dampen the
pace of credit growth.
It also should be recognized that it will not be possible to achieve
durable economic growth underpinned by abundant credit in the
same manner as that pursued during the pre-crisis boom period.
It will be necessary to limit the reliance on debt-financing and
shift towards more equity financing. Given the need to ensure
fiscal sustainability, recourse to more state funding for
restructuring the economy and increasing investment is not a
feasible option. An appropriate business environment has to be
created for attracting new non-debt capital flows. This will
require addressing the institutional and regulatory bottlenecks
that currently inhibit investment. In this context, increasing the
efficiency of the legislative and judiciary systems will be
extremely important.
Not all CESEE countries have been equally hit by the crisis.
Indeed, a few countries in the region managed to escape the
worst effects of the financial crisis, highlighting the role of
country-specific factors. Economic growth and strong credit
expansion in these countries have resumed after a brief pause.
For them, an important question is whether the momentum can
be sustained. Based on the lessons from the crisis, a key priority
for these countries should be to prevent a build-up of imbalances
that could threaten financial and macroeconomic stability. The
main tasks are to identify and implement on a timely basis
measures to curb the boom and to build the capacity to cope with
a possible bust. An advantage here is that, because of the
differences in cyclical position, policy conflict between
monetary policy and prudential policy is absent, unlike in the
case of countries suffering from balance sheet recession.
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Given the integration of CESEE countries in the world financial
markets, credit growth in these countries has acquired an
international dimension. There is a significant presence of
foreign-owned banks, and external funding is an important
source of bank liquidity. While external bank funding for the
region has been on a declining trend since the onset of the global
crisis and sizeable deleveraging has already occurred, parent
bank funding still represents a large share of bank funding in
several CESEE countries. Thus, countries in the region are
highly vulnerable to changes in the external environment. If
parent banks come under pressure to deleverage and build up
capital in the period ahead on account of the results of the just
concluded euro area asset quality review and stress tests or
because of tighter global financial conditions, the liquidity
support for credit growth in the daughter banks may not be
forthcoming.
I would like to conclude by pointing out that central banks alone
cannot succeed in reviving credit growth and economic growth.
Putting the economies in the region back on track will require an
integrated national policy strategy to restore the health of the
financial sector, restructure the corporate sector, reinforce the
sustainability of the public finances, improve the flexibility of
product and labor markets, and reform the business environment.
Because of the complementarity of the measures, coordination
between government agencies and other stakeholders is essential
in policy implementation. Successful and timely policy
implementation will require political resolve and social
consensus. If there is no determined follow-through on policies,
the fragile recovery that is underway will come to an end and
economic problems will intensify.

B. Christopher Towe, Deputy Director, Monetary and
Capital Markets Department, IMF
Thank you very much Governor Jazbec for these very helpful
opening remarks. Let me just add a few additional thoughts
before we begin with the first session.

24
At the outset, I would like to underscore the importance of the
topics that we will be debating today and tomorrow.
Like the Governor, I too find it ironic that we are meeting here
today to discuss how to reinvigorate credit when only 10 years
ago the worry was excess credit growth. Indeed, almost exactly
10 years ago, the IMF co-hosted a conference in this region
whose proceedings were published in a book entitled—Rapid
Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Endless Boom or
Early Warning?
Unfortunately, for all of us, the answer to that question was that
rapid credit growth, especially cross-border credit, was an early
warning for crisis.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that lending in foreign
currency was excessive, there was inadequate risk management
by foreign banks, macroprudential oversight was too weak, and
home-host relations were not robust enough.
And while it is encouraging that considerable progress has been
made in addressing these shortcomings, the region is still
struggling with twin hangovers from the global financial crisis
and home-grown credit busts. These have undermined the credit
channel, left balance sheets still fragile, and dampened growth.
And, as the IMF has recently reported to the G20, the economic
environment is likely to become more challenging in the period
ahead.
Yes, we expect the global recovery to regain strength in the
coming year, on the back of exceptionally supportive financial
conditions and moderating fiscal consolidation. And
strengthening balance sheets also should support the recovery in
the remainder of 2014 and into 2015.
However, downside risks have increased, including those related
to geopolitical tensions, continued signs of deflation pressures in
some regions, and the possibility of a disorderly renormalization
of the United States’ (U.S.) monetary policy. A more
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fundamental concern is that the new normal post-crisis will be
much lower potential growth. Moreover, there is growing
concern that easy monetary policies globally are leading to
financial excesses and asset price overvaluations in some
markets, which could increase the chances of a disorderly
unwinding when monetary accommodation is unwound.
So I would leave you with three thoughts as we begin our
discussions today and tomorrow.
First, the issues we are to address are vitally important for the
economic well-being and financial stability of the region.
Second, with increasing risks globally, there is an even greater
urgency now to tackle the impediments to sound and
growth-enhancing credit.
Third, the fact that we have been fortunate enough to assemble
here such an impressive number of key policymakers from the
region provides a unique opportunity to engage in a frank and
candid dialogue on these issues. I am confident that this
opportunity will be seized by all of you and look forward to
lively, policy relevant, and fruitful discussions.
With these remarks, let me close by thanking Governor Jazbec
and his team for having organized this event, especially in such a
lovely venue.
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III. WHAT IS DRIVING CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS?
CAN SOMETHING BE DONE?

A. Lead: Marco Piñón, Advisor, Monetary and Capital
Markets Department, IMF3
It is a pleasure to be here before such a distinguished audience.
The topic that brings us here is an important one for the CESEE
economies. Indeed, reinvigorating credit growth on a sustainable
basis will be important because it relates directly to the
well-being of the people of the region. The idea of this seminar
is to benefit from the collective experience of high-level policy
practitioners, from within and outside the region. Key questions
that we will try to answer together in this event include: what
works or at least has better prospects of working, and what are
the costs and benefits of different alternatives?
In this session, the idea is to offer background information for
each of the key questions that have been posed to the four panel
discussions that follow. It is organized in four parts. First, it
gives a quick assessment of credit growth performance in the
region; second, it aims to shed light on the factors that are likely
to be driving credit growth; third, it discusses the measures that
have been taken to revitalize credit, both in the region and in
other parts of the world; and fourth, it suggests possible ways
forward by comparing part two (what drives credit) and part
three (what has and has not been done).

3 Mr. Piñón’s presentation was co-authored by Johannes Ehrentraud and Benjamin Huston,

Economist and Research Assistant, respectively; from the Monetary and Capital Markets
Department, IMF.

27
CESEE credit growth performance
Starting with the first part: how is credit performing in the
CESEE region? The red line in Figure 1 depicts credit growth in
annual terms for (a selection of) advanced economies. It shows
that after the drop resulting from the global crisis in 2008–09,
credit has remained fairly stagnant in real terms, even further
contracting throughout the crisis. In the case of (selected)
emerging market economies (green line), the drop in credit
following the global crisis was less severe, and it has since
recovered. In some sense, this crisis is different from what we
have seen in the past, and the old saying “when developed
countries catch a cold, emerging economies get pneumonia” did
not generally apply. Except in Europe! In the case of the CEESE
region (blue line), excluding Russia and Turkey, having
experienced a substantial boom before the crisis, credit collapsed
and thereafter credit growth has remained, on average, negative.
While these are arithmetic averages of growth rates and there is a
lot of heterogeneity across countries, credit for the region as a
whole is not performing well.
Before turning to the next part, let us look at Russia and Turkey,
which were excluded from the previous analysis, where the story
is different.
In these cases (dotted line), credit collapsed initially but, much
like the emerging economies in other parts of the world, it
bounced right back soon after. This raises a different question: is
this sustainable, or is it a repeat of what we saw before the crisis?
And if it’s a repeat, what can be done to prevent another large
correction?
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Figure 1. Real Bank Credit Growth, by Region
(In percent, year over year)
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Source: EBRD, BIS, IMF staff estimates
Note: vertical black line denotes onset of global financial crisis.

To take another look at the same issue, Figure 2 classifies
countries by their rate of credit growth (quarterly average over a
one-year period). The first column shows that credit in most
advanced economies is still contracting in real terms or
expanding only moderately. In contrast, the second column
shows that (a selection of) non-European emerging economies
are already exhibiting clear signs of credit expansion, sometimes
vigorously. In the case of the CESEE region as a whole (third
column), credit is still generally contracting, six years after the
onset of the global crisis. As previously presented, this chart
confirms that for a few cases, notably Russia and Turkey, credit
growth is vigorous, behaving similarly to that observed in nonEuropean emerging economies.
To summarize, while credit growth has already resumed for most
of the emerging markets outside Europe, the majority of CESEE
countries continue to experience negative credit growth, much
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Figure 2. Average Credit Growth, by Region
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Source: EBRD, BIS, IMF staff estimates
Note: bank credit is measured as the average of real FX-adjusted quarterly bank credit growth over the
period of 2013Q-2013Q4.
Average credit growth levels are: “Contracting” is between -10 percent and 0 percent, “Moderate” is
between 0 percent and 3 percent, “Expanding” is greater than 3 percent and less than 10 percent, “Rapidly
Expanding” is greater than 10 percent.

like many of the developed economies, including in Europe.
Moreover, with some exceptions, recent developments do not
point to a clear trend toward an improvement.
Factors explaining credit growth
Let me move to the second part of this section. To shed light on
what may be behind credit developments in CESEE countries,
we have used a number of complementary approaches
(Figure 3). Borrowing from recent econometric research at the
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Figure 3. Approaches to Identify Credit Constraints
Bank-level Panel Analysis

• Regression model with bank fixed effects

Structural Model on Bank Lending

• Disequilibrium model using data from Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania

Bank Lending Surveys

• CESEE bank lending survey
• IIF emerging market bank lending survey

Figure 4. Bank-Level Panel Analysis
Main Results
• Bank fundamentals more constraining post crisis, but macroeconomic constraints
remain

Bank fundamentals

• Banks in CESEE tend to lend more when (i) their asset quality is better; (ii) they are
less subject to liquidity constraints; (iii) they have higher capital reserves

Parent bank characteristics
• Lower funding costs and higher capitalization of the parent increase credit growth
in CESEE

*Analysis done by Gregorio Impavido, Jerome Vandenbussche, and Li Zeng (IMF-EUR).
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IMF’s European Department, one approach that we have used is
panel regressions, that is, the estimation of pooled time series
cross-country regressions (with fixed effects), with generally
encouraging results. Another one is disequilibrium (between
supply and demand) models, which are time series models for
individual countries. Although typically less robust than panel
models, the results of disequilibrium models tend to offer similar
intuition. To complement this, we have also taken advantage of
two leading bank lending surveys for the region: the first one is
the CESEE Bank Lending Survey and the other is the Institute
for International Finance (IIF) Emerging Market Bank Lending
Survey.
So, we are trying to use different or alternative approaches that,
as a group, will give us a broad view of the likely “suspects,”
that is, factors that we should focus on as possible drivers of
credit growth (or lack thereof) in the CESEE region. For the
purposes of this presentation, we would like to concentrate now
on the first econometric approach, which is the panel analysis,
and the CESEE Bank Lending Survey.
The results of the bank-panel model estimated by staff of the
European Department of the IMF were initially published last
year, but were updated for this conference last June. So they are
fairly recent and are available online. This model uses individual
bank-level data for 2005–12 and it covers 75 banks, both
domestic and external, in nine countries. It uses three sets of
explanatory variables to ascertain which ones may be driving
credit growth: macroeconomic factors, domestic bank
fundamentals, and parent bank conditions.
The results are not surprising and show that both bank
fundamentals (domestic and foreign) and macroeconomic
conditions matter. What we have found interesting is that the
relative importance of these two factors appears to be shifting. In
the early part of the global crisis, their importance was more or
less evenly distributed but, as the crisis evolved, bank
fundamentals appear to have gained importance.
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Let’s look at some details of the estimated panel analysis
equation. In the equation, higher asset quality, liquidity, and
capital reserves, and are found to be associated with higher credit
growth. For parent bank characteristics, we find that lower
funding cost and capitalization of the parent increases credit
growth. Again, the results are not surprising.
Another way to look at this, using the same equation, is in the
two charts below (Figure 5). The top chart shows the variance
decomposition of credit growth for domestic banks. The drop in
credit growth now and the average rate observed during 2002–08
can be explained by two bars: the one in blue shows how much
of the drop is explained by bank fundamentals; and the one in
red shows how much of it is explained by macroeconomic
conditions. As you can see, in the early years of the crisis, the
model tells you that, roughly half was explained by bank
fundamentals and half by macroeconomic conditions. But as the
crisis evolved, the breakdown seems to have changed, with bank
fundamentals becoming more important. A similar story is told
by the lower chart for foreign banks. The only difference is that
we have included one more variable, which is parent conditions,
i.e., bank fundamentals for foreign banks. We found generally
the same conclusion, that is, that bank fundamentals and parent
bank conditions appear to be driving the poor performance of
credit growth in the region.
Before moving to the results of the surveys, let me digress
slightly and briefly discuss the issue of how external or domestic
factors are driving credit. The original version of the panel
regression estimated by the IMF’s European Department
included global factors as one of the retained explanatory
variables. The conclusion at that time was that global factors
were important drivers of the drop in credit at the beginning of
the crisis, but also that they were becoming less important as
domestic conditions became more relevant. This was an intuitive
result consistent with our priors. Thus, it comes as no surprise
that, in the re-estimated model with more recent data, this
variable dropped out (i.e., was not statistically significant).
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Figure 5. Credit Growth Decomposition, 2001–2007
(In percent of total credit growth)
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Note: credit growth decomposition was estimated relative to average credit growth over 2001-2007 pre-crisis
period.
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To shed more light on this, the charts below show the emerging
markets bond index (EMBI) spread for Europe (Figure 6) and a
comparison of the evolution of NPLs in the CESEE region,
advanced economies, and (selected) emerging markets
(Figure 7). The EMBI jumped to very high levels at the
beginning of the global crisis, and while there have been
subsequent spikes, these have been smaller. At present, while
still above pre-crisis levels, the EMBI is substantially below the
levels observed during the crisis. I think we can say, with some
confidence that this suggests that global factors, while important,
are unlikely to be a critical determinant factor for credit growth.
In contrast, if we look at the comparison of NPLs between the
developed, developing economies and then Europe, we can see
that the economies where credit recovered quickly in emerging
markets have lower and declining NPLs, after a little spike at the
time of the crisis. Yes, there is an identification issue here,
although it is partially addressed in the previous econometric
work presented above. However, it is interesting to note that in
the developed economies, which are also facing a credit growth
problem, NPLs have continued to increase. Now, what is
happening in the CESEE countries? They also see an increase,
but at a much more rapid pace. While these are only arithmetic
averages, they not only show a dramatic increase, but also just as
worrisome, no clear downward trend.
Now, let us move away from the econometric results and turn to
what the industry’s surveys tell us, i.e., what the banks’ views
are regarding the factors that are driving credit growth. In this
case, we will concentrate on the CESEE Bank Lending Survey
prepared by the EIB. The survey is conducted twice a year,
covering over 100 groups, both domestic and international. It
includes a number of questions aimed at assessing demand and
supply factors that may be driving credit growth. The results are
interesting and generally support what the econometric work
says. It finds that, while numerous factors affect credit growth,
NPLs are the single most important factor. Second to NPLs,
bankers believe that regulatory changes are also an important
constraint.
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Figure 6. EMBI Spread Europe
(In basis points)
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Figure 7. Nonperforming Loan Ratio, by Region
(In percent)
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In Figure 8 below, negative values means that credit conditions
are getting worse, while positive values means that they are
improving. As previously mentioned, the single most important
factor according to banks is NPLs. And this was true for both
domestic and external factors. Moreover, it is true for the
previous six months and even more important in terms of
expectations for the following six months (red versus blue bars).
The survey also shows that bankers find changes in regulation,
both local and at the EU level, also important. Somewhat
surprisingly, they do not see funding, especially local, as a
particularly important constraint.
Before I turn to the next topic, let us explore further the results of
the survey. Figure 9 shows the evolution over time of demand
and supply factors constraining credit growth. Again, if the
numbers are negative it means that things are getting worse.
Conversely, when the numbers are positive, it means that things
are getting better. According to this, conditions on the demand
side have stabilized and have even moved from very negative to
slightly positive. On the supply side, while becoming less
negative, the results indicate conditions are still deteriorating,
albeit at a slower pace. The next question here is what bankers
expected for the future. Will this get better or worse?
Interestingly, bankers expected both supply and demand to
improve markedly over the following six months. Before we
become overly optimistic, however, it is important to note that,
according to the survey last year, there was also the expectation
of a recovery, which did not fully materialize.
Policies put in place to support credit
Let me now move to the third part of the presentation. We have
so far looked at how bad the problem seems to be, and
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Figure 8. Factors Constraining Credit Supply
(As a net percentage of positive and negative responses)
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Note: Negative values indicate tightening credit conditions.

Figure 9. Outlook of Credit Supply and Demand Conditions
(As a net percentage of positive and negative responses)
40%
30%

2013 expectations

20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%

2014 expectations

-40%
-50%
12Q3 - 13Q1

Demand
13Q1 - 13Q3

Supply
13Q3 - 14Q1

14Q1 - 14Q3

Source: CESEE Lending Survey (H1-2014)
Note: Negative values indicate tightening credit conditions.

now we want to look at what policies have been put in place in
the region so far. For that, I want to use the results of an IMF
survey conducted late last year for 42 countries and questions
covering over 50 policy categories. The results of this survey
were published last year in the Global Financial Stability Report
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(GFSR), although for the case of the CESEE countries, the
survey was updated just two months ago.
Figure 10. Taking Stock of Credit Policies Implemented
Scope
42 countries, including CESEE
About 50 policy categories
 Measures enhancing credit supply
 Measures supporting credit demand
Note: detailed table available online at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/02/pdf/appendix2_1.pdf

Questions that were asked covered a wide array of measures to
enhance credit adopted in the region and elsewhere. This is not
to say that these measures are advisable. Clearly, some may not
be effective or, under certain conditions, may entail higher costs
than benefits. The purpose is to do a comprehensive survey of
measures adopted. On the supply side, there were 50 policies in
5 sub-categories: monetary policy, fiscal programs on credit,
supportive financial sector regulation, capital market measures,
and bank restructuring (Figure 11). On the demand side, it
covered measures related to corporate and household debt
restructuring, including government-led schemes, legal
approaches, and workout plans (Figure 12).
In Figures 13 and 14 below, “Y” denotes measures that have
been implemented. It does not describe the specific measures
taken or how deep or successful they have been. So it is a broad
look into the general areas where countries are moving, a bird’s
eye perspective of what has been done.
Let’s take a look at credit supply policies. The left side of the
table presents the responses for developed economies (both
European and non-European), while the right side presents the
results for CESEE economies. One of the first things that stands
out is that the column on bank restructuring is sparsely populated
in the case of CESEE, compared to developed economies. This is
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Figure 11. Policies Enhancing Credit Supply
Monetary policies
 Monetary policy operations
 Purchases of private sector assets
 Lending facilities to firms and households via banks
Fiscal programs
 Direct extension of loans to firms and households
 Subsidies and tax incentives
 Credit guarantees
Financial sector regulations

Reduction of RWs for SMEs

Forbearance on recognizing NPLs
Capital market measures

Promotion of corporate bond markets and securitization
Bank restructuring

Recapitalization programs

Asset purchases, and guarantees for bank assets

Figure 12. Policies Supporting Credit Demand
Corporate/ Household debt restructuring

Government-led scheme with contingent fiscal liabilities
o Debt restructuring using state-owned banks or asset
management companies
o Subsidy and tax incentives

Legal approach (without direct fiscal involvement)
o Moratorium on debt services
o Amendments to bankruptcy-related rules

Coordination to reach orderly workout plan

an interesting result given our finding from previous sections
that the problem of high NPLs is more acute in these countries.
As a first take, it appears to be an area in which much can still be
done.
Similarly, perhaps less significant, but still important, is the
result for capital market measures. In the responses received, not
a single CESEE country reported that they have adopted capital
market measures. While some countries may not be large
enough, it is an interesting result to keep in mind. For example,
the possibility of a regional approach comes to mind as a
possibility worth exploring.
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Figure 13. Credit Demand Policies Implemented Since 2007
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Figure 14. Credit Supply Policies Implemented Since 2007
Corporate Debt Restructuring
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Let’s move to the other side of the equation, that is, the demand
side. Compared to the supply side, here the picture is more
mixed. Let’s look at the implementation of corporate and
household debt restructuring across groups of countries. Starting
with the first column covering developed economies, while
implementation is rather mixed, it is interesting to note that all
the countries that faced the strongest impact of the crisis, the socalled periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), have
implemented both corporate and household debt restructuring
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schemes. In the case of the CESEE area, the picture is more
varied. In these countries, while some have implemented debtrestructuring programs, particularly for corporations, many have
not. While this is by no means definitive, the latter provides
some evidence that more could be done in this area. Of course, a
deeper analysis on a case-by-case basis, and taking into account
other factors would still be needed.
Before I conclude, let me qualify the analysis that we have so far
presented. First, ascertaining causes and effects is difficult. But it
is also essential to understand the root causes of low credit and
hence, the potential effectiveness of alternative measures to
revitalize it. While the econometric work presented above
incorporated to some extent the latter, there is further work that
could be carried out in this area. Also importantly, the analysis
presented above did not elaborate on the costs and benefits of the
alternatives measures, or on the medium-term financial
implications, including whether there is fiscal space. Nor did it
enter into the issue of the monetary framework, which clearly
has implications for the viability of some measures.
Nevertheless, despite these important qualifications, it should
provide a broad but useful framework to see where further
analysis and policy efforts could concentrate.
Figure 15. Policy Considerations

Policies are not
always effective…

… or, even
advisable

• Cause and Effect?
• Important to ascertain root causes

• medium-term financial stability implications (fiscal space, debt levels,
monetary framework, etc)

• Cost-benefit analysis is important
• Introduce distortions/ inefficiencies and weakened incentives
• for rigorous credit assessments
… and may entail • for bank or household debt restructuring
unintended
• Potential for significant fiscal implications
consequences
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The way forward
One key conclusion we derive is that the risk of a creditless
recovery appears significant for several countries in the CESEE
region and that spurring sustained credit growth requires actions
in both home and host countries, particularly the former
(Figure 16). A central issue here is the need to repair banks’
balance sheets, and also corporate and household balance sheets.
An area that appears particularly promising, despite serious
challenges in its implementation, is that of decisive actions to
deal with the problem of high NPLs. Other areas that also appear
to offer promise include corporate and household debt
restructuring efforts.
This presentation has focused primarily on the countries that are
facing low credit growth problems. A few countries, however,
are already experiencing vigorous growth, and raising different
policy questions, such as whether credit growth is
sustainable/excessive, and if so, the appropriate macroeconomic
policy mix (Figure 17).
With this let me conclude. This presentation provides a
justification and background for the four panels of this seminar:
repairing balance sheets; prospects for credit growth and foreign
bank engagement; measures to revive credit markets (best
practices and pitfalls); and risks of a new financial crisis.
Figure 16. Findings
Risks of a creditless recovery appear significant for several countries
• Spurring “sustained” credit growth requires actions in both home and host countries
• More proactive actions on debt restructuring and NPL resolution, appear particularly important
• Measures to repair corporate and household balance sheets also appear promising
• Other actions could also be considered, such as diversification of financing options, provided that
benefits are carefully weighted against costs
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Figure 17. Further Findings
Rapid credit expansion in a few countries raises the question of sustainability
• Is credit growth excessive?
• Appropriate macroeconomic policy mix?
• A possible role for appropriate macroprudential policies?
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IV. PANEL 1: REPAIRING BALANCE SHEETS AND
OTHER CHALLENGES

A. Summary
Panelists discussed the extent to which balance sheets in the
financial system and the corporate and household sectors
constrain credit growth in the CESEE region; the key
impediments to the repair of balance sheets; and how best to
address high levels of NPLs and high private and household
indebtedness. The discussion focused on practical considerations
to make meaningful progress both in the banking system, as well
as in the private and household sectors, given the experience in
the CESEE region as well as in the rest of Europe.
There was acknowledgement that credit is procyclical. On the
one hand, weak credit growth is to an extent a symptom of
stabilization from the imbalances that had built up before the
crisis. On the other hand, the financial crisis is likely to have
depressed credit levels beyond this correction. In this context,
several alternative explanations for weak credit growth, both on
the supply and demand side, were discussed.
Firstly, banks may not have sufficient funds to lend because of
weak balance sheets as a direct result of the crisis and the effects
of a high level of NPLs, toxic assets, and hidden off-balance
sheet activities. Secondly, credit may be suppressed due to
perceived underperformance of potential borrowers. The vicious
circle that emerges out of the banks' risk-aversion during the
downswing of the business cycle prevents growth, which results
in underperformance of potential borrowers and may potentially
further increase NPLs.
The discussion stressed that, while some advocate natural
processes for the resolution of weak balance sheets and low
credit, the process is usually too slow and proactive actions may
be necessary. Moreover, it pointed out that capital increases have
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not been sufficient or timely for much of the region. In this
connection, improvements are needed not only for banks’
balance sheets, but also for those of corporations and
households; this calls for actions that go beyond central bank
policies.
Going forward, panelists argued that the primary focus of the
policymakers in the CESEE region should be on improving the
quality of institutions and regulation. The argument was that
unnecessary barriers hindering NPL resolution, such as
inappropriate and inefficient insolvency and tax legislation that
causes delays in restructuring and raises confidence issues in
potential investors, should be removed. There were calls to
improve and reinforce risk management strategies and corporate
governance, and also to improve coordination of macroeconomic
policies. Monetary policy cannot alone provide a further demand
stimulus, so the fiscal stance and structural reforms should be
reconsidered, and institutional and legal frameworks should be
strengthened.

B. Presentations by Members of the Panel
Lead: Jan Švejnar, Columbia University and Vilem Semerak
(CERGE EI)
Quite a few issues have already been raised. I will go quickly
over those that have been covered and deal a little bit more with
some other ones.
The first thing to remind ourselves of is that credits are
procyclical. The literature indicates that credit supply is very
much procyclical, and that there are three key factors that hinder
the provision of credit: (i) banks may not have funds to lend;
(ii) companies may not be fit enough to borrow (collateral
constraints); and (iii) banks may have funds but cannot lend
because of regulatory constraints (poor health of banks versus
capital adequacy rules). In addition, customers may change their
evaluations of what will be happening in the future and may be
less willing to indebt themselves than before.
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Note that cases (ii) and (iii) above are directly related to the
balance sheets of borrowers (business sector) and banks (and
possibly other intermediaries), respectively.
Problems related to the financial crisis and subsequent recessions
(or slow recoveries):


Assets that turned “toxic”
o

Assets related to subprime market-linked derivatives
(Iceland, Cyprus, and Greek bonds)



Domestic NPLs



Additional issues



o

Hidden risks
agreements)

(“off-balance

sheet”

o

Additional pressure: Basel Leverage Rule

risks,

repo

New threats
o

Threats related to complicated relations with Russia

When we consider banks’ balance sheets, there are problems
related to the financial crisis and the subsequent recession(s)
and/or slow recoveries. There are assets that turn “toxic,” such as
the bonds of Iceland, Cyprus, and Greece (subprime market
linked derivatives), and there are domestic NPLs. Additional
issues are related to hidden risks (off-balance sheet activities,
repo agreements) and the Basel Leverage Rule. There are also
new threats related to complicated relations with Russia that
have emerged recently.
Let me say a few words about the CESEE region. NPLs in the
region are a legacy of fast credit growth before the crisis and one
observes a variety of performances. There are, for example,
countries with low shares of NPLs––Estonia, Slovakia, Poland,
and Czech Republic––and there are countries with high shares of
NPLs––Albania, Serbia, and Romania (see Figure 1). Moreover,
two issues can be observed in these situations: (i) data
deficiencies and possible underreporting (highlighted in the
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Vienna initiative report), and (ii) macroeconomic disequilibria in
countries with a high share of NPLs. The disequilibria act as
constraints on policymakers and increase the risk of further
shocks that may escalate the NPL problems.
So if you look at Figure 1, you see that on the left there are
countries that have relatively high shares of NPLs, which are
growing over time. These are the Baltic countries that have
reduced the share of NPLs to a low level, and countries such as
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia where the share is
steady at a relatively low level.
Figure 1. Bank Nonperforming Loans
(In percent of total gross loans)
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Figure 2 shows current account balances and balances of goods
and services as a share of GDP in the CESEE countries. It is
noteworthy that some of the same countries are at the extremes
as in Figure 1.
A somewhat similar picture emerges when we look at the
government budget surplus/deficit figures (Figure 3). It is
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Figure 2. External Disequilibria of CESEE Countries, Current
Account Balances, and Balances of Goods and Services
(In percent of GDP)
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Figure 3. Fiscal Disequilibrium, Cash Surplus/Deficit in 2012
(In percent of GDP)
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interesting that, even with a simple set of indicators, one can
start getting a sense of what is going on. The in-depth analysis
done by the IMF is naturally complementary.
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The process of cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets is affected
by economic growth and the time span under consideration. With
enough growth and time, many problems go away. Bankruptcies
of banks with the biggest problems and mergers and acquisitions
are also parts of the process. There are obvious problems with
natural processes. There are losses brought about by the lack of
trust, asymmetric information, and slow pace of the process.
There is also the chicken-and-egg problem—economic growth
will be achieved when the balance sheets are better, but balance
sheets improve when the economy starts to grow.
So what assistance can governments and regulators give? First, a
timely identification of risks is essential. Yet, this is not an easy
task because of international linkages and hidden risks. Second,
the government could provide support that would accelerate
takeovers of these “ill” banks by healthier partners. The question
that arises here is whether the government ought to provide
guarantees. Third, one could have swaps of NPLs and toxic
assets for higher quality bonds or other assets. This is usually
done by state-controlled asset management corporations. The
question is how often you can do this––just once when you, for
instance, establish the market system, or more frequently?
Fourth, there could be direct recapitalization––the state provides
additional capital and (temporarily) becomes a shareholder.


Efforts to reduce NPLs exist, but the results are weak
o



Share of NPLs has continued to increase in many
countries

Reduction of NPLs is an uphill struggle
o

Weak economic recoveries

o

Negative effects of lower quality institutions on the
quality of credit allocation and subsequent enforcement

o



Too slow enforcement of collateral



Company restructurings underutilized



Tax systems that hinder loan write-downs

Complications related to developments in Russia
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When examining NPL resolutions in the CESEE region, one
observes that there have been major efforts, but the results so far
have not been particularly impressive, as the share of NPLs has
continued to rise in many countries. Among the factors
contributing to this outcome, one notes weak economic
recoveries and the negative effects of underdeveloped
institutions on the quality of credit allocation and subsequent
enforcement. Institutional weakness often results in low reliance
on company restructuring and excessive reliance on a tax system
that hinders the write-down of loans. And of course, there are
complications related to the developments in Russia.
Examining the five-year (2007–12) change in NPLs in Figure 4,
one observes that Albania, Romania, Slovenia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria significantly increased their share of NPLs. The 2012–
13 data in Figure 5 indicate that this growth in NPLs continued
in spite of the awareness of the problem and the efforts to deal
with it.
Let me end with some implications for the CESEE region. The
primary focus should be on improving the quality of institutions
and the regulation and coordination of macroeconomic policies.
An emphasis also ought to be placed on removing unnecessary
barriers that hinder the resolution of the NPL problems
(e.g., burdensome insolvency legislation and tax barriers).
Finally, it is useful to adopt best practices observed in other
contexts (see e.g., the Vienna initiative report).
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Figure 4. Change in the Share of NPLs, 2007–12
(In percentage points)
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Figure 5. Change in the Share of NPLs, 2012–13

Source: World Development Indicators, online database (as of September 2014).
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Panelist 1: Josef Bonnici, Governor, Central Bank of Malta
Thank you. It is a pleasure for me to be here, and thank you,
Boštjan, for inviting me. I come from a country, which is not
part of the region we are focusing on, so I have been thinking
about what I can say that would add some input to this debate.
First of all, Malta has a relatively large financial sector, probably
the second largest in Europe after Luxembourg. The second
place used to be occupied by Cyprus, but things have changed
since then.
The banking crisis in Cyprus has focused attention on other
European countries with developed financial sectors. Malta came
under the spotlight as being similar to Cyprus as another small
country with a large banking sector.
However, the structure of the Maltese banking sector is very
different from the Cypriot one. In Malta, there is a clear
separation between international banks and core domestic banks.
The core domestic banking sector in Malta follows a traditional
banking model, relying mainly on resident deposits for its
funding and lending exclusively to the domestic economy. This
contrasts with the situation in Cyprus, where systemically
significant banks have taken on a large international role that
included large holdings of Greek paper and a large volume of
funds from outside the EU. In addition, unlike Cyprus, Malta’s
core domestic banks have very low reliance on non-resident
deposits. Cypriot banks made significant efforts to expand
overseas, especially in Greece, where banks’ exposure was
concentrated and which formed the starting point of the Cypriot
banking crisis.
Some 12 to 13 years ago, Malta followed the United Kingdom’s
example of separating supervision from the central bank and
setting up an independent authority in charge of national
financial supervisory tasks. According to the legislation in place,
the central bank was responsible for ensuring financial stability,
while the supervision was managed by another institution, the
Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). At the time, the
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credit market was booming and the Central Bank of Malta had
limited ability to supervise and control the situation in an active
manner.
More recently, the European Systemic Risk Board, the newly
established institution to oversee risk in the financial system as a
whole, came up with a recommendation for a financial stability
board or authority. I agreed with this proposal since this could
provide us the opportunity to influence the relationship between
the banking sector and the economy. In the local context, the
establishment by the Central Bank of Malta and the MFSA, of
the Joint Financial Stability Board (JFSB) was an important step
in the preparation for the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Amongst the issues that have been discussed by the JFSB was
the proposed revision of the Banking Rule BR/09/2008. The rule
deals with provisioning for NPLs, taking into account their
duration. It also calls for a specific buffer linked to the gap
between provisions and NPLs, and takes into account the
International Financial Reporting Standards’ accounting
definition of NPLs. There was a lot of resistance concerning the
NPLs from an accounting point of view. We introduced a
requirement of extra buffers that banks would be required to hold
over a period of three years. The reason we did this was also
because we felt that the banks, since they were profitable, should
allocate a higher portion of their profits to provisions for NPLs
rather than distributing them. This was a bone of contention
because the banks were very keen on distributing profits so that
their share prices keep going up. I kept on arguing, as my
predecessor did, that banks should make more provisions instead
of distributing profits. Still, the banks ignored my
recommendations. Accordingly, we reviewed the banking rule
dealing with the provisioning for NPLs, which had the result of
reducing distributable profits, but not to an alarming degree. This
initiative was undertaken at a time when banks were repairing
their balance sheets in view of the Asset Quality Review (AQR).
Recently, I came across a newly elected member of the European
Parliament who wanted to see me and know what I thought of all
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these bank changes and bank regulations. He said,
“…introducing all these regulations, doesn’t this mean that
banks will be less able to lend? Doesn’t this go against what is
now required for a high rate of economic growth?” And of
course, I explained that having a sound and healthy domestic
banking sector is an important necessity for economic growth,
and one should not rely on implicit government guarantees.
Today, economies can no longer be dependent on implicit
government aid, mainly due to the introduction of the bail-in
element. I have the impression that some mistakenly argue that
the pendulum has swung too far towards regulation at a time
when the economy is weak. In addition, people believe
economies have gone through harsh budgetary restrictions, so
that a relaxing of regulations is needed. This presents a
challenge, and although some gains have been made, some more
gains are yet to come, such as some type of common deposit
compensation scheme, which is in the background. At least some
improvements need to be made in this direction.
In the case of the Maltese economy, the banking sector has been
showing signs of weak credit growth, and at the same time,
NPLs have increased. Nevertheless, the economy keeps growing;
in fact, it is growing by about 3 percent. Unemployment is
falling, and employment growth is very strong due to the
increased participation rate and the inflow of people from
countries where low wages and high unemployment are causing
a human-capital flight.
When credit growth is negative, one has to examine also the
substance of the causes behind it. Again, because I come from a
very small country, I have the advantage that I can speak to all
presidents of the banks and their chief executives, and the story
differs from one institution to another. Sometimes the averaging
process hides the substance of the argument, because there are
cases in which a bank is restructuring and is still issuing new
credit while the old credit is being reduced because of balance
sheet repairs.
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Overall, it is possible to observe a negative credit growth within
an economy that is growing, so the overall situation may be not
that negative. This is one of the aspects that I have learned, that
is, one also needs to disentangle the information within the
aggregates.
Panelist 2: Boris Vujčić, Governor, Croatian National Bank
High credit growth rates and the significant rise in private sector
debt in the CEE countries prior to the onset of the global
financial crisis have generally not been perceived as a problem
or potential danger. The rationale behind this way of thinking
was based on the belief that these countries had been on their
natural way of catching up with more developed countries
through the process of real convergence. These “natural”
developments have been additionally stimulated by the high
level of global liquidity, low risk aversion, low interest rates in
developed markets, as well as the high share of foreign banks in
the banking sectors of most CEE countries, serving as an
efficient transferring channel for foreign capital in search of
higher returns. Despite the intensive catching-up process in the
pre-crisis period, CEE countries’ debt levels are still relatively
low compared to the advanced European economies, and neither
corporate nor household indebtedness seems to be excessive.
The level of corporate sector indebtedness in the majority of the
CEE countries is lower than both the commonly used threshold
of 80 percent of GDP and the EU average (Figure 1, top). A
similar analysis shows that, for the household sector, this picture
looks even better (Figure 1, bottom).
The world financial crisis and the accompanying recession
resulted in a substantial decline in the real income of households
and the corporate sector in the majority of the CEE countries.
Declining income and the worsening economic outlook reduced
sustainable debt levels, which in some countries prompted the
adjustment of the private sector’s balance sheet and resulted in
deleveraging.
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Figure 1. Corporate and Household Indebtedness
2003

2008

2008 EU average

2012 EU average

2012

140,0
120,0

as % of GDP

100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0

Slovenia

Slovakia

Slovakia

Romania

Poland

Hungary

Lithuania

2008
2012 EU average

Slovenia

2003
2008 EU average

Latvia

Croatia

Estonia

Czech Republic

Bulgaria

0,0

2012

as % of GDP

70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Source: Eurostat.

Romania

Poland

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Croatia

Estonia

Czech
Republic

Bulgaria

0

58
The adjustment of unsustainable levels of private sector debt,
particularly in households, to the sources available for the
servicing of this debt (current income and financial and real
assets) may lead to significant economic costs in view of the
importance of private consumption as one of the key generators
of economic growth. It is therefore vital to achieve a better
understanding of the process of household deleveraging,
particularly its required intensity and duration, which is a
prerequisite for creating adequate expectations of short-term and
medium-term economic growth and for developing
macroeconomic and macroprudential measures in line with the
fundamentals.
Household sector—is there a need for further adjustment?
The most common questions associated with household
indebtedness are related to the estimation of the necessary shortterm balance-sheet adjustment of the household sector, the
potential need for additional adjustments, and the driving forces
behind the adjustment. When analyzing levels of indebtedness,
the question is which benchmark to use––other CEE countries,
EU or euro area countries, or something else.
But even when the benchmark is chosen, there is still a question
of how to know whether a country is over-indebted or not. Stable
levels of debt in literature were until recently based on a static
threshold value determined on the basis of historical data such as
a specific pre-crisis level, positional value in the distribution of
debt of a group of countries4 or a trend level.5 According to the

4 The indicators of macroeconomic imbalances of the European Commission (MIP Scoreboard

Indicators) take (consolidated) private-sector debt-to-GDP ratio of 133 percent as the threshold
value.
5 Methodology of countercyclical capital buffers.
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new approach,6 the level of debt that is economically reasonable,
given the current level of income, should be determined based on
models taking into account key macroeconomic determinants.
The selection of the econometric method (and the estimator)
enables an individual approach and better identification of the
specific country features.
According to the usual indicators, it does not seem that the
household sector in the CEE countries is excessively indebted. If
the model for the non-risky level of indebtedness is estimated for
other countries, it is expected that most of them would not “flash
red.” Therefore, it could be concluded that the non-risky level of
indebtedness depends on the prospects for GDP growth and
household income growth, which are very difficult to predict.
This additionally complicates the estimation of the optimum
level of household indebtedness, making it almost impossible.
In order to assess the level of household sector indebtedness—
which is determined by key current macroeconomic factors and
is thus country- and period-specific—as well as to determine
which part of the necessary short-term balance-sheet adjustment
of the household sector in the EU countries has already been
made, the Croatian National Bank (CNB) has estimated a model
on the basis of quarterly data for 28 EU countries in the period
from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2013.
In 2013, in almost one-half of the observed countries,
households were on average capable, given the disposable
income, of taking on additional debt. Croatia belongs to a group
of countries with a relatively low need for further adjustment of
debt to the disposable amount of income (below 10 percent). If

6 Empirical research of a thus-specified optimum level of debt has only appeared recently, mainly

for the United States; please see Albuquerque B. et al. (2014): Has U.S. Household Deleveraging
Ended? A Model-based Estimate of Equilibrium Debt, ECB Working Paper Series 1643.
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the countries for which the estimated model did not prove to be
statistically significant are excluded from the analysis, in the
process of adjustment, under existing conditions, 5 percent of
deviations should be eliminated within a period of one to three
years (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Household Indebtedness in the EU
Indebtedness at the end of 2013
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In the period of strong credit expansion and economic growth in
Croatia, the aggregate creditworthiness of households, measured
by the economically justified level of indebtedness, rose steadily,
so the underestimation of the realized levels of household debt
compared to those implied by the fundamentals left room for
further borrowing. However, with the slowdown in economic
growth in early 2007, the potential for further borrowing first
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started to decline, and then vanished completely with the
outbreak of the global financial crisis and its spillover to the
domestic real sector. The last six years of recorded recession in
Croatia prompted households to adjust their credit liabilities to
some degree to their disposable income (by approximately
10 percent since end-2008). However, this debt reduction was on
average slower than the fall in income, with the result that in the
entire recession period the need for further short-term household
deleveraging fluctuated around a relatively low four percent
(Figure 3).
Figure 3. Observed and Modeled Level of Indebtedness for Croatia
Deviations
Estimated indebtedness

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10

as % of household disposable income

90

Q3/03
Q1/04
Q3/04
Q1/05
Q3/05
Q1/06
Q3/06
Q1/07
Q3/07
Q1/08
Q3/08
Q1/09
Q3/09
Q1/10
Q3/10
Q1/11
Q3/11
Q1/12
Q3/12
Q1/13
Q3/13

as %of household disposable income

Observed indebtedness

Sources: Eurostat and CNB calculations.
Note: The modeled level of household indebtedness is shown as a four-quarter moving
average.

Corporate balance sheet—in need of repair
The average profitability of Croatian companies is lower than in
the majority of EU countries, resulting in a relatively high debt
burden compared to profits. Croatian corporate sector
profitability has been relatively poor even during the pre-crisis
period, while the ongoing recession has just worsened the
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already negative trends (Figures 4 and 5). There are many lossmaking enterprises, among which companies from the
construction sector dominate.
Figure 4. Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) for
the Corporate Sector
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Indicators presented in Figures 4 and 5 lead to the conclusion
that the need to repair corporate balance sheets stems from poor
profitability rather than from elevated debt. In practice, this
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means that efforts to restructure the corporate sector and improve
its profitability should be stepped up, while debt reduction might
not resolve the underlying issue of inefficient capital allocation.
Figure 5. EBITDA over Interest on Financial Debt and EBT over
EBIT
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Croatia has taken the first step in that direction by introducing
pre-bankruptcy settlement (PBS) in order to foster corporate
restructuring and resolution of NPLs. PBS started in late 2012
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and represents a temporary (one-off) “Chapter 11” type of
procedure aimed at fostering corporate restructuring. About
6,600 companies entered into this procedure, which is 7 percent
of the total number of companies, and they employ about 55,000
people, against 850,000 in the corporate sector. An analysis of
the capital-to-asset ratio and return-on-assets ratio of companies
in the PBS procedure and the rest of the nonfinancial sector
shows that companies in the PBS are loss-making with high
leverage, which is a result of little or no capital (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Capital-to-Asset Ratio/Return on Assets
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Banks’ exposure to these companies amounts to
HRK 0.5 billion, which is approximately 10 percent of all banks’
corporate exposures. About 50 percent of bank clients in PBS are
from construction activities, but it should be noted that a
significant part of professional, scientific, and technical activities
are also closely linked to construction (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Structure of Banks’ Clients in Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements
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The first preliminary analysis conducted after a year and a half
from its introduction shows that PBS still has a long way to go,
but according to the percentage of reached or executed
agreements, PBS for bank clients seems to be progressing
slightly better than for the others (Figure 8). Ensuring profitable
business models still remains one of the biggest challenges,
together with the fact that most of these companies need fresh
capital.
When to react?
One of the main conclusions based on the analysis of private
sector indebtedness is that it is almost impossible to know if
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Figure 8. Progress in Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements—All Companies vs.
Bank Clients

30.3%

34.9%
Agreement reached or
executed
Business plan accepted or
being modified
Process started or sent to
council
Agreement refused,
abandoned or delayed

12.3%
22.5%

23.7%

46.5%

Agreement reached or
executed
2.5%

Business plan accepted
or being modified
Process started or sent
to council

27.3%

Agreement refused,
abandoned or delayed

Source: Financial Agency.

there is too much credit or not. From the central bank's point of
view, this presents a major challenge; yet it also encourages the
view that policymakers should react not necessarily only to the
level, but also to the rate/pace of credit growth. This means that
if credit is growing rapidly, the central bank should act, even if
models do not show explicitly that the growth pace is excessive.
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Therefore, if the credit growth rate is high, and the analysis
shows that there are signs of overheating in the economy—even
without analytical confirmation of an excessively high
indebtedness level—it would be reasonable to conduct a policy
aimed at slowing down credit activity. The Croatian case
confirms this conclusion. In the pre-crisis period, the CNB had
introduced a set of monetary and macroprudential measures
aimed at restraining both credit growth and the buildup of
external vulnerabilities. Although these measures were criticized
at the time, the crisis has proven that the rationale for introducing
such a set of measures was right. Therefore, despite the fact that
analytical tools and models often present the main tool for
making decisions, which is good and necessary, central bankers
and all other market participants should always be aware of the
potential limitations of these models.
Low credit activity—what could be done?
When trying to find an answer for stagnating credit activity in
banks’ balance sheets, the high level of NPLs in the CEE
countries is usually seen as one of the main credit growth
constraints. But this is true only if NPLs are not adequately
provisioned. If a bank has an adequate provisioning policy, it is
possible to dispose of NPLs or put them into the asset booth and
manage them separately, leaving enough room for granting new
loans. Conversely, if NPLs are not adequately provisioned,
banks may lose a lot of energy in trying to evergreen and
restructure them in order to hide the real situation in the balance
sheet, which they should actually show to their shareholders,
owners, and depositors.
This implies that regulators in that area have a very important
role. Considering the fact that Croatia has a higher NPL ratio
than the EU average, the above reasons motivated the CNB to
tighten provisioning standards in order to deal with the seizure of
collateral and related procedures which create obstacles to an
efficient unwinding of NPLs (Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Nonperforming Loans Ratio
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If a bank does not adequately tackle the loan-resolution process,
regardless of collateral, it has to increase the provisioning level
progressively over time. This means that if banks have NPLs,
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they should make the necessary provisions, even if the loan is
fully collateralized, amounting to at least 30 percent of the loan
value two years after delinquency, and then 5 percent
subsequently every six months. At some point it will become
very unreasonable for banks to wait, and the measure will serve
as an incentive to clean up the balance sheet in order to dispose
of NPLs.
The other very important factor for repairing and cleaning banks’
balance sheets is the surroundings in which banks operate. In
that sense, the CEE countries do not represent a stimulating
environment, primarily due to the fact that creditor protection
rights are relatively weak as seizure of collateral is often very
difficult, sometimes even impossible. This represents a serious
obstacle in disposing of NPLs. This problem is very difficult to
solve even if distressed debt managers are engaged; they also
face the same (usually) legal problems as it gets very
complicated to seize collateral or to dispose of collateral without
entering into uncharted legal waters. Thus, one of the key issues
for increasing the efficiency of NPL resolution is improving the
legal environment in which banks—as well as potential buyers
of distressed debt—operate. Unfortunately, it is impossible to
make these changes in a short period of time, meaning that banks
still have to rely on their prudent policies, as well as on forwardlooking regulators.
The high share of NPLs is also related to the elevated probability
of default, which may induce banks to grant less credit. If the
quality of loans is analyzed according to their vintage, it can be
observed that more recent loans have a lower probability of
default, while the most problematic loans are those which
originated in the period from 2003 to 2008. During the crisis,
banks have tightened their lending standards and extended less
credit, and the quality of these loans has been better than that of
the loans granted during the boom period. Banks' behavior is
determined not only by models, but also by people who are
running the banks, meaning that the quality of granted loans does
not only depend on models and risk analysis, but also on the
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quality of bank management—a factor that is often neglected in
the debates on how to ensure good loan quality.
Concluding remarks
It is not clear that credit growth is crucial for growth as such. A
detailed analysis reveals that the main problem lies in corporate
balance sheets that need to be repaired primarily because of low
profitability. The ROE of companies is an important indicator in
this regard and points to the heart of the problem. Efforts to
restructure the corporate sector and its profitability are needed,
and for that purpose Croatia has introduced PBS.
In practice, too much emphasis is generally put on credit growth
as a way of problem solving. There is no clear evidence that
more credit is necessarily related to stronger economic growth.
This broken link has been confirmed by the Croatian data as
well, as Croatia had the highest rate of credit growth in the EU
over the last five years and one of the lowest rates of GDP
growth. I would say that we should look again at the familiar
evidence from international finance and open macroeconomics,
which has taught us that there is usually enough capital, but the
issue is how good and how efficient is the process of financial
intermediation. If the intermediary directs capital into the wrong
sector or company, this will certainly reflect on the future level
of NPLs and reduce the countercyclical potential of the banking
sector in the downturn.
In that context, the main challenge is to find a long-term viable
growth model based on an improved allocation of capital and
underlying corporate profitability, which will simultaneously
improve the debt sustainability arithmetic. The first task, in that
sense, is to repair corporate sector balance sheets, rather than
focus on banks’ balance sheets and credit.
Panelist 3: José Ramalho, Vice Governor, Banco de Portugal
In Portugal, we have a long experience of dealing with unsound
balance sheets that can be useful for other countries. There are
three main ideas. First, we made a lot of mistakes, so if you can
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avoid them, good for you; second, we had some success in
correcting balance sheets and so if the measures that we have
taken are useful for you, that’s also good; and third, we still have
a lot of work to do.
As you can see, over-indebtedness is a serious situation in
Portugal, not only in the public sector but also in the private
sector. The figures we have are much higher than those
presented by my neighbor Boris Vujčić, on Eastern Europe debt.
The household debt ratio was above 100 percent and the
corporate debt ratio was above 140 percent of GDP in 2010. The
private sector debt accumulation was reflected in a strong
expansion of banks’ balance sheets that showed signs of
unhealthy developments. Then, in 2010, we lost market access
and, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, we had to ask for
an adjustment program, which started in 2011.
The program had three pillars. One of them was financial
stability, which involved several work streams and several
instruments. There is one instrument that I would like to
highlight because it has proven to be very useful for us. This
instrument is the Funding and Capital Plans. These are quarterly
forward-looking reports that banks had to prepare and that have
proven instrumental in enabling the central bank to gear the
adjustment of banks’ balance sheets towards the capital and
funding targets.
The main results overall have been very positive; by 2013, we
had a much healthier financial situation. The borrowing needs or
the lending capacity of every domestic sector has improved. The
country achieved a net lending capacity, i.e., an external surplus,
after several years with an external deficit close to 10 percent of
GDP. And we are now seeing debt repayment flows from
corporations to banks and from banks to the central bank and to
the external sector. Debt ratios started to improve very clearly in
the household sector. In the corporate sector, this improvement is
more recent and more limited. The public sector debt ratio is
expected to start declining this year, but I will leave the public
sector out of this presentation.
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Now, concerning the banks, results were broadly positive.
Solvency strengthened significantly, liquidity and funding
structure became much more stable. We have been able to
manage a more or less orderly process of balancing deleveraging
needs with the financing of the economy. This was particularly
challenging, because we needed to deleverage but at the same
time we could not leave the economy without finance. Here I
would like to make two points. Firstly, a large part of
deleveraging was done by reducing external assets. This was the
case in Portugal; maybe it is not possible in other countries.
Secondly, credit has declined, but we have evidence that some
degree of discrimination has been achieved in favor of the most
dynamic sectors. This is very positive, because, as the Governor
of the Bank of Slovenia said, the allocation of credit is crucial
when you are deleveraging. And then the inevitable weak point
is the NPLs. NPLs have increased a lot because of two factors––
economic recession and stricter supervisory action by the Bank
of Portugal. Because of that, banks have recorded losses for three
years in a row and only in 2014 are they returning to
profitability, if we exclude Banco Espírito Santo, which is an
idiosyncratic case.
Let’s turn to households. The developments have also been very
positive. Households have improved the capacity to service their
debts and the incentives to engage in new borrowing have been
reduced. What I would like to highlight is that these positive
developments were the result of a combination of different
policies and changes in behavior. There was a change in the
savings behavior of households that adjusted consumption
downwards and consequently increased their savings rate and net
lending capacity. Monetary policy also made a contribution in
this particular sector, namely because there was a pass-through
of lower interest rates to existing mortgages that benefited
existing mortgage borrowers. There was also a contribution from
structural reforms, particularly through the development of the
housing rental market that decreased the demand for housing
credit. And there was also a contribution from fiscal policy—the
tax deduction of mortgage interest payments was sharply
reduced for old loans and actually eliminated for new loans; this
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also reduced the demand for housing credit. Debt ratios benefited
from these measures and started to decline consistently, and
there were no major problems of debt restructuring or household
over-indebtedness.
In regard to corporations, the story is more complex. There we
had more mixed results because there were many more blocking
factors that prevented a holistic approach from being fully
pursued. And so this led us to launch a corporate debt
restructuring program with the following key points:
discriminate between the viable and nonviable firms; restructure
viable firms; and resolve or liquidate the nonviable firms. The
major problems that we are trying to overcome are the risk of
evergreening temptations by banks, the lack of coordination
among creditors and with debtors, and the blocking power of
debtors. There are multiple measures that were implemented or
are in preparation under the program, including microprudential
supervision actions, changes in insolvency regimes and other
legal changes, the reinforcement of the role of the credit
mediator, and different measures to promote the capitalization of
firms.
Lessons learned. The first set of lessons has to do with
monitoring and prevention; this is crucial. Monitoring market
development is not enough; it may lead to complacency and
delayed action, and we have been misled by that in a way. We
also need to carefully monitor information on the behavior of
economic agents, namely the savings evolutions and patterns,
balance sheet structures, and all that; particular attention needs to
be given to credit growth. Another lesson is that the financial
sector is instrumental in the process of debt accumulation. So it
is very important to have sound policies for banks. Now we have
macroprudential policy instruments that we did not have at the
time, and we hope that they will be very useful in the future.
A second set of lessons has to do with correction, once we are in
a situation of excessive debt. One lesson is that the correction of
over-indebtedness is very likely to have recessionary impacts, as
economic agents’ attempts to restore or improve their debt-
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servicing capacity in a stressful situation are likely to negatively
affect consumption and investment. A second lesson is that bank
deleveraging is important, but it is not enough. The central bank
has a strong influence on the balance sheets of banks and can—
to some extent—gear the correction of these balance sheets. But
this is not enough to correct balance sheets of households and
corporates. And for those other balance sheets, we need what we
call a holistic policy response––the combination of different
policies, addressing both stock issues and flow issues. This
response involves contributions from conventional monetary
policy, non-conventional monetary policy, prudential measures,
fiscal policy, and—last but not least—structural reforms. The
latter vary from country to country; but in our case, they have
proven to be very, very important—namely the change in the
legal framework.
Panelist 4: Stanislava Zadravec Caprirolo, Vice Governor,
Bank of Slovenia
The issues to address are the lessons from recent developments,
the challenges ahead, and the policy response to the challenges.
To begin with, we could ask: what happened; why it happened;
what was the policy response; where are we now; and what
further challenges do we face?
The broad picture as to where we currently stand—as has already
been discussed by previous presenters—is that we are facing
very weak and constrained credit activity, not only in Europe but
also globally. The observed credit dynamics are the result of
country-specific factors and a mix of drivers that are common
across countries, and are propagated by globalization and
financial integration. We have to take into account such
interactions when defining either common or country-specific
policies at the European level or globally. We also need to take
into account that we are limited and constrained by not having
had some of the tools available, let’s say, 20 years ago (before
the single monetary system). Also, the effectiveness of available
tools is different and policy framework conditions and
circumstances have changed. In such a context, some policy
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responses might not have the appropriate feedback or desired
impact.
The common drivers of the crisis affecting us include: financial
losses; the freezing of the interbank market and the sudden stop
of capital flows; financial disintegration; and weak aggregate
demand. While countries are commonly affected by these
factors, they also exhibit specific conditions prior to the crises
that magnify the effects––such as financial bubbles, highly
leveraged corporate and household sectors, and so forth.
Policy responses have been similar at the global and countryspecific level, and they have consisted mainly of balance sheet
repair. The questions for today, particularly regarding banks, are:
(i) Are the banks’ balance-sheet repairs sufficient to move
countries to a sustained growth path? (ii) Are the banks’ balance
sheets still subject to risk pressures? The response to both
questions is clearly “No.” But then, what are the additional
policies that we have to follow and push forward? Countryspecific policies have to tackle the specific weaknesses of
nonfinancial private-sector balance sheets and address specific
structural issues. In Marco Piñón’s presentation, the policy
responses of different countries taken so far were reviewed. The
presentation focused on the financial market response and the
well-coordinated fiscal policy response during the first phase of
the crisis. But now there is clearly need to refocus the policy
responses beyond the financial sector, on both the global and
country-specific levels.
In the list of priorities, it is not only the problem of credit supply
that needs to be tackled, but also the problems of weak overall
aggregate demand and weak confidence, which are holding back
credit dynamics and recovery. Credit supply constraints, as we
are aware, have been mainly addressed over the past five years.
But the supply still remains constrained, and the question is why.
Is it because there is not enough liquidity and/or capital, or is it
because certain channels are not yet functioning; or are there
other drivers affecting confidence?
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Without doubt, on the aggregate demand side, there are also
constraints to be addressed. Let me focus briefly on the
Slovenian case, to just underline the broad versus specific
dimensions that influence not only the policies that need to be
agreed and measures to be taken, but also their effectiveness.
Slovenia already experienced a banking crisis 20 years ago. The
policy responses at that time in terms of the banking system were
pretty much the same as those being taken currently. Policy
measures included state recapitalization of banks and the sett-up
of an entity to deal with NPLs removed from banks. However, a
few elements of the policy set-up were very different and had a
bearing on the policy outcome. One is whether or not to have an
independent monetary policy. Clearly, within the monetary
union, we have a common coordinated monetary policy; but its
effect differs across countries. Thus, to ensure the desired
effects, country-specific policy measures have to be focused on
additional policies to achieve a given outcome. Another
consideration is the global dimension of the crisis and the
weakness of aggregate demand. Is this weakness countryspecific, limited to the euro area or global? It seems that weak
aggregate demand that affects country-specific recovery is a
more common problem, particularly at the euro area level, and is
linked also to a lack of confidence that—of course—overlaps
with country-specific conditions. The third important issue that
is different in the current crisis is the institutional framework
with global implications (i.e., regulation), particularly state aid
rules and regulation affecting EU countries.
Now let me turn to supply and demand shocks affecting credit
activity, and those affecting Slovenia in particular.
Supply shocks were broadly similar across the globe, affecting
most large economies with few exceptions. An initial shock was
the shutdown of interbank markets and the consequent liquidity
crunch. The second was a fundamental shock to banks’ capital;
equity losses in the banking system were followed by the
reversal of wholesale funding. There were not only sudden stops
of capital flows but also their reversal, which still continues in
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some countries today. In some cases, like Slovenia, the capital
flows were also affected by insufficient and untimely capital
increases. Banking fundamentals, liquidity, and capital are those
that really matter with regard to the credit supply. Insufficient
and untimely capital increases triggered a confidence shock and
deposit outflows in 2012 and 2013, in addition to those of bank
deposits. The available supply of funds was strongly affected by
the sizable private outflows (nonfinancial corporations and
households) in 2013 (4.7 percent of GDP), which was similar to
that of banks. But credit recovery does not depend only on
supply but also on shocks affecting demand, which in Slovenia
were very similar to the experiences of other countries. In
particular, the collapse of domestic demand, weak external
demand, and leveraged nonfinancial companies increased credit
risk on the back of a collapse in asset prices, and consequently
also resulted in the tightening of credit standards.
The policy response evolved over time and was underlined by
the global, broad policy responses of the U.S. Federal Reserve
(Fed) and the ECB, and then by specific-country responses.
Some affected credit supply, which is the first step to be taken
but definitely not the only one. Now policies should address
primarily the demand side, hopefully, with a faster speed than
those addressing supply constraints.
What is the current state of affairs?
The banking sector is in general stable, liquidity is ample, capital
is robust enough, and confidence has returned to some extent in
terms of deposit behavior. But there are some extremely
important elements to be addressed. These are the interbank
market channel and interest rate differentials. The question of
confidence is of utmost importance in this respect.
What should be done to restore credit growth, confidence, and
cross-border flows—especially within the weak economic
environment where other alternative sources of financing are
also limited?
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The new supervisory infrastructure is now set up. The AQR
exercise and the stress testing of banks’ balance sheets before
entering into the Single Supervisory Mechanism is designed with
the objective of restoring confidence by increasing transparency.
It remains to be seen whether the expectations of this policy
decision and measure are going to bring further positive effects
in terms of restoring confidence in the banking sector and
renewing cross-border flows. Aggregate demand is the key
challenge to be tackled by policy responses now, which
definitely goes beyond monetary policy. Balance-sheet repair of
the nonfinancial sector is also a key policy priority. But on the
other hand, there is also a need for policies to find the very
delicate balance between structural reforms, in terms of their
impact on aggregate demand, and fiscal stance in the medium
term. There is a need for an overall EU fiscal stance to address
the issue of aggregate demand and structural supply policies that
should encompass the deleveraging of corporate and household
sectors. This is particularly important because the fiscal space of
many countries is quite constrained, while on the other hand, the
monetary policy cannot do the job alone to further push the
demand side.
With this I conclude and look forward to your remarks.

C. Discussions
Following the presentations, participants from the floor—several
of them members of other panels—posed questions and raised
important issues for discussion by the members of the panel.


Participants acknowledged the critical importance of
addressing weak balance sheets—whether for banks,
corporations, or households.



However, they questioned whether the discussion was
over-emphasizing the need for credit growth. Several
examples were given in which lower levels of credit, or
credit growth, have been associated with higher GDP
growth, and vice versa. In particular, when much of the
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credit goes to the wrong sector, as happened in many
CESEE countries before the crisis, countries end up with
problems later on—such as high NPLs, or even a
sovereign debt crisis.


Participants also asked whether enough emphasis has
been placed on the appropriateness or viability of the
business models followed by banks and corporations. In
this sense, high NPLs in the bank’s balance sheets may
not be so much a result of the level of indebtedness in
corporations but rather a reflection of their
fundamentals. In this connection, it was posited whether
the problem is the banking model and whether the issue
is how to create the right incentives for banks to start
lending to highly dynamic, productive, and innovative
firms.



Several participants questioned whether there had been
an overreliance on monetary easing, which may have
delayed needed reforms—including NPL resolution—
and, hence, the recovery. Prolonged easing can delay the
recognition of losses, while low interest rates can lead
banks to overestimate payment capacity and to keep
nonviable and nonproductive businesses. Failing to
resolve the NPL issue and allowing nonviable
corporations to continue to operate increases the cost of
funding for the viable economy and slows down
economic growth.

Panelists’ responses to questions and comments
Credit level and funding. One panelist emphasized that the
credit level is indeed important and that the funding channel is a
part of what has to be restored. Some countries still lag behind in
the recovery process because they have little diversification of
funding sources. Other funding instruments have to be
developed, particularly those that would benefit SMEs; for
example, there is no equity channel. A policy is needed, and it is
interesting that in the IMF survey presented in this seminar, none
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of the CESEE countries had implemented any capital market
measures.
Allocation of credit. A panelist warned about the risks of having
central banks—and authorities, in general—conducting a kind of
industrial policy and channeling credits to certain sectors of the
economy to the detriment of other sectors. This must be left to
banks, because it requires micro information at the firm level.
Central banks cannot be a substitute for adequate risk
management by banks.
Restructuring the financial system. Another panelist noted that
this crisis has provided an opportunity to restructure the financial
system, and it should be taken. To start a recovery, nonviable
firms should be simply resolved and new ones should emerge. In
this connection, having adequate provision for NPLs helps
because then banks can more easily dispose of bad assets.
Moreover, the companies can get rid of the debt and start from
scratch, with some even getting some equity in.
For example, in the United States, compared to Europe,
recognition of losses and repair of balance sheets was easier
because there is no recourse credit. If people cannot pay, they
return their keys to the bank. Also, on the asset side of bank
balance sheets, you had mostly mark-to-market assets, which
entailed an immediate haircut, realized losses, and the need to
recapitalize the banks.
Monetary accommodation. In response to the concern that
monetary accommodation could delay the restructuring reform,
one panelist warned that this has to be put into the context of
where we stand in terms of expected inflation. If there is a
possibility that one can get stuck in a prolonged deflation
situation, monetary accommodation is necessary. On how to
stimulate new investments in SMEs, risk-sharing schemes have
been implemented in some countries, which have been
successful.
Studies and experiments. A panelist emphasized that
econometric analysis confirms that firms that go bankrupt
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actually look pretty bad several years beforehand. If the banks
paid attention and were willing to cut off lending at an earlier
stage, they could probably avoid some of the NPLs. Moreover,
there have been a number of experiments in the region on
noncollateral-type lending, based on well-prepared business
plans and cash flows. Econometric studies confirm that these
seem to perform as well as the traditional collateral based loans.
It may be good to know in future discussions why they have not
been utilized more.
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V. PANEL 2: PROSPECTS FOR CREDIT GROWTH
AND FOR FOREIGN BANK ENGAGEMENT IN THE
REGION

A. Summary
The panel reviewed prospects for credit growth and foreign bank
engagement in the region, against the background of concerns
that the global financial crisis and global regulatory reform were
causing foreign banks to rein in their exposures to the region,
thereby impairing credit and growth.
The panel considered a range of issues. First, has credit growth
been unduly impaired and, if so, what factors have been at work?
The panel generally acknowledged that credit growth has slowed
in recent years, and that in many cases this has been a cause for
concern. As for the reasons for weak credit growth, three main
factors have been identified: the high level of NPLs; pressures to
boost capital, both domestically and internationally; and tighter
regulation and supervision, both at home and abroad. However,
some emphasized that weak credit growth was not being
universally felt within the CESEE, and this diversity of
experience illustrated that macroeconomic fundamentals were
also an important driver.
Others argued that deleveraging was the natural consequence of
earlier credit excess, and therefore could not be avoided. And, by
the same token, they cautioned that it was more important to
address the structural constraints to credit than to take measures
to subsidize or otherwise boost lending. These latter steps risk
distorting the allocation of loanable funds, imposing fiscal costs,
and could retard the more fundamental adjustments needed.
Moreover, some warned that it would be important to take these
steps quickly, since the current global environment is relatively
favorable and the process of repairing balance sheets could be
even more difficult once monetary conditions became less
accommodative.
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The panel also touched on the effect of regulatory reforms, at
both the EU and international levels. It was recognized, as shown
in bank surveys, that stricter capital and liquidity requirements
has dampened credit provision, but the consensus view was that
this was a necessary step to promote a more stable financial
system in the long run. Moreover, it was recognized that the
effects of regulation would be offset, at least in part, by
improving confidence and lowering the cost of bank financing.
Regarding reforms at the EU level, these too were viewed as
favorable; but concern was expressed about the rules governing
"state aid," whose complexity could impair the ability of
jurisdictions to respond quickly and effectively to systemic
threats.
The panel debated the merits of domestic versus foreign
ownership of banks, as well as the role this has played in
dampening credit. Some argued strongly that foreign banks––
especially those that were larger, diversified, and well
established––has brought considerable benefit to the CESEE
before the crisis, improving the efficiency of intermediation and
improving access to credit—especially for the corporate sector.
During the crisis they had shown better financial performance,
experiencing lower levels of NPLs and managing to maintain
higher levels of credit.
Others suggested that the distinction between foreign and
domestic banks was overstated. These panelists emphasized
more the role of management in explaining divergences in
performance, the level of competition among banks, and the
importance of both home and host supervisors in ensuring the
soundness of risk management. It was suggested that it was
important to ensure that foreign banks showed a long-term
commitment to their host country, including by listing their
equity on the local stock market.
Structural issues were also identified as a potential factor
explaining differences in credit growth. Notably, uncertainties
about the legal structures in some CESEE countries—including
those governing collateral collection, or the application of
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sanctions as a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict—were seen
as driving the willingness to extend credit across borders.
Moreover, while several panelists welcomed efforts to reduce the
reliance of banks on short-term wholesale funding, they
recognized that this was likely to adversely affect the willingness
and ability of parent banks to fund their foreign subsidiaries.
This argued for steps to improve access by banks to alternative
sources of long-term funding.
Several panelists also stressed the importance of steps to address
the high level of NPLs in the CESEE. However, it was
acknowledged that this was complicated because these NPLs
largely reflected loans to the corporate sector, and were
concomitantly harder to resolve given weaknesses in existing
legal frameworks and the fact that NPLs were in many cases
held by state-owned banks—and thus political hurdles would
need to be addressed in the event of foreclosure.
The panel expressed a range of views on the role of state banks
in the recovery process. Some argued that state banks had in
many countries performed poorly in the crisis and that these
banks had grown in importance as a result of bail-outs. They
worried that state involvement in credit allocation could lead to
inefficiencies and (ultimately) fiscal costs, and they suggested
that countries would be well served to act decisively and quickly
to divest their ownership stakes. Others took a more sanguine
view, arguing that divestment was less important than ensuring
that state banks were subject to proper governance structures that
ensure they operated under sound commercial principles.
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B. Presentations by Members of the Panel
Lead: Christopher Towe, Deputy Director, Monetary and
Capital Markets Department, IMF7
Introduction
Let me begin by saying how honored I am to be able to chair this
session, which allows us to try and tackle a set of issues that are
hugely relevant for the region—which has been struggling for
the last several years to reinvigorate credit, especially by foreign
banks.
Fortunately, my panelists are both distinguished and deeply
knowledgeable of the underlying problem and policy challenges.
My role principally is to try and lay out a framework for the
discussion and trust my panelists to follow up with a more
substantive discussion.
The issues before us, I think, can be distilled into the following
three questions:
1) Do we think economic activity will be supported by
credit, and what conditions need to be in place for
this to happen?
2) To what extent should we fear that regulatory
reforms, including Basel III and the Banking Union,
will have an inappropriate impact on foreign bank
engagement in the region?

7 Mr. Towe’s remarks were co-authored by Jeanne Gobat, Senior Economist, Monetary and
Capital Markets Department, IMF.
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3) What will be the implications for credit growth as
foreign banks rely increasingly on local funding?
Will credit support the incipient recovery?
The good news is that most data suggest that economic growth is
picking up in the region. In our April 2014 World Economic
Outlook (WEO) projections, the CESEE—excluding Russia and
Turkey—was projected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2014 compared
to 1.2 percent in 2013. Our more recent projections are still
being finalized, and it’s possible that global and regional growth
forecasts may be revised down slightly—partly owing to the
intensification of geopolitical tensions. But we still see the
region as continuing on the recovery path.
The less good news is that credit growth for the region, including
cross-border lending, has remained sluggish compared to other
emerging market regions. Indeed, while the Bank for
International Settlements’ (BIS) quarterly report that was
released last week showed that cross-border lending has
rebounded generally, an important exception that of was
emerging Europe, where cross-border credit fell for the fourth
consecutive quarter.
This suggests that, while the aftershocks of the global financial
crisis may have receded for many regions, the hangover is still
being felt here.
And as my colleague, Marco Piñón, has already pointed out, the
EIB’s most recent survey of bank lending suggests that credit
conditions are likely to remain tight over the next six months.
This survey is very informative about the factors that are likely
to act as a drag on bank lending, and quite clearly suggests that
there are both home-grown and international factors at play.
At home, the survey suggests that three factors are most
important: (i) the high level of NPLs; (ii) domestic regulatory
reform; and (iii) looking forward to the next six months, concern
that local market conditions may weigh on credit.
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On the international front, the survey suggests that credit is being
dampened by: (i) EU-level regulatory reforms; (ii) group-wide
NPLs; (iii) levels of bank capital at the group level; and
(iv) growing unease about market conditions.
Should we be concerned about the weak prospects for credit
growth in the region? I think the answer is an unequivocal “yes.”
This issue has been studied extensively by my colleagues in the
IMF’s Research Department, who conclude that—when
recessions are associated with a credit crunch and asset price
bust—output recoveries tend to be creditless, and that these
creditless recoveries are usually suboptimal since the downturns
are deeper and the recoveries slower than otherwise.
This reflects not just the overhang of debt from the credit boom
but also the dampening effects of balance sheet impairments,
weak local capital markets, and limited access to foreign
funding.
What are the policy messages of these findings? I would not
suggest that the answer is to drive up credit at all costs, since
credit is neither necessary nor sufficient to drive an economic
recovery—especially when the recession reflects the hangover
from a credit boom.
And policies to promote credit that are distortionary, impose
undue fiscal burdens, or diminish incentives for balance-sheet
clean-up should be avoided.
Instead, I would argue for steps to fix the plumbing that is
clogging up the credit channel; policymakers need to:


promote the recognition and resolution of NPLs;



adopt clear and credible plans for addressing capital
shortfalls where they may exist;



take strong supervisory action when these plans cannot
be met; and
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support these steps with legal and other reforms to
facilitate corporate bankruptcy and debt workouts.

Taking these steps would help relieve banks from legacy assets
and improve their capacity to finance new, viable projects at
reasonable interest rates.
None of these steps is easy, and I don’t pretend that there is a
one-size-fits-all approach; but early and decisive action is
essential.
How will the global regulatory reform agenda and the
prospective banking union impact credit prospects in the
region?
Let me now shift to the next important question on how the
global and European regulatory reform agenda could impact the
credit outlook in CESEE as well as foreign banks’ engagement
in the region. In regard to the European move to banking union,
we see this as an important opportunity to address the
shortcomings that were brought to light in the recent crisis.8
The reforms are expected to establish a level playing field for
bank regulation and supervision, consistency in bank resolution
and deposit insurance frameworks, and (eventually) clarity on
the financial backstops to break the adverse feedback loop
between sovereigns, banks and the economy. And a crucial first
step will be the AQR and stress testing exercises that are just
concluding.
These steps will have important implications for the CESEE
countries, both because many are members of the euro area and

8 The EU measures include the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Capital Requirements

Directive (CRD) in 2013, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and the adoption of
harmonized standards for deposit guarantees.

89
because many are host jurisdictions for the European institutions
that will be subject to the Banking Union.
We see a number of positive implications of the establishment of
the Banking Union for countries in this region:


It should help reduce the fragmentation of euro area
banking and money markets that have emerged in recent
years. But, this does not mean necessarily more crossborder lending, but greater confidence and lending rates
that are more clearly linked to underlying risk.



It will enhance consolidated supervision of euro area
headquartered banks, including of their subsidiaries in
the CESEE region, which should help improve host and
home regulatory and supervisory coordination and
consistency.



It will introduce common and harmonized standards and
their implementation, reducing the likelihood of
regulatory arbitrage or supervisory home bias.



The AQR should also help identify any remaining
weaknesses in banks in the system and improve
confidence.

Overall, the reforms should help establish a healthier and better
supervised banking system in the euro area and, given their
systemic role in the region, should enhance the financial stability
of CESSE banking systems.
However, we also see a number of challenges, many of which
were flagged in our recent Financial Stability Assessment
Program (FSAP) and Article IV Consultation assessments of the
EU. These include:


There will be operational risks that are associated with
any major institutional change, and it will be critical that
the transition does not result in a diminution of oversight
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as responsibilities shift from national authorities to the
ECB.


Even once banking supervision at the ECB is up and
running, there will be the challenge of coordinating its
work with the work of national authorities, which will
continue to have sole responsibility for a very large
number of banks.



Moreover, it remains to be seen how EU authorities can
and will respond when there are divergences between
national and region-wide priorities and conditions.



Notwithstanding the establishment of the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), there remains a lack of full
clarity about how the burden of large bank resolution
will be shared among members of the Union.



The question of burden sharing is especially relevant for
countries that are hosts to foreign bank subsidiaries.



And finally, the uncertainty surrounding the results of
the AQR and stress tests has cast a pall over cross-border
lending by euro area banks; while we may hope that the
results will be confidence enhancing, this still remains to
be seen.

These issues are nicely laid out in the recent note by the Vienna
Initiative Working Group.9 There, the point is made—which we
endorse—that these uncertainties increase the premium on ex
ante discussions with all parties on information sharing and crisis
management arrangements.

9 Vienna Initiative Working Group on the European Banking Union and Emerging Europe,” April 30,

2014.
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And what about the implications of the global regulatory reform
agenda?
Regarding Basel III, I think the big unknown is how large an
impact the new capital and liquidity requirements will have on
the cost of funding and equity capital.
Encouragingly, recent IMF research suggests that the effects
should be manageable.10
This study suggests that among the major financial markets, the
effect would be to raise lending rates by only around 20 basis
points. The relatively small size of the increase reflects the fact
that much of the adjustment has already taken place, the
assumption that the incidence of the measures will fall at least
partly on the banks themselves through cost cutting, and partly
investors will reward banks with lower costs of funding as they
become safer.
As for the impacts in the CESEE, we can take comfort from the
fact that, in many cases, banks in this region are well placed to
accommodate these new requirements because their capital is
generally of high quality and—in some cases—loan loss
provisioning has been raised.
Indeed, our more recent analysis of bank activity suggests that
the effects of regulation are also being mitigated by several
factors including: the fact that these regulations are being phased
in gradually; the extraordinarily easy monetary policy conditions
throughout the world; the fact that many banks are adjusting to
tighter regulations by scaling back their trading books; and

10 André Oliveira Santos and Douglas Elliott, “Estimating the Costs of Financial Regulation,” IMF
Staff Discussion Note 12/11, September 11, 2012.
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efforts by banks headquartered elsewhere (e.g., Australia,
Canada, and Asia) to build market share.
But we should not fool ourselves into thinking that these
measures will not have a material effect, since the intention was
to raise costs and curb lending, to reduce unwarranted risk taking
and enhance buffers.
And these costs are likely to be greater in jurisdictions where the
under-appreciation of risk has been greatest and where the scope
for accessing nonbank financing is the least.
Moreover, it also remains to be seen whether credit spreads,
which have fallen to unusual lows in recent years, are more
vulnerable to the effects of the eventual unwinding of monetary
accommodation in the United States and elsewhere than the
effects of the tighter regulatory environment. To paraphrase
George Soros’ famous commentary on the global financial crisis
“It’s only when the tide goes out, that one sees who’s swimming
naked.”
What will be the implications for credit growth as foreign
banks rely more on local funding?
This leads me to the final question on what will be the
implications for credit growth as banks rely more on a local
funding model.
At the global level, we have seen significant adjustments in
funding structures, with banks moving away from reliance on
short-term wholesale funding—including the interbank market
and money market funds—and moving towards deposit and/or
bond funding.
This has been a relatively universal phenomenon but has been
especially apparent among European banks. Indeed, work by my
IMF colleagues suggests that the application of the net stable
funding ratio (NFSR) would have a disproportionate effect on
European banks. This reflects the fact that banks in Europe have
tended to rely more heavily on short-term wholesale funding—
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including the interbank market, the dollar swap market, and
money market funds—to support their lending.
This suggests that the introduction of the NFSR, which will be
fully phased in by 2018, could weigh on the funding provided by
European banks to their CESEE subsidiaries.
While this could seem to be an ominous development, there are a
number of reasons why this should not be viewed with alarm.
First, a lower reliance on wholesale funding is appropriate, since
the crisis showed this can be dangerous and procyclical in times
of stress.
Second, we are seeing welcome signs that banks in the region are
shifting their business models toward greater reliance on local
deposits and other sources of funding.
This should provide a more stable platform for credit
intermediation in the region, and it will reduce incentives for
foreign currency lending and reduce maturity and currency
mismatches.
Greater reliance on local funding will help insulate local markets
from regional shocks. This is not to say that cross-border and
intragroup funding will disappear; but hopefully, and thanks at
least in part to regulatory reform, the risks associated with this
type of funding will be properly priced.
Concluding remarks
So let me now offer a few concluding remarks, which are
intended to help stimulate the discussion among the panel.
I tend to agree with those that feel that financial regulatory
reform at the global, EU, and national levels will dampen credit.
However, I also tend to view this credit compression, at least in
large part, as entirely appropriate. The leverage that was built up
ahead of the global financial crisis was—with the benefit of
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hindsight—unsustainable and too often directed to low-quality
borrowers. And so the deleveraging we are seeing is, in many
cases, the unfortunate and painful after-effects of this earlier
excess, and the shift in business models that is underway will
deliver more sustainable and sounder financial systems.
However, I believe that there are policy measures that can and
should be taken to help this adjustment, especially where credit
is unduly constrained and having potentially long-lasting effects
on growth potential.
Although these will be discussed in more detail in our other
sessions, my suggestion would be to focus on the constraints to
credit growth rather than seek to circumvent them with stimulus
measures. By this I mean:


Tackling the high NPLs, which act as drag on bank
earnings and balance sheet position.



Strengthening capital markets, including markets for
securitized lending and covered bonds. This would not
only improve bank access to stable funding, but also
provide instruments to meet the Basel III liquidity and
funding requirements.



Addressing legal and administrative constraints on
financial market services and infrastructures, and on
corporate debt restructuring.



Supporting the development of a healthy pension and
insurance sector, since these can be an important source
of long-term funding, including the direct funding of
corporates and projects through investment in bonds and
equity.



Improving the quality and effectiveness of bank
supervision,
regulation,
financial
reporting,
transparency, and governance, since these will help
encourage the participation of outside investors.
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Addressing these factors, as well as maintaining strong macro
fundamentals, will keep banks committed to the region and
provide the foundation for sustainable credit growth.
Panelist 1: Boštjan Jazbec, Governor, Bank of Slovenia
I would like to follow up on the puzzle between foreign and
domestic banks. In my view, what really matters is effective
management, and this ultimately depends on the exercise of
proper ownership. Let me give four reasons why ownership
really matters.
The first reason is the governance issue. The roles of principal
agents should be clearly defined by the proper owners and then
made use of. It does not really matter if you have domestic or
foreign banks, though it does matter if you have state-owned
banks.
The second issue is the ability to raise capital. In the European
context, it is very difficult for any state-owned or public-owned
bank to raise capital because of the punitive state aid rules that
are currently in place. In Austria and Slovenia, we have already
felt the consequence of this. It is also difficult to perceive how
domestic investors will be able to raise the enormous amount of
capital needed to make banks financially stable and meet the
ever increasing capital adequacy requirements. This is the point
where I would slightly disagree with Christopher Towe when he
said that the new rules might impede credit growth. I am always
puzzled with that because I understand that the capital is on the
liability side of the balance sheets of the bank. If you increase
capital then something has to match up on the asset side. So, it
means that more capital might not necessarily reduce credit
activity. In addition, more capital also reduces the cost of
funding. This is something that has already been mentioned a
few times today.
The third reason why ownership matters is attitude towards risk.
In my view, banks that have proper owners are more risk averse
and have better risk management.
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The fourth reason is approach to NPLs. This is also something
that we are trying to resolve at this seminar. If you look at the
Slovenian case, the approach to NPLs is different because it is
also related to the attitude towards risk. And the way in which
NPLs have been managed by foreign banks in Slovenia is
different compared with domestic banks. Data show that, until
2008, there was no difference in the level of NPLs between
domestic banks and foreign banks. However, following the onset
of the financial crisis, foreign banks were better in the
management of NPLs. In my view, this also demonstrates that
ownership really matters. In the case of Slovenia, most of the
NPLs are related to problems in the corporate sector, unlike in
some other countries such as Ireland and Spain, where NPLs
were mainly related to the mortgage market. Since most of the
NPLs in Slovenia are related to the corporate sector,
transforming the NPLs also means ownership restructuring.
There also may be a political dimension when you have
ownership restructuring, as is the case in Slovenia. Since a
majority of the banks in the country are state-owned banks, it
means that, when the stakes of the banks (i.e., NPLs) are taken
over through a debt-equity swap, we have a vicious circle that
never ends. How can we solve this puzzle? We again come to the
principal agent problem: Who is in the lead and who should
make the final decision? All I know is that playing with other
people’s money is really expensive in the long run.
I will stop here and hope for more discussion of these issues.
Panelist 2: Ewald Nowotny, Governor, OeNB
The economic recovery in the region remains fragile in the light
of increasing downside risks. Several factors are significantly
contributing to the slowdown of the growth momentum in the
euro area as well as the CESEE region, including the mounting
geopolitical tensions across the globe, the still ongoing process
of balance sheet repair in the financial and nonfinancial private
sectors, and the continued need for further fiscal consolidation in
some countries.
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As the most recent growth forecasts have been revised
downwards for the world economy, the euro area, as well as for
the CESEE region, the challenges are clear. The recovery is
lagging and uneven, mostly due to crisis legacies resulting in
lower growth potential. Investment has been subdued and
demand remains weak. Hence, reinvigorating (credit) growth in
Europe appears high on the agenda of policymakers. Beyond the
support of accommodative monetary policies, targeted reform
measures are needed in order to avoid recoveries which go hand
in hand with prolonged periods of weak output and employment
growth. In general, structural reforms to strengthen growth
potential or make growth more sustainable are needed.
Due to its geographical and cultural proximity to CESEE,
Austria has always had a special interest in the region. Austrian
banks were among the first to enter the region, realizing the
possibilities and potential of the region and thereby acting as a
driver for banking sector development. Their long-term
commitment to CESEE is also reflected in their broadly
maintained total exposure to the region in the past years, which
amounted to EUR 97.5 billion by mid-2014.11 With a total
number of 62 subsidiaries as of June 2014, Austrian banks are
still the major players in the region and contribute to a stable
flow of credit to the local economies. Thanks to their traditional
business model and higher than EU growth rates in CESEE, their
activities in the region also continue to be an important
contributor to the profitability of Austrian banks on a
consolidated basis.
However, CESEE operations also come with higher risks. Higher
NPL ratios, goodwill write-downs, and political uncertainty in
some countries pose challenges to Austrian banks operating in
the region. These risks have translated into higher risk costs over

11 CESEE exposure of majority Austrian-owned banks (BIS definition).
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the past few years. What is more, in the past, the profit sources
of Austrian subsidiaries had been evenly distributed across
CESEE, which also yielded risk diversification benefits; in
recent years, by contrast, profits have increasingly come from
just a few countries, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Russia, and Turkey. This highlights a concentration risk and the
need for a sustainable growth strategy in the region. Recent
turmoil in some of these markets has also underlined the fragility
of the current earnings situation. The reduction of exposure in
some countries with a difficult economic environment or
unorthodox economic and financial policy was more than
compensated for by an increase in other CESEE countries, where
Austrian banks’ subsidiaries have generated profits and
registered a relatively stable credit quality in recent years.
As far as foreign currency lending of Austrian banks’
subsidiaries to CESEE is concerned, these loans, which have
declined by 7.1 percent year on year, amounted to
EUR 4.2 billion at end-2013, taking into account exchange rate
effects. Yet, the outstanding volume of foreign currency loans
continues to pose a material risk both to households and to
Austrian banks.
The decreasing trend in foreign currency lending of Austrian
banks reflects the success of the macroprudential tools already
implemented by the Austrian authorities before 2014, most
recently the revised minimum standards on risk management and
new lending in foreign currency from early 2013. Furthermore,
in March 2012, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) and
the Financial Market Authority provided supervisory guidance12
with a view to strengthening the sustainability of the business
models of large and internationally active Austrian banks, in

12 For further information see http://www.oenb.at/en/Financial-Stability/Systemic-RiskAnalysis/Sustainability-of-Large-Austrian-Banks-Business-Models.html.
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order to ensure that they increase their capital buffers, rebalance
the funding position of subsidiaries, and prepare recovery and
resolution plans for potential crisis situations. Monitoring results
from the end of the first quarter of 2014 indicate that a large
majority of Austrian banks’ subsidiaries in CESEE have
sustainable business models (on a year-on-year basis).
Strengthening of the long-term stable funding of foreign
subsidiaries goes hand in hand with developing domestic capital
markets, which can be more difficult in small economies that
have not (yet) adopted the single currency. These measures also
reflect the spirit of the Vienna Initiative13 to promote a
sustainable growth model underpinned by strengthened
capitalization, while at the same time proactively preventing
pronounced boom-bust cycles.
Coming back to the conditions for reinvigorating credit growth,
it is important to note that potential output growth is still higher
in the CESEE region compared to the euro area. Many CESEE
countries have followed a remarkable economic catching-up
process over the past two decades, but have not yet reached the
levels seen in most of the euro area countries. These differentials
imply a great potential for above-average growth, not only for
the CESEE region, but also for the countries with which the
region maintains close relations. Owing to the slump in growth
in the CESEE region caused by the global financial crisis, the
previously substantial growth differential between the CESEE
EU member states and the euro area has declined in recent years.

13 The European Bank Coordination “Vienna Initiative” is a platform for cooperation and discussion

of all the relevant public and private sector stakeholders of EU-based cross-border banks active in
emerging Europe, such as home and host country supervisors, the European Commission,
international financial institutions like the IMF, and banks. The Vienna Initiative was launched at the
height of the global financial crisis in January 2009 and played a key role in stabilizing the situation
in the CESEE region. It helped to prevent a systemic banking crisis in the region and ensured that
credit kept flowing to the real economies during the crisis.
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Nevertheless, this growth differential is projected to persist until
2019 according to the most recent WEO by the IMF.14
Countries with a geographical proximity and traditionally strong
ties with the region, like Austria, are in an excellent position to
support this process. Austrian banks stay committed to a retailoriented business model and continue to focus on CESEE. In this
regard, with a more sustainable business model, banks play a key
role in providing finance to the real economy. This is particularly
important as higher investment can boost demand, which—in the
end—supports economic recovery. In order to tackle the policy
challenges and possible responses in connection with
reinvigorating credit growth in CESEE, it is critical to learn
about the various experiences of different countries in the region
and to exchange opinions. Moreover, as CESEE and the euro
area are economically and financially integrated, close
coordination between home and host authorities is vital.
Panelist 3: Jan Tóth, Deputy Governor, National Bank of
Slovakia
The presentation consists of two parts. The first part deals with
our experiences with foreign ownership of banks. The second
part gives more detail about the Slovak banking sector.
Today’s banking sector in Central Europe (V5 countries) could
be arguably divided into three groups in terms of its healthiness
and performance. The best group consists of Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. Poland and Hungary are in the middle group,
with the issue of foreign exchange loans. Slovenia seems to fare
the worst, having the universal state banks as major players.

14 WEO (October 2014).
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Slovakia’s policy lesson is simple: sell the state banks; attract
foreign bank capital from the developed world; and have
reasonably low and stable domestic interest rates (i.e., monetary
policy of inflation targeting). The advantages of having foreign
banks have vastly exceeded the disadvantages. Having state
banks in post-communist Slovakia turned out to be extremely
costly for the tax payer.
Part 1: Slovak experience with foreign ownership of banks
The Slovak banking system has emerged from the formerly
common Czechoslovak communist banking system. In the early
1990s, the Slovak banking system still had many characteristic
features inherited from the previous regime and commercial
bank activities were concentrated in a few specialized banks.
Beyond the procedural difficulties faced at the very beginning in
the newly stabilizing banking sector, the transformation process
was impeded by the fact that most of the main financial market
institutions had to be newly created, because the majority of the
processes were originally managed from Prague—former capital
of the Czech-Slovak Republic. The role of the newly formed
National Bank of Slovakia was not only to supervise the
development of a new banking system, but above all it was
responsible for introducing a new currency and maintaining an
independent monetary policy.
A consequent period of hectic changes in Slovak society
involved also the financial sector. The market has witnessed a
dramatic increase in the number of financial institutions with a
banking license (that peaked in 1996, when reaching 34). Within
a few years, the share of foreign ownership in the sector
increased to 50 percent. Simultaneously, employment in the
banking system increased and so did the banks’ assets, liabilities,
and loans.
However, buoyant evolution in the unclear environment brought
a significant increase in NPLs. The share of classified loans rose
to almost 30 percent of total loans. This unpleasant development
was fuelled by inefficient banking institutions, inexperienced
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banks with an underdeveloped methodology for assessment of
creditors, weak risk management, relatively widespread partisan
rating of clients, and financially illiterate customers.
Accumulation of NPLs was prevalent in the corporate sector. In
the unhealthy political environment, coupled with an unstable
economic environment, unfair practices of business managers
were relatively common, coupled with political pressures to
provide unprofitable loans to friendly businessmen.
In the nonstandard economic environment, interest rates were
very high. Interest rates on deposits were around 15 percent and
the interest rates on loans were at the level of 20 percent per
annum. The need for tightened monetary policy and a massive
defense of the exchange rate was to a large extent a consequence
of very loose fiscal policy and a lack of structural reforms.
A natural component of transformation was privatization of state
banking institutions. The inevitable intermediate step in this
process was cleaning the banks of the accumulated NPLs. This
happened in 2000 and 2001. Based on available estimates, NPLs
represented one of the biggest costs of the overall transformation
process, exceeding 11 percent of GDP in Slovakia. The value of
the NPLs in state banks reached EUR 3 billion (more than
9 percent of GDP). NPLs of well-connected local private equity
accounted for another EUR 660 million (i.e., 2 percent of GDP).
This is a huge cost that is fully comparable to what many
observers would consider to be the biggest cost—a broad-based
privatization process involving local friends during the 1994–98
Meciar era. The price difference between the revenue and the
accounting value of those companies was comparable at
10.7 percent of GDP (EUR 3.2 billion). Hence, the state
ownership of universal big banks turned out to be extremely
expensive in a post-communist country.
The early negative experience (the stigma of the banking crisis)
and its high public costs helped shape the more conservative
behavior of clients, bank regulators, and supervisors in Slovakia
in the following years.
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Next, the development of the Slovak banking system took place
in an environment of low inflation supported by inflation
targeting monetary policy. Interest rates declined substantially.
At the same time, cleaning of the banking sector asset side and
low inflation, which helped protect deposits, resulted in a small
loan to deposit ratio in Slovakia. Loans and deposits in foreign
exchange have been very limited.
Based on theory, foreign ownership of banks brings several
benefits and costs. Undisputed benefits include transfer of knowhow, higher competition, and better or “more independent”
allocation of resources in the host country. Besides benefits, we
may identify some costs related to weaker longer-term
commitments. We may expect fewer financial resources to be
available for corporates, because lending to corporates is more
complex and requires stronger effort and more analysis. In
general, the volume of available finances depends on the value
of collateral and costs or complexity of monitoring. These
factors may lead to higher lending to households and fuel real
estate booms.
However, the existence of these relationships in practice is not so
straightforward. The experience of the Slovak Republic is based
on the gradual creation of three different groups of commercial
banks. The first group present in the market can be called “pure”
foreign banks. These banks usually relied on capital from their
home countries and concentrated on corporate private-sector
clients. Therefore, they usually strongly supported policies that
strengthened corporate balance sheets and investments, mainly
structural reforms and low taxation. The second group represents
“mixed” foreign banks. These are former state banks acquired by
large Austrian or Italian banks, and they retained their positions
of biggest players in the Slovak market. In these banks, we could
observe gradual corporate culture changes, and in general their
services are more expensive. The third group comprises small
local banks that are often owned by local equity firms. These
banks have tended to finance their owners and sometimes engage
in more risky activities (e.g., Greek bonds).
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As already indicated, the three groups differ not only in terms of
their ownership, but also in terms of their behavior and historical
development (Figure 1).
1) “Pure” foreign banks could not rely on a wide
branch network and they did not perceive Slovakia
as their key market due to its small size. They
focused on medium and large enterprises, and thanks
to their connections with mother banks, they were
able to dramatically improve their price
competitiveness and introduce new investment
banking products (structural finance).
2) “Mixed” (foreign) banks took over mortgage and
consumer finance as the theory would predict. These
segments have remained the most dynamically
growing until now. But the banks did not stop there
and continued to service a corporate clientele as
well, including SMEs. In fact, at present, there are
some signs that the “mixed” banks are trying to price
out “pure” foreign banks in the large and midcorporate sector.
3) The group of small local banks relied on central
bank financing due to limited access to money
market activities. Also, their capital adequacy ratios
are usually not as strong as those of the other groups.
Euro adoption and the economic, financial, and debt crises
influenced the three groups differently. Despite the ability to
adapt to euro area prices and increase their price competitiveness
(among the top seven lowest prices in the eurozone at present),
we can observe a decrease in profit and market shares of “pure”
foreign banks. The main reason seems to be the fact that foreignowned companies tend to finance themselves via corporate
headquarters on a larger scale than before. In contrast, our
“mixed” banks continue to benefit from a growing retail sector.
Retail loans are growing at double-digit rates and the banks
maintain very favorable returns on equity or assets. The prices of
mortgages have been the highest in the eurozone. The last
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relatively small group of local banks keeps on maintaining lower
capital adequacy ratios and, due to worse access to the money
market, they continue to prefer central bank financing.
Based on our experience, the presence of foreign banks brings a
lot of advantages for the stability of the banking sector. These
include the transfer of know-how, liquidity, and capital support.
The existence of large universal state banks turned out to be
extremely costly.
As a small disadvantage, unlike domestic banks, foreign banks
tend to be more prone to limit their lending activities in the event
of an economic downturn or uncertainty. As shown in the
Figure 1, domestic banks continued lending while foreign banks
slowed down their lending activities in recent bad times.
Figure 1. Differences in Behavior of Domestic and Foreign Banks
Yearly change of the volume of total loans to nonfinacial
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Part 2: Slovak banking-sector today
Moving to a broader picture of the present Slovak banking
sector, we cannot omit several important features that distinguish
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it from the majority of the euro area banking sectors. As was
already indicated, foreign ownership of the banks has been
gradually growing. Today, foreign capital is highly engaged in
the Slovak banking sector. Subsidiaries of foreign banks and
branches of foreign banks represent almost 85 percent of total
assets (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Prevailing Foreign Ownership
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At the same time, the Slovak banking sector is much less
sensitive to financial markets due to high domestic deposits.
Clients’ deposits to total assets ratio is the highest in the EU
(Figure 3). This aspect forms a very good funding position for
the Slovak banking sector, because it eliminates reliance on
funds from parent banks and lowers liquidity funding risk.
Loans are fully funded by clients’ deposits. The loan-to-deposit
ratio is lower than the euro area average (Figure 4). And both
total and corporate loan-to-deposit ratios belong to the lower half
of the EU countries (Figure 5).
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Figure 3. Dominant Role of Clients’ Deposits
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Figure 5. International Comparisons of Returns
(In percent)
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Capital adequacy remains one of the pillars of the banking
sector’s resilience to external risks. The capital adequacy ratio
has continued to rise, and in 2013 it reached 17 percent.
Simultaneously, we could observe an increase in Tier 1 capital.
The value of this ratio for the Slovak banking sector was higher
than the median value for EU countries (Figure 6).Capital
adequacy remains one of the pillars of the banking sector’s
resilience to external risks. The capital adequacy ratio has
continued to rise, and in 2013 it reached 17 percent.
Simultaneously, we could observe an increase in Tier 1 capital.
The value of this ratio for the Slovak banking sector was higher
than the median value for EU countries (Figure 6).
Besides a good level of capital adequacy, Slovak banks have an
adequate leverage ratio. The average value for the Slovak
banking sector fluctuated between 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent in
2013. In June 2013, large international European banks recorded
a value of 3.0 percent. At the same time, banks operating in
Slovakia follow conservative bank business models and maintain
sound profitability.

109
Figure 6. International Comparisons of the Tier 1 Capital Ratios
(In percent)
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Besides a good level of capital adequacy, Slovak banks have an
adequate leverage ratio. The average value for the Slovak
banking sector fluctuated between 7.6 percent and 7.8 percent in
2013. In June 2013, large international European banks recorded
a value of 3.0 percent. At the same time, banks operating in
Slovakia follow conservative bank business models and maintain
sound profitability.
However, sound overall performance indicators do not mean that
there is no scope for improvement. At a time when the corporate
sector is curbed by a weak economic outlook and development is
driven by the retail sector, we may identify several risks
stemming from the low interest rate environment and limited
demand. Low interest rates, in combination with high debt-toincome ratios for selected clients, may indicate risks in case
interest rates significantly increase in the future. In the retail
sector, we also may observe rising loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
and a relatively high share of intermediaries taking over lending
activities. Taking these risks seriously, measures formulated in
the new European directives are already being implemented well
in advance of deadlines and will be soon extended with our own
country specific recommendations. They range from specific
loan to value recommendations to individual clients’ stress tests
and the introduction of third-party regulation.
Panelist 4: Andrzej Raczko, Member of the Management
Board, National Bank of Poland
The main subject of our panel discussion is the prospects for
credit growth and foreign bank engagement in the CESEE
region. The example of Poland in this respect is interesting from
the point of view of credit policy during and after the last
financial crisis.
Before proceeding to this issue, I would like to briefly
characterize the significance and size of the foreign bank sector
in Poland. In the Polish banking sector, 63.4 percent of equity
belongs to foreign banks. Regarding the value of assets, their
share is almost 58.8 percent of the assets of the whole of the
banking sector. What differentiates Poland from the other
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countries of the CESEE region is the significant diversification
of the ownership structure of foreign banks, taking as a criterion
the country of origin. Naturally, banks from the euro area
prevail, but there are also banks from other regions and
continents operating here, e.g., the United States (Figure 1).
The significant diversification of the foreign bank sector
diminished the risk of deleveraging. The risk of negative effects
of deleveraging for the Polish financial sector resulting from the
problems of some foreign parent banks is significantly reduced,
as no banks from a single country dominate the sector. This is
why neither the Greek crisis, nor the Irish crisis, nor the Spanish
banking-sector crisis caused tensions in the Polish banking
sector. The problems of parent banks led mainly to a change of
owner and, to a small extent, an outflow of subsidiary bank
financing. In other words, the parent banks in financial need sold
profitable Polish subsidiaries to a new foreign company, which
immediately offered liquidity support. For these reasons, the
deleveraging process—unlike the cases of some other countries
in the region—did not have a perceptible impact on credit
growth in the economy. The outflow of foreign funding, which
was noticeable in the first quarter of 2014, was related to banks’
originating mortgage loans in foreign currencies before the
financial crisis. During the crisis, these banks stopped lending to
households in foreign currency. As a result, the principal
repayment of the existing portfolio of foreign-currency loans led
to a gradual reduction in the need for foreign funding by the
banking sector from abroad (Figure 2).
The stable position of foreign banks in Poland results, to a large
extent, from the convergence process that the Polish banking
sector has undergone. On the one hand, Polish banks received
the know-how of foreign banks; while on the other hand, the
foreign banks learned how to adapt their services to the needs of
the local market. If we compare the performance of both sectors,
we see that they differ only slightly. ROE and net interest margin
are practically at the same level; foreign banks have a slightly
higher capital adequacy ratio.
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Figure 1. Ownership Structure in Terms of: Assets, Loans, and Equity
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The considerable difference between the cost-to-income ratios is
caused by the significant share in the domestic bank sector of
one state bank (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego), which finances
large infrastructure projects and manages foreign credit lines
obtained from international financial institutions, e.g., the EIB
and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). Due to the profile of its operations, this bank—unlike
other universal banks—does not pay the high costs of
maintaining a network of branches (Figure 3).
Similarly, there are no major differences in the structure of the
balance sheets of domestic and foreign banks. An important
difference is the higher share of foreign funding and a
correspondingly higher share of mortgage and corporate loans in
the structure of foreign banks compared to domestic banks.
These differences are entirely understandable. Foreign banks
benefited from easy access to foreign funding from their parent
banks. Through foreign subsidiaries, these funds were used to
grant mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency to Polish
households and large enterprises, mainly Polish exporters
(Figure 4).
Domestic and foreign banks have stopped granting foreign
currency denominated loans to households that are not hedged
against exchange-rate risk. The problem of foreign-currencydenominated mortgage loans was not such a painful experience
in Poland as in other CEE countries, since at the beginning of the
credit boom the Polish Financial Stability Authority (KNF)
introduced quite restrictive conditions for borrowers of foreign
currency loans (the so-called Recommendation “S”). As a result,
foreign-currency loans were granted only to households with the
highest incomes. During the crisis, these households were able to
service their debt despite a significant depreciation of the zloty.
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Figure 2. External Positions of BIS-Reporting Banks vis-à-vis All
Sectors, 2013:Q1–2014:Q1
(Change Percent of 2013 GDP, Exchange-Rate Adjusted)

Source: Vienna Initiative CESEE Deleveraging and Credit Monitor, August 4, 2014.
External Positions of BIS-reporting Banks vis-à-vis all sectors, 2013:Q1–2014:Q1 (Change,
Percent of 2013 GDP, exchange-rate adjusted.
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Domestic and foreign banks have stopped granting foreign
currency denominated loans to households that are not hedged
against exchange-rate risk. The problem of foreign-currencydenominated mortgage loans was not such a painful experience
in Poland as in other CEE countries, since at the beginning of the
credit boom the Polish Financial Stability Authority (KNF)
introduced quite restrictive conditions for borrowers of foreign
currency loans (the so-called Recommendation “S”). As a result,
foreign-currency loans were granted only to households with the
highest incomes. During the crisis, these households were able to
service their debt despite a significant depreciation of the zloty.
Let us now focus on the credit policy conducted by banks of both
sectors. Are foreign banks more risk averse than domestic
banks? The level of NPLs is a significant indicator of the scale of
credit risk undertaken by banks. Although the NPL indexes are
approximately at the same level, it is easy to explain some small
differences. The level of NPLs for corporate loans is higher in
domestic banks than in foreign banks. This difference is
explained by the larger share of large enterprises in the credit
portfolio of foreign banks (often these are subsidiaries of foreign
firms or domestic exporters). In turn, domestic banks have a
larger share of SMEs in their credit portfolio, which have a
higher level of credit risk. The NPLs of consumer loans are at a
similar level; however, the higher share of NPLs for mortgage
loans is related to the structure of these loans. As previously
mentioned, mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency
were granted to the wealthiest clients, which is why they have
the lowest NPL level. These, however, dominate in the mortgage
loan portfolio of foreign banks. It seems that foreign banks are
more effective in assessing credit risk, although they undertake it
on a larger scale than domestic banks, which is shown by the
higher risk-weighted assets (Figure 5).
It would be beneficial to get a more comprehensive picture of
credit policy before, during, and after the financial crisis. The
National Bank of Poland (NBP) examines changes in credit
policy by using opinion polls of senior loan officers.
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Figure 4. Balance Sheet Structure of Domestic- and
Foreign-Owned Banks
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An indicator based on the survey shows easing or tightening of
credit standards. A comparison of the credit policies between the
foreign bank sector and the domestic bank sector in the years
2005–14 is presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Cumulated Changes in Credit Standards

Source: NBP.
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In the case of mortgage loans, the lending conditions were
tighter in the foreign bank sector. Foreign banks granted mainly
foreign currency loans, which—in accordance with the
requirements imposed by the Polish FSA—required tighter
criteria for granting credit than in the case of loans in zlotys.
After 2012, foreign banks further tightened credit conditions due
to the imposition of stricter prudential requirements on the way
in which the portfolio of foreign loans should be managed.
Consumer loans were granted on similar lending conditions in
both sectors. Significant easing of lending standards in the
segment of consumer loans observed since the beginning of 2013
can be to a large extent attributed to amendments to the Polish
FSA’s Recommendation “T” on granting these loans. The
amendments were particularly vital for the granting of low-value
loans, for which the requirements on creditworthiness
assessment were significantly eased. The segment of low-value
consumer loans is dominated by foreign-owned banks. As a
result, it was this group of banks that took the biggest advantage
of the amendments in Recommendation “T” (and improving
macroeconomic conditions) and expanded their activities in the
consumer loans market.
Although there were some differences in the credit policy of the
domestic and foreign banks in Poland, the dynamic of credit
supply has not varied significantly between the sectors in recent
years. This is explained by the convergence process of the
domestic and foreign banking sectors, which has accelerated
since 2004.
The fundamentals of the banking convergence process were
established in the middle of the 1990s. Initially, green-field
investments dominated in the foreign bank sector. At this time,
foreign subsidiaries differed significantly from the domestic
banks in terms of the acceptable risk profile, financial
instruments applied, management principles, and client base—
which were made up mainly of foreign companies operating in
Poland. In the second half of the 1990s, a period of intensive
privatization of the banking sector began. A significant number
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of state banks were purchased by foreign investors. The method
of privatization was important; it consisted in finding a strategic
investor, who in the privatization agreement pledged to ensure
conditions for the long-term development of the acquired bank,
mainly in terms of constant capital accumulation. An important
role was played by the Polish banking supervisory authority. Its
rigorous approach meant that decisions regarding the
management of subsidiary banks had to be taken at the
boardroom level of these banks and not at the level of the
headquarters of parent banks. Headquarters only controlled
strategic decisions, which gave quite a significant amount of
autonomy to the local staff. As a result, the value added brought
by the foreign investor in the form of capital, a management
model (particularly of risk management), and new financial
instruments were adapted to local conditions. The privatized
bank maintained the client base, the local staff, and––in general–
–the universal business model of the bank. Banks created as
green-field investments soon lost significance in the foreignbank sector; they either remained as niche banks servicing only a
certain segment of the market (for example, banks financing the
purchase of cars) or became absorbed by large foreign banks that
were created as a result of privatization.
Competition from large universal foreign banks also forced
important changes in the domestic bank sector. Domestic banks
were compelled to introduce modern technology (information
technology (IT) systems), banking services,. and risk models
similar to those of foreign banks. The need to constantly
accumulate capital forced domestic banks to look for capital on
the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This process also affected banks
controlled by the state, leading to their gradual privatization. The
requirements for a listed company curtailed the negative impact
of state ownership on credit policy.
Let us summarize: The diversification of the Polish banking
sector—both in terms of the significant share of domestic banks
and the broad representation of foreign investors from various
countries—helped ensure a sufficient level of competition,
particularly in relation to credit operations. Polish banking
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supervision and an appropriate mechanism of privatization
resulted in a constant accumulation of capital in the foreign bank
sector; consequently, capital has not been a barrier to constantly
increasing credit activity. Sound domestic supervision
regulations and the adaptation of foreign credit risk models to the
Polish situation compelled the banks of both sectors to pursue a
prudential credit policy. The significant role of local staff in the
management of subsidiary banks prevented a credit crunch, even
though their parent banks were hit by a sudden stop of credit
activity during the last crisis.
Panelist 5: László Baranyay, Vice President, EIB
Thank you very much. Let me start my remarks in a light way
and perhaps a somewhat unusual approach, as Hungarians
sometimes do, even in economics. On my way to Ljubljana, I
stopped to buy a book—The Alchemists—which was named
business book of the year. The book is about three famous
central bankers, calling themselves alchemists without adding a
question mark. I think the difference between an alchemist and a
central banker is that alchemists never managed to produce gold,
which was their main target. However, central bankers today try
to use several new tools and facilities with the objective of
supporting economic recovery, which is why I think it is an
interesting book to read, even though the title may not be very
adequate.
I thought about my role in this important meeting of highly
respected representatives, politicians, and academics. It is
perhaps a bit of a special one because I represent an international
financial institution that directly invests in the real economy,
while here we are talking a lot about the national banks’ role, the
central banks’ role, the banking sector in general, and the special
case of foreign-owned banks, etc. The role of EIB in the
European economy is therefore somewhat different.
But first let me ask a question. I always begin with a question. I
follow J.F. Kennedy’s way of thinking, who once suggested not
seeking the Republican or Democratic answer, but simply the
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right answer. But I think that before doing that we first have to
think about the right questions!
What are the prospects for credit growth?
I think discussing the prospects for credit growth is indeed
important, but the more fundamental issue concerns the
revitalization of economic growth in Europe and all around
world, as was mentioned earlier by the Croatian Governor. So
what is the macroeconomic situation in the world, and what is
the macroeconomic situation in the countries that we have
mentioned? Let me highlight only one figure about these
countries––GDP growth. Several countries have not reached the
level of economic growth and economic performance that they
had before the crisis, e.g., Hungary and some other countries. At
the same time, we cannot generalize. Poland is absolutely
different because the Polish economy is in a sustainable
economic situation and faces comparably few problems in the
banking sector, which supports its economic growth and
sustainable public finances.
Where are we then? Are we in the middle of the crisis, after the
crisis, or before the next crisis? Well, I know that—in regard to
the economy—we are always before a crisis, and we never know
when the new crisis will begin.
I think the last crisis was not a normal cyclical crisis, and that’s
why I propose quite different tools to be used for the
management of the consequences of the crisis.
The situation is quite controversial, and I think it is important to
make clear this distinction when we discuss the problems in and
outside the eurozone. There are some very important economies
outside the eurozone as well (e.g., Great Britain) and some of
them are actually not candidates to join the eurozone. So it is
important to see the whole banking sector, not only the part of it
that is in the eurozone. The banking regulation and the ECB
must observe it as a single sector.
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In the CEE region, the foreign-owned banks have a special role.
The parent companies of these foreign-owned banks settled
mainly, but not exclusively, in the eurozone. That’s why many of
them can be regarded as banks of the eurozone, but others not.
Furthermore, there is a very significant, active, and consequently
very important financial institution in this region, which comes
from outside the EU.
In summary, I think there are new challenges and we have to
find new answers for new challenges.
I mention the phrase “global metamorphosis’” because—as you
may know—Zeus had several metamorphoses, but always with
the same aim, yet it was not a politically correct one. We have a
politically correct aim because we want to increase the
investment capacity of governments, economies, and by
extension the competitiveness of the EU. The current global
economic situation is a big challenge for the European countries
and EU member states. The investment bank’s tools and
opportunities are different from those of the central banks. EIB
has several special activities, and the most important ones are its
lending, blending, and advising activities, which are well known.
Advising capacity and advising activity are quite important for
the creation of new investment projects that are bankable for the
commercial banking sector. The impact of such projects on the
economy is good, not only for economic growth, but also for the
employment situation. Furthermore, I think one of the key
challenges for the future of Europe is the issue of youth
unemployment, because the level of youth unemployment is very
high in several countries and we will have to do everything we
can to reduce it. Besides project finance and investment advice,
we operate our advisory services for these dedicated goals as
well.
The EIB is not only a single bank, but also a banking group. This
is important because of the opportunities for investing offered by
the European Investment Fund (EIF), the EIB Group’s equity
subsidiary, which also provides guarantees for SMEs. It is quite
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important when, in this region and also in other regions of
Europe, companies are partially undercapitalized.
By way of conclusion, I would like to mention that when we are
working together with the commercial banking sector, we also
cooperate with the other international financial institutions.
Our cooperation with other international financial institutions,
the national promotional banks, and the commercial banks is
excellent. I would point out that the cooperation with the
national promotional banks (even though some countries don’t
have such an institution, e.g., Slovenia and Poland), but where
they exist, the cooperation is highly appreciated and fruitful.
There is enough liquidity available in the markets and the
funding is cheaper than previously. The question should be
posed differently; because the real question is not who should
provide the financing, but rather what can be financed in a
responsible manner to increase growth? That is the question for
the future.

C. Discussions
Following the presentations, participants from the floor raised a
number of issues, mainly centered on the relative importance of
foreign- and state-owned banks in explaining the credit boom
and its eventual bust.


One participant noted that banks had had differing
experiences with the growth of NPLs after the credit
boom, with some being more successful than others in
maintaining credit quality. He suggested that western
banks, in particular, had benefited from better risk
management during the boom years, which—in turn—
had helped insulate them when the bubble burst. He also
wondered whether state-controlled banks had been
subject to insufficiently rigorous governance and risk
management.
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Another participant acknowledged these differences, but
suggested that it was the banks’ business models rather
than their ownership that was the more important factor.
In his experience, more important factors were the fact
that banks that had entered the region as green-field
investors, versus having partnered with an established
entity, and the quality of management ownership. And
private ownership was also no guarantee of proper risk
management. Moreover, he questioned whether
European rules for state aid could be applied easily in
the region, given the already heavy involvement of the
public sector in the financial sector.



Another comment was that public ownership of banks
could be helpful in times of crisis, since it facilitated the
crisis response. While there were legitimate concerns
about the inefficiency of public banks, state control of
banks was less of an issue in determining the efficiency
and stability of the financial sector than the quality of
public institutions and their policies.



A contrasting view was that public sectors were tempted
to direct credit in ways that delayed corporate
restructuring and the recognition of losses, which created
inefficiencies in the allocation of credit and the economy
more generally. These problems were compounded by
shortcomings in bankruptcy law, tax law, and the
efficiency of credit allocation.



Another participant argued that the improvement in
corporate governance brought by foreign-owned banks
was immense, especially given that they were less
subject to vested interests. However, he cautioned that
foreign banks tended to share common risk
methodologies, often based on historical data and
relationships that were not attuned to the specificities of
the CESEE region. This created the risk of an overly
procyclical reaction to a crisis.
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Panelists’ responses to questions
Resource mobilization. One panelist suggested that a key issue
in the region was the dearth of funding for investment, and for
this reason he viewed as significant the Juncker Plan and a
similar proposal by the Polish Finance Minister, which promised
to mobilize resources from the public and private sectors, as well
as from international institutions. He viewed prospects for a
European consensus on these proposals as encouraging.
Bank ownership. Several panelists expressed their views on this
issue:


One panelist stressed the critical importance of highquality corporate governance and management, which
needed a proper balance between foreign headquarters
and local staff. At the same time, the domestic
supervisory framework could play an important role in
ensuring that (i) foreign investors in the banking sector
took an appropriately long-term view of their
participation, and (ii) there was healthy competition
between domestic and foreign-owned banks. This
emphasis helped explain the relatively favorable
experience of the foreign banks in Poland. For example,
to help encourage this longer-term perspective, the
Polish supervisor had insisted that foreign-owned banks
be quoted on the Warsaw stock exchange, which helped
improve local capital markets and the transparency of
bank operations. Another key to success was an effective
deposit guarantee scheme, which in Poland was solely
bank funded, helping to avoid the transfer of risk to the
public sector. The Polish authorities’ conservative
response to bank stress—the central bank was not asked
to provide liquidity to insolvent banks—had also
encouraged strong risk management and corporate
governance.



Another panelist strongly disagreed with the notion that
state ownership was irrelevant for the quality and health
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of the banking sector. In his view, it was not sufficient to
simply appoint strong managers, because the experience
of the crisis illustrated clearly that state-owned banks
had performed the worst. Indeed, the relatively high
costs of state-ownership of banks could be seen not just
in the region but globally.


A third panelist agreed, but also noted that strong
competition was needed to ensure efficiency, either on
the funding side or the lending side. The experience in
Austria illustrated that public ownership was particularly
problematic when the bank operated in a niche market
and was not subject to healthy market forces. He also
cautioned that the recently agreed rules on bank
resolution could impair the ability of authorities to
respond quickly to banking sector stress, since the
consultation processes appeared to be cumbersome. He
suggested that these rules still needed to be fine-tuned to
enable a quick and effective response to crises.



The final panelist agreed that the response of the stateowned banks in the crisis had tended at times to be
unhelpful, especially given their reluctance to write off
loans. He also viewed the deleveraging process as a
natural response to the excessive inflow of capital that
had occurred during the boom years, and was not
something that could be resisted.
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VI. PANEL 3: MEASURES TO REVIVE CREDIT
MARKETS: BEST PRACTICES AND PITFALLS

A. Summary
The panel discussed various possible measures to revive credit
markets and a range of best practices and associated pitfalls in
the environment following the financial crisis, with the prospect
of slow and potentially creditless recovery.
In the introduction, it was stressed that central banks face two
main challenges during financial crises. The first challenge is to
provide sufficient liquidity to the financial system, while the
second is how to ensure that this liquidity is transmitted into
credit growth. All the panelists agreed that there were important
bottlenecks in channelling credit to the real economy and that
innovative approaches are needed to successfully resolve this
issue.
Several schemes aimed at channelling liquidity provided by
central banks to the real economy were discussed. While
panelists largely agreed that the funding-for-lending scheme in
the United Kingdom had had limited success, some argued that
in other jurisdictions, and depending on the design of the
scheme, they can have even stronger positive effects. Some
touched upon the ECB's purchases of asset-backed securities
(ABS), and while they viewed it as a positive measure, nobody
saw it as a sufficient one. One panelist stressed that the fundingfor-lending scheme in the United Kingdom was successful only
in sectors where there was sufficient collateral. A consensus
view was that these programs only provided resources, but did
not provide proper incentives for banks to lend, especially to
SMEs. Because it is incentives that matter most, additional
measures were needed to increase banks' incentives to lend.
The panel discussion touched upon direct intervention by central
banks as a potential option. While one panelist suggested that
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central banks should directly target SMEs, most panelists
emphasized that such an intervention poses risks. Several
panelists mentioned that such measures are especially prone to
political interference, as they entail directed lending towards a
particular sector. One panelist pointed out that the provision of
targeted subsidized loans to SMEs by government-owned banks
worked well when such banks were not given orders regarding to
whom to lend, but were left to their own decisions within the
allocated budget. Some panelists suggested that multilateral
institutions could stand in as intermediaries and that this could
help to avoid central banks having to channel credit directly to
the real economy.
A few panelists stressed that it is necessary to first identify the
friction that is preventing credit growth and then apply
appropriate policies to address this friction. One panelist
suggested that credit demand and supply factors should be
disentangled and that a decrease in credit is not problematic
when this is due to falling demand related to over-indebtedness.
It was emphasized that new credit should be channelled to viable
companies and that the quality of new credit is more important
than quantity. Another panelist argued that negative aggregate
credit growth may be a result of the situation where viable
companies are able to obtain new loans, but over-indebted or
unviable companies are not. In such cases, negative credit
growth implies a correction of imbalances and an improvement
in the credit quality, which is a desirable outcome from a policy
perspective.
The panel debated the issues of confidence in the banking sector.
Several panelists mentioned that confidence needs to be restored
before credit growth can be expected. One panelist argued that,
while AQR and stress tests help in restoring confidence and
credit growth in the medium run, they may nevertheless result in
credit contraction in the short run—especially in banks that are
short of capital. Another panelist argued that confidence issues
resulted in a fragmented financial market in which banks in
different jurisdictions face different nominal interest rates.
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Panelists agreed that cross-country differentials in real interest
rates can be exacerbated due to inflation differentials.
The panel discussed alternatives to bank funding, especially for
the SMEs. The consensus view was that alternatives to bank
financing should be developed, and that financial markets should
have a greater role. Several panelists saw securitization and
further development of ABS markets as a plausible alternative to
bank lending. Venture capital funds, joint venture funds, and
development of mini-bond markets were also mentioned as
alternatives. Some panelists viewed ABS markets as a way of
easing credit risk management for originating banks. One
panelist emphasized that credit risk models used by banks should
be tailored to the country where the bank is active and should be
less reliant on history-based risk models in countries that are
undergoing a structural change by reorientation to different
drivers of growth.
Several views were expressed regarding the costs and benefits of
a creditless recovery. Some panelists argued that a creditless
recovery is typical following a financial crisis. New investment
had been slow and therefore new credit is not required because
of substantial spare capacity. However, others argued that credit
growth would speed up the recovery. One panelist stressed that
economic growth in the region would have stalled even without
falling credit, because structural reforms have stalled. When
these reforms are revived, both economic growth and credit
growth will return.
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B. Presentations by Members of the Panel
Lead: Fabrizio Coricelli, Paris School of Economics and
CEPR15
Creditless recoveries and deleveraging
Creditless recoveries have been a typical feature of recoveries
from financial crises and sudden stops in emerging economies,
as documented by Calvo et al. (2006). Calvo et al. define a
creditless recovery as an episode in which the GDP recovery
point has been reached—when GDP has gone back to its prerecession peak—but the real stock of credit has not recovered its
pre-crisis level. Coricelli and Roland (2011) take a broader
perspective and analyze a sample of 143 countries over the
period 1963–2003, thus excluding the Great Recession. They
identify 421 recession episodes for both advanced and emerging
economies. Table 1 summarizes the frequency of creditless
recoveries and the depth of the recession in creditless recoveries
(defined as the drop in GDP from the pre-recession peak to the
trough).
Table 1: Creditless Recoveries
(In percent)
Creditless Recoveries

Developed
Countries
Emerging
Markets

Recoveries with
Credit
Output
Stock
Decline

Proportion of
Creditless
Recoveries

Output
Decline

Stock

2.6

-10.5

2.0

18.5

35.8

5.0

-18.6

2.5

24.9

40.6

Source: Coricelli and Roland (2011).
Note: Output Decline = Average decline in GDP per capita during the recession period;
Stock = Change in credit per capita between the pre-crisis peak and the full-recovery year.

15 Centre for Economic Policy Research.

131
Interestingly, creditless recoveries are not uncommon.
Furthermore, they are associated to a deeper recession and to a
longer duration of the period from peak to recovery (3.2 years
compared with 2.7 years in the “with-credit recoveries”).
Creditless recoveries may be a cause for concern not only
because of the more persistent recession phase, but also because
of the likelihood that either the post-recovery level of GDP
remains permanently below its pre-recession trend or that the
post-recovery growth rate remains below its pre-recession trend
growth. These two possibilities are presented in Figure 1 and
contrasted with the pattern common to the with-credit recoveries,
defined as a “Friedman recession” (Cerra and Saxena (2008)).
In emerging Europe, following the Great Recession, there is a
highly heterogeneous set of experiences. Some countries, such as
the Baltic States, experienced a creditless recovery. Several
Southern-Eastern European countries experienced a creditless
“nonrecovery,” as GDP has yet to recover its pre-crisis peak—a
phenomenon shared by most European and euro area countries.
Finally, there are countries such as Turkey, which did not
experience any fall in credit and still faces the problem of
containing credit growth. With the exception of Turkey, most
emerging Europe is either in the state described by the first panel
of Figure 1 (“Hamilton recession”) or in the third panel (with a
fall in the growth rate).
Furthermore, with a few exceptions most emerging European
countries face tight credit conditions as a result of their
dependence on the supply of credit originating in the euro area,
which is struggling to reactivate credit supply in a bankdominated financial sector.
The nature of the recovery has crucial implications for the
assessment of the deleveraging process. Indeed, a permanent loss
in output—or, even worse, a permanent loss in the growth rate of
output—implies a growing debt burden in terms of output.
Moreover, lack of inflation, or deflationary pressures present in
the eurozone, further increase the burden of debt.
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Figure 1. Patterns of Post-Recession GDP Dynamics
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Source: Author’s calculations.
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Deleveraging
The eurozone fits into the worst scenario in terms of Figure 1.
Indeed, while the United States seems to replicate a Hamilton
recession, the eurozone is travelling along a dismal growth path,
with no recovery of a pre-crisis growth rate. In fact, six years
since the start of the Great Recession, the eurozone experience
can be defined as stagnation (Figure 2).
As a result, eurozone countries have not yet begun the process of
deleveraging, as the adverse dynamics of output have increased
rather than decreased the total debt to GDP ratios. Looking
forward, this is extremely dangerous. Although the real economy
suffers from a lack of credit, the need to reduce the burden of
debt is a clear obstacle to the revival of credit in the economy.
As households and firms are faced with either the burden of their
own, private debt or with the uncertainty of the future burden on
their income of the government debt, European countries are
confronted with a difficult prospect in revitalizing private credit.
However, the deleveraging process is only one dimension of the
problem.
The other dimension, perhaps even more important, is associated
with the inability of the banking sector to channel credit to the
system, even when central bank policies have induced an
increase in liquidity in the system.
How to revive credit to the economy in Europe
The financial sector of emerging Europe is dominated by the
presence of banks from the eurozone. Therefore, credit supply in
emerging Europe depends on the health and lending policies of
banks of the eurozone. The EIB CESEE Bank Lending Survey
(2013) identifies in the large stock of NPLs and regulation the
two main obstacles to reviving bank credit in Europe.
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Figure 2. GDP Dynamics Post Crisis—United States vs. Eurozone

Source: Geneva Report on the World Economy 16, (2014).

Figure 3. Debt Levels in the Eurozone

Source: Geneva Report on the World Economy 16, (2014)

Against this background, two types of policies have been tried in
Europe. One is the so-called funding-for-lending scheme,
implemented in the United Kingdom during the recent recession,
as well as in Hungary (funding-for-growth scheme) and in some
ways also by the ECB in its targeted longer-term refinancing
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operations (TLTROs). The second is the policy recently
introduced by the ECB to purchase ABS in the market, with a
special focus on SME loans and mortgage loans. We will briefly
discuss these two policies.
Funding-for-lending
The scheme was implemented in the United Kingdom in 2012,
and mainly consisted in reducing the funding costs for banks and
building societies by providing them with relatively cheap
liquidity. Banks received as loans treasury bills for up to four
years in exchange for the widest possible range of collateral,
including existing portfolios of loans. Those treasury bills could
be used as liquid assets to increase lending or turned into cash if
necessary. Banks faced favorable conditions on the funding as
long as a bank’s stock of lending did not contract over the period
to end-2013.
It has been widely recognized that the effects of the scheme were
very disappointing. Mortgage loans showed some signs of
recovery, but loans to SMEs failed to recover; in fact, they
continued declining.
From this experience, one can conclude that reducing the cost of
funding is not sufficient to increase bank loans. Furthermore, in
terms of allocation across types of borrowers, it emerged that the
scheme suffered in consequence of the collateral requirements
that characterized bank loans, collateral requirements that tend to
be tightened in a period of financial distress. Indeed, mortgage
lending may respond, as it is based on ‘’real collateral,’’ whereas
SME lending is harder to revive, as SME projects possess much
less collateral.
ECB purchases of ABS
The ECB has launched in August–September 2014 a plan to
purchase ABS. The rationale of the program is to free resources
for banks that have in their books ABS that are not traded, and in
this way revitalize the ABS market. The final objective of the
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program is to increase credit to the economy, especially for
SMEs and possibly for households.
The scheme has drawbacks: The most serious is likely to be due
to the fact that, if new flows of loans to SMEs are not
guaranteed, banks will be reluctant to lend to SMEs—even if the
ECB buys the existing stock of ABS. Therefore, why may the
program fail in reviving credit flows to the economy? The
reasons are similar to those that have led banks to invest the
funds obtained through the LTRO in treasury bills rather than
bank loans. Indeed, left to make their own decisions, banks may
have incentives to reduce loans where they are most needed.
Market failure is a salient feature of financial crises, during
which banks become dysfunctional.
Reallocation of resources
In addition to the negative effects of a large stock of NPLs and
procyclical regulatory measures, there is a fundamental problem
impairing the efficient functioning of credit markets during the
recovery from a financial crisis.
The problem is that loan contracts tend to be associated to
collateral requirements. During a financial crisis, collateral
values collapse and, thus, the firms’ borrowing capacity falls.
Banks are more risk averse in the aftermath of crises, and thus
collateral requirements are likely to be tightened. Most
important, the availability of collateral is not correlated with the
production efficiency of the borrower. The amount of collateral
available for the firm is largely a technological parameter, as it is
linked to the tangibility of its assets. For instance, real estate
tends to be associated to real collateral. Even though the fall in
real estate prices experienced during the crisis has sharply
reduced the value of housing as collateral, it is remarkable that
after the crisis real estate experiences a more rapid recovery than
many manufacturing SMEs (see above example on the United
Kingdom). The hoped-for reallocation of resources away from
real estate and construction—spurred before the crisis by
excessive lending—to dynamic manufacturing or service firms is
impeded by imperfections in financial markets.
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Therefore, even accepting the view that rather than an overall
increase in credit to the economy, an efficient recovery,
consistent with gradual deleveraging, should rely on a better
allocation of credit, it remains true that the market is unlikely to
achieve such efficient reallocation of resources.
Dilemma and solutions
In summary, it is hard to revive credit without more direct and
targeted interventions by central banks. How can we reconcile
this with the objective of avoiding political capture and a large
distortion of the private banking sector? It is hard to find
solutions. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape innovative measures
that are able to reach directly the real economy and the firms and
sectors more in need of credit. Adam Posen has suggested that
the United Kingdom create a state-backed and dedicated smallbusiness lending bank with funding support from the Bank of
England. Similarly, for the euro area, proposals have been
advanced to complement purchases of SME-related ABS with
guarantees from the ECB for new loans to SMEs, which will be
later on be securitized (Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2014)).
In general, a more pragmatic approach is needed, perhaps
learning from the Brazilian experience after the Argentinean
crisis at the beginning of the 2000s, whereby the central bank
lent directly to exporters with large immediate benefits for the
real economy (Calvo et al. (2013).
Panelist 1: Erdem Başçi Governor, Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey
Thank you very much Fabrizio, and thank you for the invitation.
It is always a pleasure to be in Slovenia.
It is an interesting feeling to be the first speaker on this panel and
to talk not about how to revive credit markets, but about how to
contain credit booms. Fortunately, our problem is a rather nice
one, as we are still trying to contain and direct the credit
expansion in Turkey. There are many reasons why we still have
a relatively rapid credit growth in this global environment.
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One of the reasons is the low household sector leverage that we
had initially. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved after
four decades of extremely high and volatile inflation and
extremely heavy fiscal dominance. Turkey solved the fiscal
dominance problem by bringing down the budget deficit-to-GDP
ratio from double-digit levels to below 2 percent as of now. With
the inflation targeting regime, we have also addressed the
inflation problem and decreased it to single digit levels. Since
then, access to long maturities and the low cost of credit have led
to a significant demand coming from households and firms for
all sorts of credit.
Now, the question is, what do you do with your external
account? If the private-sector debt is booming instead of publicsector debt, then you have a low domestic savings rate and,
inevitably therefore, a high external deficit. Having an external
deficit at levels like 10 percent of GDP in 2011, may sound a
good idea if you had ample liquidity thanks to quantitative
easing in major central banks. But when people start talking
about normalization, then the spotlight turns on the countries
with external deficits. It is, therefore, a good idea to contain the
extremely rapid credit growth in the private sector through
macroprudential policies. Turkey has used those effectively,
together with monetary policy.
I would like to express two points that are essential to revive
credit––first, to provide liquidity from the central bank, and
second, to ensure that central bank liquidity is allocated to useful
ends by the banking sector.
In our case, the situation is somehow similar, but the opposite.
We basically should reduce liquidity, including the creation of
“inside money.” Regarding the second point, we should ensure
that liquidity continues to support productive forms of credit at a
sustainable pace, which I call a “targeted credit policy.” How do
you run a targeted credit policy? One very nice example, which
works well in Turkey, is a state-owned bank that is directly
targeting SMEs. This is basically a bank, which is eligible to get
some subsidy from the government’s budget. Therefore, in the
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budget there is an amount which will be transferred to specific
types of SMEs through subsidized loans. This has been there for
a long while, since the bank was established many decades ago.
It is working well.
Previously, before Turkey’s 2001 crisis, the problem was that
this subsidy was not budgeted; the bank was directly ordered to
lend to SMEs at a low cost and thereby made losses. That was a
very bad idea, and then after a reform in 2002, this process
became very transparent––there is a budgeted amount,
everybody knows the fiscal costs, and the bank makes money off
these loans. The purpose is served by this budgetary subsidy
mechanism. The second example is coming from history. The
central bank has been using funding for an exports program.
Turkey has an export deficit problem; therefore, it is a good idea
to fund exporters directly. The second use of this program is
lending to exporters in domestic currency, but with FX indexed
to LIBOR, through the Turkish Eximbank (state-owned
investment bank for financing exports) and any other bank
willing to use this facility. They then put a very minor spread on
these funds and lend them to the exporters. This is, in essence,
like buying FX from our exporters, so we are building our
reserves through this channel. This facility has been used from
time to time in history, and after the global financial crisis in
2008, we have reactivated it by increasing the line. Today, the
stock of receivables we have from this channel is US$9 billion,
and we are going to add this amount to our reserves within the
coming eight months.
These are just some examples. But then, what do we do about
consumer loans? The pace of consumer credit growth reached
35 percent, 40 percent nominal, when QE2 started at the end of
2010. That was simply unsustainable and not very good for the
current account deficit as well. Our research has also shown that
consumer loans are the main drivers of the current account
deficit, in sharp contrast to business loans. We have really taken
a lot of macroprudential measures such as higher risk weights on
nonmortgage consumer loans―100 percent and 150 percent,
depending on the maturity, well above the Basel II minimum;
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and also 50 percent instead of 35 percent on mortgages. We have
introduced a LTV restriction of 75 percent on housing loans; also
recently, loan-to-income restrictions initially for credit cards, and
we will then extend these restrictions to broader types of
consumer loans. All in all, it works. Now, the pace of consumer
credit growth has come below 10 percent, which is compatible
with our macro objectives, including the external deficit. But
commercial loans still keep growing at about 20 percent,
nominal. So basically, the composition is shifting from consumer
loans to commercial loans. But as a central bank, we have not
been able to do it alone; the bank regulator and the Government
had to take action to achieve this by using macroprudential
policy instruments.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Panelist 2: Adam Balog, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of
Hungary
Thank you for the invitation. I am really sorry that the Governor
could not come; it was a last minute issue. I will try to convey
what he wanted to explain.
The first thing about Hungary––it is a very small and open
economy. It is among the top ten most-open economies in the
world, which means a lot of things strategically in the credit and
capital markets. First, half of our GDP is produced by
multinational companies, who are financed by their parent
companies. We do not have much to do with that.
Second, we have the SME market, which is responsible for the
second half. This is highly fragmented, and very hard to finance
through the capital market; only bank credit is an option for
them. However, our banking sector is to a large extent foreignowned; but this would not be a problem, except that they are
foreign-directed banks and it is really hard for them to
understand how the Hungarian SME market works. That is the
reason why there are constant problems in solving credit issues
with the SME sector.
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Third, we have the household sector, which is about 40 percent
employed by either multinationals or the state, and it is a
relatively lucrative segment for the banks.
All in all, this situation resulted in some issues for SME
financing even before the crisis, but especially after it. In
practice, it meant that competition among the banks took place in
the household sector, in the form of FX lending, or in the
multinational sector, where, as I just said, we do not have much
to do, or in commercial real estate lending, where a small
Hungarian real estate bubble evolved. Thus, poor SMEs with a
normal business have always had a problem in accessing credit
in Hungary.
Then the crisis came, and—in a country like Hungary with an
open economy, a huge budget deficit, and growth problems—
unfortunately it not only resulted in contraction in lending where
the problems occurred; I mean here particularly the household
sector, but also in SME lending, where excessive lending had not
taken place. SME loans outstanding amounted to 14–15 percent
of GDP, which, when compared to other countries, is less than a
quarter, less than a half. Still, after 2009, a steady contraction in
SME lending started, reaching minus 5–6 percent annual growth
rate.
Hungary needed a targeted solution. First we had to understand
where the problem was, because there was not a liquidity
problem in Hungary. We have seen the decrease in other sectors
more as normalization and not a problem; only in the SME
sector did we see it as an issue. We reviewed the situation
regarding debt and found both supply and demand problems. For
SMEs, the cost was actually too high; interest rates of 8, 10, and
12 percent were not affordable to the SMEs, while banks—due
to issues with the government, the legislation, and the general
problem of the banking groups in Europe—decided to change
their credit conditions negatively. For SMEs, they increased
considerably the role of collateral, making it almost impossible
for SMEs to fulfill these conditions. Hence, all other steps were
very negative to SMEs.
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The Hungarian National Bank decided on a funding for lending
scheme, a targeted scheme with two phases. First, the goal was
to revive SME lending. Here we allowed the refinancing of
outstanding loans, including the refinancing of FX loans to
Hungarian florint loans, and only to a small extent were banks
asked to finance, for example, investments. The interest rate
charged to banks by the national bank was zero percent, and they
were allowed to lend to SMEs at a maximum of 2.5 percent. It
was not a general easing, but a targeted one. Nevertheless, the
administration was managed by the banks, the selection of SMEs
was made by the banks, and risks were assumed by banks as
well. Even if we accepted the SME loans as collateral, we did so
with a 50-percent haircut, while the other 50 percent of the
collateral had to be standard eligible securities.
The first phase was, in our view, very successful because in three
months EUR2.3 billion was lent, which stopped the decrease in
SME lending. Even the annual growth rate went to slightly
positive territory, so we saw a small but steady increase in SME
lending. It is largely attributable to the scheme, but we also saw
signs that normal lending had started to improve as well.
The second phase was different; it was even more targeted. Here
we allowed basically only new loans, as 90 percent of the
scheme has to be used for new lending and only 10 percent is
allowed for refinancing. Investment loans are preferred within
new loans.
This scheme stopped the decrease in SME lending and the
second phase has already boosted the economy in Hungary,
which all in all, according to our calculations, may lead to a 0.5–
1 percent GDP increase this year and next year. We are also
writing a paper about that, which is already underway and will
be ready in few weeks. Thank you very much.
Panelist 3: Yannis Stournaras, Governor, Bank of Greece
The global financial crisis has impaired the ability of the
financial system in the euro area to channel funds to the real
economy, in particular, for the financing of long-term investment
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and SMEs. Banks in the euro area have been particularly
affected as the financial crisis was followed by a sovereign debt
crisis, which has set in motion a negative feedback loop between
banks and sovereigns. As a result, over the past six years, bank
credit to the real economy and, in particular to SMEs, has fallen
dramatically in the EU. Credit, which had been growing at
double-digit growth rates before the global financial crisis, has
contracted during the past few years.
The crisis also hit banks in the CESEE region, as foreign bank
engagement in the region declined and the over-indebtedness of
households and businesses, a legacy of the earlier credit
expansion, led to a large and rising volume of NPLs. In some
cases, those have reached, or exceeded, 20 percent of total loans.
As a result, bank credit in the region declined from average
growth rates above 30 percent in the period 2003–08 to close to
zero or even negative rates of growth in recent years.
Bank credit is particularly important for economic growth in the
EU. This situation is attributable to the fact that European
economies are heavily dependent on bank financing. This
dependence on banks is in contrast to the United States, where
capital markets play a bigger role in financing the economy.
CESEE economies are also bank-based financial systems in
which capital markets remain relatively underdeveloped.
Consequently, bank deleveraging, combined with increased risk
aversion on the part of investors, has affected the ability to
finance sustainable growth throughout the region.
A key characteristic of the economic recovery in the euro area at
the present stage is the weakness of bank lending to the private
sector in general and to companies in particular. This situation
applies at both the aggregate level and for many individual
countries.
The situation appears to be better in the CESEE region (perhaps
with the exception of Turkey), as credit growth remains on
average positive, but is nevertheless too weak to support
satisfactory rates of sustainable growth. In particular, there are
countries—like Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
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FYROM—where credit to the private sector is experiencing a
moderate recovery;, but in other countries—such as Slovenia,
Serbia, and to a lesser extent Croatia and Romania—bank credit
growth to the private sector, and in particular to enterprises, is
still negative.
As Fabrizio Coricelli has discussed in his presentation, creditless
recoveries are not uncommon in the aftermath of financial crises,
in particular, when the financial crisis has been preceded by a
credit boom to the private sector. Calvo et al. (2006), in a
seminal paper published in the American Economic Review,
describe creditless recoveries as “Phoenix Miracles.” The
phenomenon of creditless recoveries has been documented
mainly in emerging market and low-income economies, but
seems to also play a role in industrial countries. Empirical
evidence suggests that creditless recoveries are more likely when
the preceding recession was deep and when the recession
coincided with a banking crisis. Several other factors also play a
role: the openness of the economy to financial flows; the degree
of export dependence; the degree of external adjustment during
the recession; and the stance and mix of fiscal and monetary
policies.
Several explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed in
the literature. One explanation is that economies can rebound
without bank credit because capacity utilization is low during a
recession, allowing GDP to recover mainly through the
absorption of unused capacity rather than through investment. A
second explanation is that, in the absence of bank credit, firms
increasingly use internal finance and trade credit. Furthermore,
even if bank credit is declining, it may be reallocated toward
more dynamic sectors, thus allowing an economic rebound.
Empirical research at the Bank of Greece suggests that the
probability of a creditless recovery depends on two additional
features of the economy: first, the saving investment gap—in
other words, the net financing needs of the private sector; and
second, the degree of a country’s fiscal and external adjustment
during the recession. In particular, the lower the net financing
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needs of the private sector at the bottom of the recession, the
more likely it is that the economy can recover without bank
credit. Since the gap between investment and savings can be
financed through either capital inflows from abroad (in other
words via current account deficits) or through lower budget
deficits (in other words by freeing private savings to finance
investment), saving-investment imbalances naturally correspond
to fiscal and external imbalances.
A second important implication of this research is that the degree
of a country’s fiscal and external adjustment during the recession
plays a significant role during the recovery. In particular, the
probability that a country may experience a creditless recovery is
higher in countries that have followed economic adjustment
policies during the recession to reduce their external and fiscal
deficits. This result has important implications for both countries
of the euro area periphery and countries of the CESEE region.
Nevertheless, creditless recoveries are suboptimal outcomes
from an economic policy perspective since, as has been observed
by several researchers, creditless recoveries are on average
weaker than recoveries with credit. As Fabrizio Coricelli also
points out, creditless recoveries may have negative effects on
long-run potential growth by affecting investment and the stock
of productive capital, but also by increasing long-term
unemployment.
A number of actions may be undertaken in order to address the
problem. I will confine my remarks to three areas: monetary
policy; confidence in the banking sector; and initiatives that
target the mobilization of funds from capital markets, thus
broadening the sources of financing the economy. I will focus on
our recent experience in the euro area, in general, and Greece, in
particular—where the banking system has undergone a
significant transformation over the past few years. Overall, my
emphasis will be on measures that aim to revive bank credit and
to mobilize funds from capital markets.
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Monetary policy
On monetary policy, the ECB has taken important actions to
improve confidence and to restore the smooth operation of the
monetary transmission mechanism. Credit growth would have
been significantly more negative had it not been for these
actions.
The policy rate is now at a historical low of five basis points.
Nonstandard measures, including the TLTROs, the ABS
Purchase Program and the third Covered Bond Purchase
Program, will inject liquidity into both banks and markets.
Confidence in the banking sector
The establishment of the Banking Union is restoring confidence
in the banking sector. The supervisory authorities are assessing
the resilience of banks and requesting injections of capital, so
that confidence in the quality of bank balance sheets will be
restored. In this respect, the Comprehensive Assessment and the
EU-wide stress tests, which are currently underway, will be key
to improving confidence in the banking sector. The Banking
Union will also help reduce financial fragmentation.
The faster that banks clean up their balance sheets, the easier it
will be for them to regain confidence, to attract fresh capital
from private investors, and to provide credit to the economy.
At this point, allow me to say a few words about Greek banks.
Following the first recapitalization of our banks in 2012, we
began to reform and consolidate the banking system. Banks
sharply reduced reliance on central bank funding, while forming
provisions for bad loans. As a result, they have been able to
attract private investors.
Early this year, we concluded follow-up stress tests that were
exceptionally well received by the markets. Following the
release of the results of the stress tests in March, core banks
completed much larger than requested capital increases to the
tune of EUR 8.3 billion, with issues being significantly

147
oversubscribed. Two systemic banks have repaid state aid that
has been in the form of preference shares. All four systemic
banks are now under private management.
These are the signs needed to restore confidence and lay the
foundation for the healthy financing of the economy at a later
stage.
Mobilizing funds from capital markets
Returning to the broader picture, it appears that bank credit will
remain constrained at least until the European stress tests are
completed and banks adjust to the results of the exercise. The
burden of NPLs in economies that have gone through a deep
recession––and Greece is a good example here––will be a major
factor constraining the supply of bank credit in the medium term.
Given the limited quantity of resources, it is important that banks
use these limited resources in a way that improves allocative
efficiency. In other words, they have to be channeled to the most
productive uses.
Nevertheless, despite the important role that banks will continue
to play in the EU, particularly for SMEs, it has been clearly
communicated by market participants that there is a pressing
need to broaden the sources of long-term financing in Europe.
Broadening the sources of financing of the economy toward
capital markets should be viewed as one of the key priorities of
economic policy.
In this respect, the development of a deep, transparent, and
robust European securitization market for corporate loans would
improve risk sharing and increase banks’ lending capacity to
corporates and, in particular, SMEs.
And this solution will probably serve its purpose better this time
than previously, since the lessons of the inadequate regulation of
some securitization models in the past can be taken into account.
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The ABS and the Covered Bond Purchase Programs will provide
an initial boost, especially for the European ABS market, which
has lain largely dormant since 2008.
However, in my view, if we are to move farther towards the
development of a market for corporate loans, a concerted effort
is needed in several directions. A list of key priorities in order to
revive credit markets should include the following:
1) Further measures to revive the market for
securitizations, in particular for SME bank loans.
Securitization is an important instrument to promote
bank credit. Allowing banks to securitize and
redistribute SME loans to a broader investor base
can provide banks with capital relief and allow them
to lend to the real economy. This is not an easy task
given the stigma attached to securitization following
the global financial crisis, when the “originate-todistribute” model led to excessive leverage and
financial fragility. Of course, lessons have been
learned since then, and the regulatory framework has
been adapted in a way that makes a repeat of past
mistakes unlikely. For this securitization to work in
a way that does not endanger the resilience of the
financial system, we must ensure that only highquality assets that are simple and transparent are
used in securitizations. In this respect, it is important
to develop a set of rules that allow the definition of a
pool of “high-quality securitizations” at the EU
level.
2) Changes to the prudential treatment of
securitizations. It is essential, in my view, to adjust
the regulatory framework for securitizations in a
way that provides banks with incentives to engage in
the market. Capital relief for banks’ holdings of
ABS which are simple, transparent, and robust could
provide an answer. The second aspect of regulation
relates to potential investors, such as insurers,
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pension funds, etc. The regulatory framework should
allow for a fair treatment of high-quality ABS
relative to ABS products with higher risk profiles, in
order to provide long-term institutional investors
with incentives to trade in the market.
3) Policies to promote better access of SMEs to capital
markets. As is well known, corporate bond markets
work well for large corporations while they are not
attractive to SMEs, which remain largely dependent
on bank loans for financing. Efforts should be
undertaken to reverse this trend and promote the
access of SMEs to capital markets. The development
of “mini bond” markets for SMEs in Italy and
Germany could serve as examples to gain insights
into best practices for the establishment of SME
markets. The development of bond and equity
markets for SMEs and mid-sized companies would
also encourage more cross-border investment within
the EU and from foreign investors.
4) Measures to develop alternative financial
intermediaries for young companies and SMEs. In
this context, efforts should be intensified toward the
creation of a risk capital market for non-listed
companies such as a market for venture capital funds
and markets for infrastructure financing. MiFID II is
an important step towards improving the functioning
of EU trading venues and setting the stage for the
development of SME capital markets. However,
further steps are necessary, in particular, to correct
differences throughout the EU in the tax treatment of
these products both at the issuer and investor level.
5) Measures to improve investors’ access to business,
credit, and financial information on SMEs. It is
well-known that most SMEs are not rated by rating
agencies. The lack of adequate and readily available
information on the credit quality of SMEs is a
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structural problem in the EU as a whole and in the
CESEE region, in particular. This is one of the major
reasons that SMEs in the EU have historically faced
significant difficulties in accessing funding from
capital markets.
There is, thus, the need for a harmonized EU
approach to credit scoring comparability of SME
data. Improving the availability of financial
information is paramount in allowing investors to
gauge the riskiness of securitized products. In this
respect, it is important to develop national credit
registers for SMEs, allowing for higher
transparency, standardization, and comparability of
underlying assets.
A final word of caution is in order: Most of the measures I have
discussed above will likely have only medium- to long-term
effects in reviving credit markets in the EU, because most of
these measures constitute fundamental changes in the structure
of the financial system. Such structures naturally change only
gradually over time. In the short term, monetary policy will
continue to play the major role in determining liquidity provision
to banks and the cost of funding for the private sector.
Nonstandard monetary policy measures and progress towards a
Banking Union are, thus, of prime importance, in order to reduce
market fragmentation and allow the normal transmission of
monetary policy to the most vulnerable areas of the monetary
union.
Panelist 4: Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor, Banco de
España
Introduction
Thank you very much and good morning to everyone. It is a
pleasure to be at this important conference, on this important
matter.
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Recent developments in the euro area show a diverging path
between the evolution of the real economy and lending
dynamics. While GDP is recovering, credit to nonfinancial
corporations continues contracting, as Figure 1 shows. In this
context, if credit does not recover, logical concerns about
economic prospects arise.
However, in my opinion, the analysis of credit developments and
the implications for growth is not straightforward and before
taking or recommending any policy action, a thorough
examination of the factors explaining credit developments is
required.
With this in mind, my contribution to this debate lies in
providing an overview of the factors explaining credit behavior
(Section 1), and discussing possible policy actions based on the
diagnosis that those factors suggest (Section 2). The analysis
focuses on developments in the euro area, but this analysis is
complemented in some particular aspects with evidence
corresponding to the Spanish economy.
Figure 1. GDP and Bank Lending to Nonfinancial Corporations: Euro
Area Year-on-Year Growth in Real Terms
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What factors explain credit behavior?
As mentioned before, in order to define the policy agenda, we
need to first analyze the factors explaining credit behavior. This
implies analyzing first the extent to which supply restrictions
predominate or not over poor credit demand. If demand factors
are relevant, then it has to be considered whether weak credit
demand is associated to the necessary corrections of imbalances.
It is subsequently important to pay attention to whether we can
expect recovery of credit demand before recovery of output, and
finally whether we can identify specific supply frictions that
need to be addressed.
Can we disentangle credit demand from credit supply changes?
Starting then with the first question on whether supply
restrictions predominate or not over poor credit demand, we have
to acknowledge that disentangling credit demand from credit
supply changes is far from easy.
Having said that, and not wishing to go into a detailed
description of supply and demand factors and its recent
evolution,16 some insight can be provided by turning to the Bank
Lending Survey17 that asks participating banks to provide their

16 A detailed description of the credit evolution in Spain can be found in Ayuso, J. (2013), “An

Analysis of the Situation of Lending in Spain,” Economic Bulletin, October 2013, Banco de España.
17 The Bank Lending Survey is an official quarterly survey that has been conducted in coordination

with all the euro area national central banks and the ECB since January 2003. The survey asks a
representative group of credit institutions about the changes in their lending policies and perceived
demand, distinguishing between three market segments: nonfinancial corporations, households for
house purchase, and households for consumption and other purposes. They are likewise asked
about their forecasts for the following three months.
Aggregate results for the euro area are regularly published on the ECB website:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html. The results for the
participating Spanish institutions are published on the Banco de España’s website:
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/infoest/epb.html.

(continued)
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views on developments in credit demand and supply. Figure 2
shows cumulative changes in demand and supply in the segment
of lending to nonfinancial corporations in the euro area and
Spain, extracted from the Survey, i.e., it shows the results over
time of the cumulative changes in demand and supply that the
survey provides for each quarter.
Figure 2. Bank Lending Survey, Cumulative Changes in Demand and
Supply, and Bank Lending to Nonfinancial Corporations
(In percentage points)
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These cumulative changes reveal that during the crisis the weak
bank lending to nonfinancial corporations has been driven by

Additionally, quarterly articles in the Economic Bulletin of the Banco de España summarize the
results of the Survey corresponding to the participating Spanish institutions and compare them to
the results corresponding to the euro area.
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both demand and supply factors, in Spain as well as in the euro
area. More recently, there have been some signs of a mild
recovery in both demand and supply. But current levels are still
significantly below the pre-crisis levels.
Panelist 5: Bojan Marković, Lead Economist, EBRD
Let me please lay down several points relevant for the revival of
bank credit growth in the CESEE region.
First, one should hardly expect a revival of economic and thus
credit growth in the CESEE region to the pre-crisis level if
structural reforms are not reinvigorated. The EBRD regularly
produces the so-called transition indicators, measuring structural
gaps between market practices in CESEE countries and best
practices in developed countries. These indicators kept
improving until the mid-2000s, but across all the transition
regions, including CESEE, they stalled from 2005 onwards
(Figure 1). This suggests that structural reforms stalled in the
mid-2000s, i.e., before the crisis struck, and some of the CESEE
countries have even witnessed reform reversals during the
prolonged crisis period. The CESEE region seems to have
become “stuck in transition,” implying that economic growth
would have probably stalled even without the fall in bank credit.
In its 2013 Transition Report, the EBRD found that—without
structural reform—revival growth convergence between some of
the CESEE countries and Western European countries may not
continue, while in some countries it may continue but at much
slower rates than otherwise (Figure 2). This has clear
implications for the pace of bank credit growth, but also
indicates that the revival of credit growth will not be sufficient to
sustainably revive economic growth.
The second point I’d like to make is that the credit growth
revival may optimally be slower in CESEE countries where the
credit-to-GDP ratio was a way too high before the crisis
(Figure 3). In the decade before the crisis, many of the CESEE
countries recorded consumption-driven growth financed by large
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Figure 1. Structural Reforms Across Transition Regions Have Stalled
Since Mid-2000s

Figure 2. Without Structural Reform Revival Growth Convergence in
Europe May Not Continue

Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2013.

capital inflows, often through banks, which resulted in large
external imbalances, as reflected in unsustainable double-digit
current account deficits. In such circumstances, some sectors—
e.g., nontradable services—overdeveloped, while some
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potentially prosperous sectors remained underdeveloped.
Ensuing deleveraging and lower bank credit growth in some
CESEE countries, therefore, may have been an optimal and
necessary adjustment (Figure 4).
The second point I’d like to make is that the credit growth
revival may optimally be slower in CESEE countries where the
credit-to-GDP ratio was a way too high before the crisis
(Figure 3). In the decade before the crisis, many of the CESEE
countries recorded consumption-driven growth financed by large
capital inflows, often through banks, which resulted in large
external imbalances, as reflected in unsustainable double-digit
current account deficits. In such circumstances, some sectors—
e.g., nontradable services—overdeveloped, while some
potentially prosperous sectors remained underdeveloped.
Ensuing deleveraging and lower bank credit growth in some
CESEE countries, therefore, may have been an optimal and
necessary adjustment (Figure 4).
That leads me to the third point to make. The ability of banks to
revive credit growth in the CESEE region sustainably over the
longer term will likely depend on who gets the new credit––
viable restructured corporates or nonviable corporates. In other
words, it is the quality rather than quantity of credit growth that
may matter, especially in countries that need to change sectoral
drivers of growth in the future—such as those with previously
large current account deficits. As mentioned, in those CESEE
countries, corporates that flourished in a decade of consumptiondriven growth were usually those in the nontradable services
sector. Business models of some of these corporates will not
necessarily remain viable in the future and they may have to
wind down. Some of them have already accumulated delayed
debt, contributing to increasing NPLs across the CESEE region.
Continued support to these weak nonviable corporates holds
back loans to viable corporates, preventing the economic
restructuring and sustainable economic and credit growth
revival.
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Figure 3. CESEE Credit-to-GDP Ratio Before the Crisis—
Private Credit
(In percent of GDP)

Source: IMF WEO, CEIC.

Figure 4. Deleveraging During the Crisis—BIS Reporting Bankers’
Claims (FX-adjusted) as Share of 2012 Nominal GDP
(In percent)

Source: BIS.

Policy focus thus should be less on “more bank credit” and more
on making the corporate sector stronger to be able to take on
more long-term debt and redevelop securitization and capital
market funding in general, not only bank-lending funding.
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Indiscriminate lending support was partly the reason why some
of the policy measures implemented over the past few years in
some of the CESEE countries didn’t eventually yield sustainable
credit growth. In Serbia, for example, the policy of subsidized
loans, which was in place from 2009 to 2014, arguably kept alive
many nonviable corporates, interfered with the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, and often just substituted credit—
which would anyways be extended through market mechanisms.
Even more discriminate subsidies should be taken with caution,
as governments throughout history were often less efficient than
markets in picking up national champions amongst corporates.
The fourth point I’d like to make is that the ability of central
banks to revive credit growth—e.g., through TLTRO—will
likely be particularly limited in countries with large NPLs,
especially when these reflect underlying problems in the
corporate sector, and these need to be resolved. Large NPLs,
even when fully provisioned, discourage new lending, as they:
(i) absorb managerial time, both in banks and corporates, thus
suffocating managers’ focus on new lending and core business;
(ii) lower the average return on the total stock of loans, thus
pushing up on interest rates on performing loans; and (iii) lower
expectations of future economic growth, thus further building-up
interest margins and cost of funding for performing loans.
But large NPLs in CESEE countries are mostly a reflection of
problems in the corporate sector, and thus clearing-up bank
balance sheets may not be sufficient to kick-start new lending. It
should be accompanied by a comprehensive corporaterestructuring action, which would: delineate upfront between
viable and nonviable corporates; restructure the prior ones; and,
in an orderly manner, wind down the latter ones. In CESEE
countries, the restructuring will be particularly challenging due
to the heterogeneous nature of NPLs in terms of sectors and in
terms of the same corporate debt consisting of a series of
bilateral lending contracts with multiple (sometimes dozens of)
lenders.
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Figure 5. Current Accounts Have Largely Rebalanced
During the Crisis
(In percent)
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Figure 6. NPLs Remain Persistently High Across the Region
(In percent)
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In such circumstances, coordination between various
stakeholders within and between countries may prove very
important. The best-suited available framework to ensure such
coordination may be the so-called Vienna Initiative framework,
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which includes home and host-country banks, regulators,
international financial institutions, and investors. The good news
is that this framework has been recently intensifying efforts on
coordinating its various stakeholders in CESEE countries with
large NPLs in order to enable them to draw on each other’s ideas
and experiences on their resolution, and yet formulate a tailormade solution, which would stimulate the orderly resolution of
NPLs.
The final point to make is that the ability of banks to extend
credits in times of changing sectoral drivers of growth may be
impeded due to the use of historically based credit-assessment
models. When drivers of growth change, corporates that did well
in the past may not do well in the future and vice versa. So
historical data is worth less than otherwise, and credit assessment
methodologies commonly used in banks may: (i) lead to
continued forbearance of nonviable corporate clients; and,
perhaps more importantly, (ii) prevent credit flowing towards
corporates with good future prospects. The issue is particularly
pertinent in the CESEE region with a large share of foreignowned banks and credit-assessment procedures unified and often
centralized in so-called home countries. Many of these home
countries have not experienced changing drivers of growth and
historically based credit-assessment models work well there, so
regional banks have little incentive to change the existing
methodology. While it makes sense for the regional banking
groups to have a unique risk-assessment methodology for the
whole group, the unified methodologies may sometimes
disadvantage subsidiaries in CESEE countries with changing
drivers of growth. Developing alternative assessment
methodologies, more aligned to the needs of particular CESEE
markets, may thus be desirable to prevent piling-up liquidity in
CESEE banks, and to help channel bank credit to prospectively
viable corporates. Furthermore, this may prove particularly
useful when these viable corporates are start-ups, or innovative
firms with an often uncertain and volatile cash flow. In such
cases, developing nonbank funding—such as venture capital,
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factoring, or securitization—may additionally help towards the
sustainable revival of economic growth.

C. Discussions
A number of issues were raised by participants from the floor
following the presentations by the panelists. The issues were
mainly related to the role of macroprudential instruments,
nonstandard monetary policy measures, asymmetries of policy
effects between stressed and nonstressed countries, and the size
of the banking sector.


While agreeing about the importance of the
securitization, one participant cautioned that small
countries have a small volume problem, which could
potentially translate into a price problem. He proposed
supranational ABS as a potential solution that would
provide sufficient volumes to be attractive for investors.



He also asked whether there is scope for
macroprudential measures to boost credit growth, and he
expressed scepticism that such instruments could work
symmetrically. He related this issue to the optimal size
of the banking sector and wondered whether it is
sensible to promote credit growth to the extent that
would return the economies to pre-crisis volumes.



Another participant raised the issue of whether the
promise of the introduction of the ABS-purchase
program by the euro system is having adverse effects on
the incentives of banks to use other long-term
refinancing operations provided by central banks. He
noted that this could cause a delay in accessing existing
schemes for liquidity provision while banks waited for
the introduction of the new program.



A final question concerned the extent to which
unconventional monetary policies introduced within the
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euro area are having asymmetric effects on countries
under stress and on those that are not stressed.
Panelists’ responses to questions
Securitization, macroprudential policies, and the ABS and
TLTRO programs. Several panelists agreed with the problem of
small volume with securitization. One pointed out that, in
addition to increasing volume, cross-border securitization would
exploit the opportunity for diversification of risks. The inclusion
of other asset classes—mortgages, for example—was viewed as
a potential solution to the small volume problem. While
technically difficult, such securitization is feasible provided there
is political will and potential involvement of supranational
entities, such as the EIB, in the process of securitization. The
panelist further argued that the ABS-purchase program would
bring the benefits of lower long-term interest rates for SMEs and
thus would foster economic activity.
Regarding the asymmetric effects of macroprudential policies,
one panelist noted that such policies may work both ways,
provided that they are sufficiently tight during booms to form
buffers that can be released during downturns. Another panelist
agreed that asymmetries were induced by macroprudential
measures and proposed greater financial integration as a
solution. An integrated financial union would be able to
redistribute liquidity from the areas where liquidity was plentiful
to the areas that may need this liquidity.
Most panelists agreed that the ABS-purchase program and
TLTRO programs are complements, rather than substitutes. One
panelist observed that some banks may be waiting for the details
of both programs to become fully known before deciding on
which instrument to use to obtain liquidity.
Another panelist linked the issue of securitization and ABS
purchases to the issue of asymmetric effects of unconventional
monetary policy. He argued that stressed economies have
problems with collateral for monetary policy operations due to
low credit ratings. While it would be illogical to exclude some
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countries' government bonds from refinancing operations on this
account, the benefit of ABS is that they can function as collateral
that is supplementary to government bonds.
Banking-sector size. One panelist noted that there is little
consensus on the issue of the optimal size of the banking sector.
However, it is important for the various ratios to be balanced,
such as the ratio between debt and equity, and the relationship
between financing and GDP.
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VII. PANEL 4: RISKS OF A NEW FINANCIAL
CRISIS

A. Summary
The panel discussed the risks of a new financial crisis affecting
the CESEE region. The hoped-for revival of credit growth may
be disrupted by renewed financial market turmoil and
macroeconomic strains. Also, misdirected or mistimed efforts to
stimulate the economy generally and in particular credit growth
may themselves be procyclical and destabilizing. The panel
therefore considered both the probability attached to various
shocks, and the evolution of financial system resilience in the
light of macroeconomic conditions and the policies pursued.
There was acknowledgement of the difficulties attached to
predicting the timing of renewed tensions and how they may
play out. Over a long enough time horizon, a major (exogenous)
negative shock is inevitable, but certain policies may be
available to enhance resilience and reduce the chance of
endogenous shocks.
There was consensus that various market rigidities in Europe and
inherited weaknesses are increasing the risk of prolonged low
growth and intensified vulnerabilities. The market rigidities need
not in themselves provoke a crisis; but may prevent financial and
nonfinancial institutions from building-up resilience to an
eventual exogenous shock, most obviously by condemning them
to low profitability and low growth.
Debt overhangs—whether in the corporate, household, bank, or
government sectors—may persistently depress investment and
consumption, and therefore growth. In these conditions, the debt
overhang is difficult to work off, as are the substantial stocks of
NPLs. Moreover, many financial institutions are not currently
profitable enough to restore their buffers from internal resources.
This uncertainty surrounding the European banking system may
hamper recovery.
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Labor markets in much of Europe display hysteresis, affecting
especially young workers, with all the attendant economic and
social costs. Youth unemployment is a social problem, a political
problem, and a generational problem. There is a need for more
investment, especially private investment but also public
investment. That investment will support both demand and also,
if well chosen, potential growth; but it requires a reduction in
uncertainty and a rekindling of optimism about economic
prospects.
Turning to possible exogenous shocks to the region, at present
obvious geopolitical risks prevail. Certain sectors have already
been affected significantly by the sanctions on Russia and that
country’s economic difficulties. Also, the European recovery has
been largely export-led; so a slowdown, especially in emergingmarket economies (for example, because of strains affecting
highly leveraged multinationals), would have strong
repercussions. Credit risk would then intensify further, most
notably in export sectors—which have, so far, been rather
insulated from recession. Even without a major global
slowdown, Europe—including the CESEE region—cannot
expect to see a further large strengthening of its current account
balance.
The current environment of very low interest rates and loose
monetary policy has certainly eased tensions; but the eventual
exit from this situation will require a delicate policy balance,
especially if some countries exit earlier and faster than others. In
this context, the prospective tightening of U.S. (and U.K.)
monetary policy could be a catalyst for a change in sentiment.
Certain financial markets, including those for European
sovereign debt, now price in very little risk; a very dramatic
repricing of assets and a return to higher risk premiums could be
disruptive and reveal underlying weaknesses. Here, political risk
in Europe, where reform fatigue and disenchantment with
established parties is widespread, may spark a “blow out” in
sovereign risk premia. Further down the road, certain trends
suggest that nonbank intermediated financial markets may be
becoming more susceptible to large, systemically driven
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portfolio shifts. Funding connections in nonbank financial
institutions (NBFIs) and between NBFIs and banks may be
becoming more nontransparent and fragile.
The short-term risk of a crisis endogenous to the CESEE was
viewed as modest. In many ways, and in many CESEE countries,
financial systems have been strengthened—for example, in terms
of reduced reliance on parent or wholesale funding, and reduced
dollarization. As a result, loan conditions are softening, albeit in
the face of weak demand for new loans. There are few signs of
excessive asset valuations or very rapid credit growth in most
CESEE countries, albeit with some exceptions. Generalized
deflation in CESEE was seen as unlikely.
Regarding the debt overhang, the picture is mixed: government
debt is high in some countries, and corporate debt is pronounced
and rising in others; but aggregate household debt is mostly
modest by European standards. Also, the distribution of debt
matters: some countries have pockets of heavy indebtedness. Of
more concern is the rising level of NPLs, especially in the
enterprise sector, which weigh on that sector and the banks.
Thus, incomplete fiscal consolidation and private-sector
deleveraging may be key ingredients of new vulnerability in
some countries of the region.
Especially if the recovery takes firmer hold, then the policy
challenge of how to sustain growth on a financially sound basis
will become more urgent. During the current relatively calm
time, the authorities can help reduce the risk of a renewed crisis
by tackling the overhang of (impaired) debt. Action is needed at
the level of banks but more importantly at the level of corporates
and sovereigns. Buffers need to be built up, and that will require
the promotion of the orderly elimination of excess capacity in the
financial sector and the restoration of sustained bank
profitability. Another element of the policy response is the
development of macroprudential instruments, and the means to
implement them in a timely fashion. But addressing underlying
weaknesses—especially long-term youth unemployment and the
low trend growth rate—will require structural measures; for
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example: in labor markets; in better education for all sections of
society; and in creating innovative European financing vehicles.

B. Presentations by Members of the Panel
Lead: Erik Jones, The Johns Hopkins University
There are signs of recovery in parts of the EU. The question is
whether they are durable. Performance across EU member states
is becoming more differentiated. Some countries are growing
more quickly and experiencing lower levels of unemployment.
Others remain mired in what can best be described as (very)
slow growth equilibrium. Moreover, the European economy is
being buffeted by shocks from the conflicts in the Ukraine, the
Middle East, and in North Africa even as it experiences the usual
volatility induced by political events such as the referendum in
Scotland, the unofficial plebiscite in Catalonia, and the mid-term
elections in the United States Also worrying is the prospect that
any recovery will only result in the accumulation of imbalances
that will lead to another round of financial fragility and
instability. For every voice that warns of secular stagnation,
there is another that cautions against the dangers of moral
hazard; calls for quantitative easing or fiscal stimulus are met
with concern for pent-up inflation and excessive indebtedness.
The purpose of this contribution is to assess the risks that Europe
will experience a new financial crisis—including the possibility
that it never completely emerged from the last one. The implicit
focus is on the countries of CESEE; given the nature of
interdependence in the EU, however, Western European
countries both inside and outside the euro area also garner
consideration.
The analysis is divided into four sections: The first examines the
evidence that the CESEE countries have actually emerged from
the crisis as part of a more general European recovery. The
second looks at the negative impact of exogenous factors. The
third explores the reemergence of endogenous risks through the
accumulation of imbalances as a result of current performance
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trends. The fourth concludes with the prospects for policy action
both at the Europe and national levels.
Rigidity and recovery
Any recovery in European economic performance should be
measured against those factors that best reflect the impact of the
crisis. These factors are less causal than symptomatic. They
matter more as obstacles to adjustment than as explanations for
the deterioration in European performance during the period that
ran from 2007 to 2013. This analysis focuses on five possible
sources of rigidity that would prevent CESEE countries (and the
rest of Europe) from recovering robustly. They are:


hysteresis in unemployment;



deflationary expectations;



a loss of confidence and an increase in risk aversion
among banks and firms;



balance sheet dependence upon cheap and plentiful
liquidity; and



excessive public indebtedness.

The problems associated with these different sources of rigidity
are well-known. Hysteresis in the labor market occurs when
cyclical unemployment becomes structural as long-term
unemployment accumulates and workers locked out of
employment lose their ability to find work. Deflationary
expectations emerge when the usual expectations about price
inflation become unanchored, and economic actors begin to
build in falling prices as part of their wage bargaining and
investment planning. A loss of confidence in the banking sector
results in fewer loans (offered at higher standards) to
nonfinancial firms and households; a loss of confidence outside
the banking sector results in a fall in demand for borrowing to
finance new investment or large purchases. Excessive
dependence on cheap and plentiful liquidity requires a balancesheet adjustment to change the gearing of debt to equity.
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Meanwhile excessive public indebtedness leaves little margin for
maneuver for fiscal stimulus.
The evidence for these rigidities across the CESEE region is
mixed. Looking at unemployment as a percentage of the labor
force, for example, what is striking is not so much the high level
of unemployment as the very slow and uneven pace of its
alleviation—particularly when compared to the fast changes that
took place during the period from 2002 to 2008. Meanwhile,
evidence for deflationary expectations in the euro area continues
to accumulate. Actual headline increases in consumer prices
remain mired below 0.5 percent on an annualized basis. The
average of forecasts for expected future price increases shows
this figure rising to “below but close to 2 percent” only over a
10-year time horizon. This estimate corresponds with the fiveyear breakeven rate in the bond markets, which have fallen to
1.7 percent in October 2014.
The news is not entirely disappointing. Confidence within the
financial sector has been improving and credit standards applied
to new loans to nonfinancial firms and households have been
loosening progressively. Moreover, these factors should continue
to strengthen as European banks emerge from the ECB’s
comprehensive assessment that was completed this October. The
result will not be a flood of fresh liquidity, but it will be an
improvement over the tight conditions that resulted from bank
de-leveraging after the ECB’s AQR and in anticipation of its
stress testing of bank balance sheets.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the softening
conditions on the supply side of the banking industry will be met
by aggressive demand for credit among nonfinancial firms and
households. Moreover, consumer and business confidence
indicators show continued signs of concern. At least part of this
pessimism is due to their own balance sheet considerations.
Nonfinancial firms also need equity and households worry about
paying down their debts. Data from credit reform shows that the
difficulties associated with repairing nonfinancial balance sheets
are taking their toll in terms of corporate insolvencies. SMEs, in
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particular, are struggling to meet their obligations and often
coming up short. The burden of these insolvencies is not
everywhere the same and yet the absolute volumes across
Europe are high relative to recent history and so continue to
weigh on any European recovery.
Meanwhile, progressively higher public debt-to-GDP ratios limit
the possibilities for fiscal stimulus. This is most evident in the
euro area where there is a heated debate between the German
government and governments in those countries most affected by
the crisis about the need to strictly observe the terms of the EU’s
fiscal compact. There is pressure on the governments of the
CESEE countries as well. Even where these countries have
relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratios, the European
Commission has been quick to raise concerns about debt
sustainability and reluctant to grant flexibility in providing fiscal
stimulus.
At the nexus of such constraints, it is small wonder that
politicians express concern about the dangers of secular
stagnation even as economists recommend ever more sweeping
structural reforms. The challenge for policymakers is to identify
which are the priorities in any given situation. The data show
considerable variation from one country to the next, both in
terms of the strength of the different sources of rigidity and in
terms of their relative impact on economic performance. This
dilemma is nothing new in European politics and policymaking.
Indeed, it is much the same as that confronted by European
policymakers during the period from 1997–2000 when the EU
developed its Lisbon strategy for open cooperation in market
structural reform; it is also much the same as that confronted by
policymakers in 2004–05 when a mid-term review of the Lisbon
strategy highlighted the many failures in making progress. The
fact that the challenge is familiar does not make it less
intractable. Overcoming market rigidities is a major obstacle to
ensuring a durable recovery.
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Exogenous shocks
The challenge of engaging in market structural reform is
complicated by the many powerful exogenous factors that are
impacting upon European economic performance. The list of
such factors is lengthy; the focus here is on just four categories.
The big geostrategic worries associated with conflict and
instability around Europe are at the top of the list. More
mundane political events add to market volatility. The
performance of key markets in Asia, North America, and
elsewhere are a concern as well. So, too, is the movement in
global currencies such as the euro, dollar, yen, and pound.
The conflicts in the Ukraine, Syria, and Libya are important
because they restrict access to key markets, jeopardize energy
security, and add to immigration pressures. These are first-order
concerns for the countries of the CESEE region, particularly in
relation to Russia. The tightening of U.S. and European
sanctions on Russia that has taken place in stages during the
2014 spring, summer, and early autumn—coupled with Russian
retaliation against European exporters—has slowed the pace of
business between Russia and the CESEE region with the promise
of even greater deceleration to come. At the same time, the
Russian economy has suffered from the heightened sense of
market uncertainty and resulting decline in business and
consumer confidence above and beyond the threat of sanctions.
This has depressed Russian economic performance and so
further dented prospects for countries that export to Russian
markets.
The potential impact of Russian sanctions on energy supplies is
important as well. Western sanctions target major energy
producers and the banks that support them. So far this has not
resulted in declines in Russian output. Moreover, the Russian
government has shown little willingness to use energy resources
as leverage––at least apart from the Ukraine, and from trying to
prevent the re-export of Russian energy resources from other
European countries back into the Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is
unclear whether this attitude will change as the impact of
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sanctions on Russian energy firms strengthens and should Russia
succeed in negotiating access to alternative markets. The two
recent agreements between Russia and China are cases in point.
Europe will remain Russia’s primary energy export market and
yet the margin for exercising leverage against smaller European
countries that are excessively dependent upon Russian energy
supplies will increase as alternative markets become more
important.
The conflicts in Syria and Libya are contributing factors in
adding downward pressure on the CESEE region because they
complicate the search for alternative energy supplies. These
conflicts also add to immigration pressures through Turkey and
across the Mediterranean; they subtract from business
confidence across the European economy, more generally; and
they distract European and American attention away from
dealing with Russia.
Meanwhile, an unusual congruence of political events has added
to market volatility. The Scottish referendum is important as an
illustration of this dynamic more than as a permanent influence.
The surprising closeness of pre-referendum polling in late
August 2014 fostered a spate of media speculation that the actual
referendum put to rest. Firms and financial actors made
contingency plans and, in some cases, deferred investments in
response––but the whole episode was quickly forgotten once the
results of the referendum became known. A similar pattern can
be seen around the plebiscite in Catalonia and the mid-term
elections in the United States, although uncertainties in both
cases have lingered. This pattern will persist as the United
Kingdom and Poland head to the polls in 2015, and as Italians
wonder when Giorgio Napolitano will resign as President of the
Republic and whether the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi
will opt for early elections. The political situation in Greece is
also problematic. There is nothing surprising about these
influences; the point is only that they create a drag on economic
performance. Should one or more of these events result in a fullblown political crisis, the impact will be even greater.
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The performance of key export markets is a further source of
concern. The U.S. market is a major consumer of exports from
Europe and has been moving more soundly into recovery. By
contrast, the Chinese market is growing in importance and yet
not performing as well. Exports to Russia are declining as a
result of the geopolitical tensions mentioned earlier. Exports to
Switzerland—which is a more important destination than Russia
and only slightly less important than China—have also been
falling off. The impact of these contractions in European exports
shows up first in those countries like Germany that rely heavily
on an export-led growth model and only subsequently in those
countries—like much of the CESEE region—that supply goods
and services for incorporation into German exports. That said,
the lag between changes in German and CESEE performance is
short. The impact of declining European export performance is
also felt in countries like Italy and France, which are less export
dependent (and are arguably suffering more for reasons related
to the rigidities mentioned at the outset). As these larger
European economies struggle, they bring down the prospects for
economic performance in the CESEE countries as well.
Exchange rates are a fourth exogenous factor. The relative
movements in the euro, dollar, yen, and pound have had a
powerful influence on European economic performance; both
because of the impact of exchange rate levels on relative cost
competitiveness, and because of the impact of exchange rate
volatility on trade and investment patterns. This influence is
likely to strengthen now that monetary policy is diverging across
the Atlantic and as intra-European conflict increases over the
limits on the use of unconventional monetary instruments like
quantitative easing and over the relative usefulness of fiscal
stimulus.
Endogenous imbalances
Turbulence in the world economy is a risk that the CESEE
region will have to learn to accept. That makes the structural
reform agenda to reduce the influence of market rigidities all the
more important. However, there is an attendant possibility that
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the fruits of any recovery in the present will emerge as future
unsustainable imbalances. This prospect is hardly unique to the
CESEE region and could be applied to the world as a whole.
Nevertheless, it is a major source of concern in Europe because
of the financial interdependence that influenced the crisis as it
unfolded. Here it is important to distinguish between symptoms
and causes in a way that is different from the discussion of
market rigidities in the first section of this analysis. Market
rigidities are in many ways a symptom (or expression) of the
crisis and an obstacle to recovery. By contrast, financial
imbalances are a symptom (or expression) of recovery and a
potential source of the next crisis.
Four imbalances warrant particular attention. The first of these is
closely tied to the political economy of extraordinarily loose
monetary conditions and finds expression in the accumulation of
indebtedness, even when there is little growth in credit. The
second emerges in the form of price bubbles that affect both real
and tradable assets. The third develops in the form of the
progressively uncompetitive expansion of labor costs. The fourth
takes the form of cross-border liabilities.
The evidence for accumulation of household indebtedness during
the crisis is mixed. Some CESEE countries like Slovakia and the
Czech Republic have seen an increase in household indebtedness
as a ratio of disposable income; others like Hungary and Poland
have seen household indebtedness decrease by the same
measure. The build-up of outstanding loans from commercial
banks is more consistent, particularly when measured as a share
of GDP. The farther east you travel in the CESEE region, the
greater the burden of outstanding loans becomes and the more
significant the increase as the crisis has moved into recovery.
This accumulation of indebtedness corresponds with a growing
burden of NPLs that will impinge on bank performance both in
the present and looking ahead. The accumulation of indebtedness
also constitutes a significant vulnerability. Should interest rates
rise suddenly due to a change in market conditions or a policy
shock coming from elsewhere (like the United States), the
consequence would be a sudden build-up of debt servicing
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requirements coupled with a greater risk of insolvency and
nonperformance.
An interest rate shock could also affect the prices of real and
tradable assets. The evidence for a real estate bubble emerging
during the recovery is not strong in the CESEE region, although
there is some concern in countries like Ireland and the United
Kingdom. A more prominent concern for CESEE countries (and
for much of the southern European periphery) is the very low
yield on (and therefore correspondingly high prices attached to)
government debt securities. An interest rate shock that punctured
a price bubble on sovereign debt instruments would quickly
reassert the symbiotic relationship between bank balance sheets
and sovereign finances by imposing losses on a significant
volume of banking assets while at the same time redirecting an
increasing share of government expenditures onto debt servicing
requirements. This is probably the most significant threat to
Europe’s recovery from accumulated imbalances.
By contrast, the impact of the recovery on relative real unit labor
costs is more varied across countries. Within the CESEE region,
countries like Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
Slovenia have experienced a relatively modest appreciation;
others like Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania have seen
their relative competitiveness increase. What is unclear in these
movements is how much the effect will show up in terms of
relative export volumes or manufacturing performance. What is
clear is that none of the countries is currently running a
significant currency-account deficit.
Indeed, that uniformity in current-account performance may be
symptomatic of a different kind of imbalance—not within
Europe but between Europe and the outside world. Here it is
useful to look beyond the CESEE region. Whereas before, the
euro area was roughly in balance with the outside world—
meaning that any current account surpluses run by countries like
Germany were offset by countries like Spain; snow, the euro
area is running a consistent current account surplus as an entity.
The CESEE countries are running surpluses as well. Hence, it is
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worth considering which part of the world is running the
offsetting deficits and how long those deficit positions will be
sustainable. This is a more generalized expression of the concern
for major export market performance insofar as it focuses not
only on how Europe’s major markets are doing at the moment,
but also on how they can be expected to perform in the
foreseeable future.
Policy response
The analysis presented here suggests the need for an effective
policy response both at the national and European levels.
National policymakers will be the primary architects of any
major market structural reforms. They will also be responsible
for any fiscal stimulus. European policymakers will have a hand
in overseeing market structural-reform efforts and in
coordinating the use of fiscal policy. Policymakers at the ECB
will work alongside these efforts by maintaining an
accommodative monetary stance. And the whole of the
policymaking community will be engaged in slowing or
reversing any accumulated imbalances.
The problem with this division of labor is well understood.
National policymakers struggle to make market structural
reforms in the face of significant domestic opposition to change.
There is progress, but it is hard won––and all too often
unrewarded either in terms of significant changes in economic
performance (within a politically relevant time frame) or at the
ballot box. The pace of reform can be accelerated under
conditions of strict conditionality, as in exchange for emergency
lending or conditional credit facilities. But such acceleration
only defers the political consequences of any major market
structural reform and risks building-up resentment toward the
impingement on national sovereignty. Portugal’s early exit from
its bailout program is a good illustration; Greece’s current efforts
to emerge from Troika supervision are also relevant; and Viktor
Orban’s campaign against the IMF in Hungary is a further case
in point.
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The challenge on the fiscal side is to take advantage of economic
interdependence within the context of the EU’s “fiscal compact.”
The countries that have sufficient flexibility should engage in
stimulus measures so that the countries that are excessively
indebted can maintain the pace of consolidation. However, such
efforts are challenging to coordinate across diverse national
electorates; they create conditions of moral hazard, and they
depend upon market structural reforms to achieve lasting
success. Hence, the trust required to organize something like this
across diverse national governments is probably greater than
what exists in Europe at the moment.
As a result, monetary policy authorities both in the ECB and
elsewhere are carrying an excessive share of the policy burden.
They have exhausted most of their conventional instruments, and
so have had to resort to unconventional measures that are openly
distributive and so subject to controversy. It is a simple matter to
calculate how much German savers “lose” from near-zero
interest rates (and negative deposit rates at the ECB) and how
much Italian tax payers ”gain” from relatively low sovereign
debt yields. As the ECB moves into the purchase of covered
bonds and ABS, its actions will give rise to a different kind of
distributive calculus. Those instruments are more likely to
circulate in some countries than in others and so the benefits of
this light form of quantitative easing will provoke a new round
of distributive controversies. A full-blown quantitative easing
using corporate paper or sovereign debt instruments will only
fuel the controversy further.
Finally, it is worth considering whether the intellectual
framework for regarding accumulated imbalances is appropriate.
The whole of the European policy apparatus treats currentaccount surpluses and deficits asymmetrically, regarding
surpluses as an indicator of competitiveness and deficits as the
reverse. This normative framing makes it difficult to bring
European economic performance into balance with the outside
world. That is a vulnerability insofar as the rest of the world
cannot operate as Europe’s consumers of last resort, particularly
when the rest of the world includes export powerhouses like
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China and the other countries of East and Southeast Asia. Hence,
there is a significant risk that Europe’s policy response will be
inadequate. If that risk is borne out, then Europe will face
another crisis—albeit perhaps only in the distant future.
Panelist 1: Cristian Popa, Deputy Governor, National Bank
of Romania
Like other speakers, let me add my thanks to Banka Slovenia and
Boštjan for having invited me.
That said, I need to qualify the agreeable character of the
invitation by recalling the early literature on proxies for central
bank independence (notably Rogoff (1986)), which spoke about
the best choice of governor being a person whose aversion to
inflation is higher than the social average. I would say that my
risk awareness regarding the financial system, if taken by similar
metrics, has seen an increase in the relatively recent period. So,
with that comment as a background to my subsequent messages,
what I want to do here in the brief time span allocated is to ask
questions more than provide answers.
My first point is that we should be rather humble about how
much we actually know and are able to quantify regarding
financial sector risks. Rather than imagining clear and detailed
scenarios about how things could go wrong, what I think is much
more productive is an investigation of the vulnerabilities
currently affecting the financial system, with some assessment of
their attached probabilities of realization. This would provide us
with an image about the way the window will crack, which
points are the weakest and what can be done about them, rather
than exactly what the broken window will end up looking like.
The second point is, given my qualification, what do we know?
The idea from previous crises is that these tend to be localized in
time and quite cathartic in the way we shape the economy and in
the way that the real sector and possibly even the financial one
undergo a restructuring that transforms them. But this idea may
no longer be valid in the same manner as in past episodes.
Depending on whether you believe that the secular stagnation
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concept is valid, or just think that this is a temporary
phenomenon, we are living through the hangover of the previous
crisis. And, again conditional upon the time horizon we have in
mind, this may influence things going wrong the next time
around.
The first risk I see is the fact that, again from the perspective of
how you look into financial system risks, at the present juncture
it is very difficult to distinguish between two things: (i) what has
been valid in the short run that we think is sustainable (or
persistent) in the longer run; and (ii) what really are positive,
factual developments compared to the normative aspects we tend
to associate with the current state or we would like to think
should undergo a correction.
One example is Daniel saying that we would like to have more
new lending taking place without more indebtedness; in the
current state, even with some considerable mileage being
registered from deleveraging in regard to both corporates and
households, debt burdens (and relative undercapitalization,
especially for the former) are still important. So are NPLs, which
are frequently invoked by banks as one of the principal reasons
for lending remaining sluggish so far. Therefore, an additional
jump in the stock of NPLs is not a scenario that helps at the
present juncture. We are barely able to deal with the existing
stock across many economies, and the attendant workout has
proven to be more difficult and time-consuming than initially
thought.
But let me say that central banks have had to take on a more
prominent role by acting like fire fighters. In the initial stages of
the crisis, they fought the risk of a really disorderly repricing of
assets because the alternative was really off the charts in terms of
welfare costs. This got us into history. How do we get out of
history is a more important question, even if tinged with irony. Is
financial repression, even if we have the backdrop of difficulties
(barely sustainable debt levels across many developed
economies) really a feasible long-term solution? That is the first
question, and one to which I believe the answer is negative.
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Secondly, the fact that we seem to be seeing increasingly
divergent business and financial cycles in different economies
and regions, is that something that is going to last or is it a
temporary phenomenon? Because in the former case, the
persistent aspects of lax monetary policy may be further
complicated. But we need to be aware of what impairments to
transmission from monetary policy may be generated in terms of
distortions in the financial sector over time. We also need to look
at how accurately markets are pricing in risks right now with this
kind of low rate backdrop being taken as more persistent than it
may actually be, with divergence looming ahead in terms of G-4
central-bank stances.
Other risks relate to the financial sector reform agenda and
macroprudential policy.
Financial sector reform agenda
Compared to its initially hoped-for configuration, the
implementation of the financial sector regulation reform agenda
has been rather inconsistently delivered. And I speak here not
only of the European perspective but more of G20. This needs to
be broader than just the EU in order to avoid delocalization and
regulatory arbitrage, both of which would impair the ability of
regulators and supervisors to obtain accurate information and act
to prevent risks from accumulating and/or being manifested. It
would also affect the cost of new capital in a manner that would
be more significant in the presence of over-indebtedness and
continued deleveraging.
At the same time, we are rightly concerned about shadow
banking, which partly is a result of things moving from the
formal sector into the informal sector and of the concentration
we have; I believe we do not even have good data on that besides
the superficial stuff. Yet we are being sanguine in the wrong way
about how liquidity dependence, common funding sources and
the complexity that evolves over time between the formal and
informal sectors in finance are shaping things. I think that comovements may be stronger than they were in the past. Indeed, I
think roll-over risk, not just rising yields that may translate into
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higher cost of capital, is a problem. And these may be significant
in a second round way for emerging markets, given the close
integration between developed and emerging market financial
sectors.
Let me now concentrate on things that have something of a
political economy nature. We are in a very difficult world here
because I do not think central banks were prepared for the kind
of actions they have had to take. But at the same time, trying to
fight a fight that ultimately concerns structural reforms and
productivity enhancing policies by macroeconomic demand
management and giving a growth mandate more or less
explicitly to central banks may not be the best way to go
forward. I am still a very orthodox believer in price and financial
stability being the best things that central banks are active in, and
that should stay with us and not be mixed with the economywide real sector mandates that I just mentioned. Also, some
countries have run into a different problem: the central bank is
seen as institutionally and reputationally so powerful, but may
actually be lacking the necessary tools when it is supposed to
compensate for or remedy actions that are time-inconsistent in
other components of the macro policy. Or the remedy to reform
that was there as a program item but was not completely
delivered upon. I think we should be concerned about that.
Macroprudential policy
The second thing is the new field offered by macroprudential
policy. Whenever we discover a new tool and its name has been
there for a while, we tend to overuse it or overpromise regarding
what it can actually deliver in isolation. I think here there are a
lot of things that need to be done, but macroprudential policy
needs to work in tandem with monetary policy as part of the
macroeconomic policy mix. We also need to look at the financial
sector inter-linkages between countries, because typically we are
talking about partial equilibrium and country specific notions,
because that brings more clarity and is an impetus for action. But
really things are much more cross-border in nature. And we need
to be prudent about how effective these measures are, if they
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have side effects—some of them do—how porous can they
become, whether cross-border cooperation by macroprudential
authorities and others blend into the mix, are they as good as
they can be or can they be enhanced. We actually need to
collectively deliver on these measures very well and avoid
overpromising. Because then, when crunch time comes, we need
to show what was on paper has actually taken place in reality and
the best safeguards have not only been thought of but are
operational, without believing that these can ever be a panacea
by themselves. Thank you.
Panelist 2: Dubravko Mihaljek, Head of Macroeconomics
Analysis, BIS
Introduction
Erik Jones’ introduction provided a stimulating framework for an
analysis of the risks of a new financial crisis in CESEE. I shall
discuss the three scenarios he outlined—recovery never really
gains momentum, Europe gets pushed back into crisis, the
recovery leads to a new crisis—and examine how likely these
scenarios are in South-Eastern Europe (SEE). For the purpose of
this note, I shall include in this region Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. This is a
heterogeneous group of countries, whose economic performance
and policies elude easy generalizations. But they display a
similar pattern of macroeconomic developments before and—
with the exception of Turkey—after the global financial crisis.
In particular, after a strong expansion accompanied by high
inflation, low unemployment, low savings, high investment
rates, and very high external deficits in 2003–08, the period since
2010 has been one of very low or negative growth, much lower
inflation, much higher unemployment, and the disappearance of
external deficits (Figure 1). The impact of the crisis was smallest
in the case of Turkey, where the economy has evolved since
2010 similarly to Asian and Latin American emerging markets.
But looking ahead, Turkey faces some of the same challenges as
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other economies in this region, and can therefore be analyzed
within the same group framework.
My main argument will be that incomplete fiscal consolidation
and private sector deleveraging, as well as the stalling of
structural reforms are key ingredients of a potential new crisis in
this region. These vulnerabilities could threaten financial
stability and lead to a standstill or reversal of the convergence
process. In other words, without fiscal consolidation,
deleveraging, and structural reforms, SEE not only puts financial
stability at risk but could also remain stuck on the periphery of
developed Europe.
The remainder of this note is divided into four sections.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the global economy at the
current juncture. Section 3 evaluates domestic risks for the
recovery. Section 4 evaluates some exogenous shocks that might
push SEE back into crisis. Section 5 concludes by examining
whether the recovery could lead to a new crisis through
repetition of past mistakes made in the private and public
sectors.
Global economy is approaching a turning point
The past year has seen macroeconomic conditions diverging
across major advanced economies: growth has taken hold in the
United States and the United Kingdom; remained weak in the
euro area; and become very volatile in Japan. In the emerging
market economies (EMEs), the slowdown in growth that started
in late 2012 has stabilized and output is expected to pick up over
the next few years, though at a slower pace than in 2010–12.
Despite a somewhat better global growth outlook, there has been
a broad-based decline in inflation, reflecting remaining slack in
labor markets (e.g., in the United States), weak domestic demand
(e.g., in the euro area), and falling commodity prices. One
concern for inflation targeting central banks has been that several
forward-looking measures suggest that inflation might remain
low or fall further over the medium term.
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Developments in SEE Countries:
Pre-and Post-Crisis1
Real GDP Growth
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Diverging macroeconomic conditions have been reflected in
diverging monetary policies. The U.S. Federal Reserve ended
large-scale asset purchases in 2014 and started preparing for the
lift-off of policy rates. The Bank of England has maintained a
very accommodative monetary policy stance through late 2014,
while the ECB and in particular the Bank of Japan have further
eased their stance.
The shifts in the macroeconomic outlook and monetary policy
have been associated with significant movements in exchange
rates. The dollar has appreciated sharply against major
currencies over the past year. Conversely, the yen has fallen
sharply against both major advanced and EME currencies.
In global financial markets, periods of unusual calm have been
interspersed with episodes of heightened volatility over the past
year. Different market segments were affected each time:
emerging market assets in January; high-yield corporate bonds in
August; and advanced economy government bonds and equities
in October.
Observers, rightly or wrongly, related these bouts of volatility
mainly to changes in market expectations about major central
banks’ monetary policies. One issue is that monetary policy
guidance may have increased market sensitivity to
macroeconomic surprises. More fundamentally, there are
concerns that after a long period of monetary accommodation,
central bank policies have become a key determinant of global
financial market conditions, possibly overshadowing underlying
macroeconomic conditions.
Given the expectations about U.S. monetary policy and the
dominant role of the dollar as the funding currency for
international investors, this implies that global financing
conditions will likely tighten over the next year or so. This
would affect not only the EMEs in Latin America and Asia, but
also those in Europe. Despite its close economic and financial
ties to the euro area, where monetary conditions will remain
easy, governments and firms in south-eastern Europe that rely on
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external funding will thus face higher borrowing costs in the
period ahead.
Domestic risks for the recovery
Against the backdrop of global macroeconomic and financial
market conditions in late-2014, one key risk for the recovery in
SEE stems in my view from high public and private-sector debt
and doubts about their sustainability as global financial
conditions start normalizing.
Several governments in the region––notably Croatia, Hungary,
and Slovenia––have debt levels close to or exceeding 80 percent
of GDP (Table 1). They depend heavily on cheap and plentiful
external funding to sustain such levels of debt. As global interest
rates start to rise, some of these governments could run into
funding problems. In its 2014 Autumn Economic Forecast,
European Commission estimates interest expenditure of the
general government in Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia in the
range from 3.3 percent to 4.1 percent of GDP. This is fairly high
compared with the euro area average of 2.7 percent of GDP on
average debt of 108 percent of GDP in 2014.
Several countries also have very high levels of private debt. In
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia, for instance,
nonfinancial corporate-sector debt ranges from 80 percent to
over 120 percent of GDP in 2014; the average for other SEE
countries shown in Table 1 was well over 50 percent of GDP.
Household debt is generally about 30 percent of GDP, which is
significantly below most advanced economies (except Italy), but
higher than in most EMEs. Moreover, several SEE countries
have seen a large increase in private sector debt––for instance,
Croatia by 14 percent of GDP and Turkey by 28 percent since
end-2008. Since much of this debt is external or, if domestic,
held by foreign investors (e.g., in Turkey), countries in question
are vulnerable not only to higher global interest rates, but also to
domestic currency depreciation against the dollar.
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Table 1. Debt of the Nonfinancial Sector
(As a percentage of GDP)
Household
Advanced
economies /4, /5
United States
Euro area
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
United Kingdom
Japan
Major EMEs /4,/6
South-Eastern
Europe
Bulgaria
Croatia
Hungary
Romania
Slovenia
Turkey

Level in 2014 /1
Corpo- GovernTotal
rate ment /3

Change since end-2008 /2
House- Corpo- GovernTotal
hold
rate ment /3

75
77
64
57
56
44
75
93
65

87
68
103
124
56
80
111
79
103

118
106
108
115
84
147
108
102
230

280
252
274
296
196
272
295
274
398

–6
–17
0
7
–5
4
–9
–8
0

–4
–5
–2
12
–5
–1
–21
–23
–3

35
34
30
36
14
28
60
44
58

24
12
28
54
4
31
31
13
55

27

79

44

150

8

21

3

32

24
41
28
19
29
21

126
90
92
48
82
50

25
82
79
40
82
34

–2
2
–9
–2
3
8

–5
12
7
–45
–7
20

10
53
6
26
61
–6

3
67
4
–22
57
21

175
213
200
107
188
104

Sources: ECB; European Commission; IMF; OECD; national data; author’s calculations.
/1 Refers to Q1, Q2, or Q3 2014; for Bulgaria, 2013.
/2 In percentage points of GDP.
/3 OECD and IMF estimates of gross financial liabilities.
/4 Weighted averages of the economies listed based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates.
/5 Economies shown.
/6 Argentina, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico,
Poland, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.

But there are also countries in the region in which private-sector
debt has been significantly reduced: Bulgaria and Romania have
seen deleveraging in both household and nonfinancial corporate
sectors; Hungary in the household; and Slovenia in the corporate
sector––though some of this reduction is offset by the rise in
public debt related to bank restructuring.
Private-sector lending conditions in the region are relatively tight
at present, and many households and nonfinancial firms are still
deleveraging, notably in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and
Slovenia. As a result, credit demand currently is very weak.
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Higher global interest rates should thus initially affect mainly
debt-servicing costs. But for borrowers who are not indebted,
tighter global financing conditions will make a difference. As a
result, it will be harder for the recovery to gain traction.
How important are other “market rigidities” that Erik identified
as weighing on the recovery: labor market hysteresis, deanchoring of inflation expectations, and insufficient credit supply
due to ongoing repair of banks’ balance sheets, but also weak
confidence of lenders in the general economic outlook?
Unemployment is already mostly structural, so the relevance of
any labor market hysteresis effects arising from the latest crisis is
probably marginal. But extremely high youth unemployment is a
major concern. However, it is not clear how far current proposals
for reducing labor-market rigidities could help reduce youth
unemployment. The real impediments to job creation are, in my
view, a poor business climate and inadequate education systems,
rather than existing labor legislation.
Similarly, it is hard to think that expectations of deflation could
form in SEE and trigger a further drop in aggregate demand.
Perceived inflation is rather high, not low. Many households in
this region spend their entire budget on food and utilities,
displaying a rising medium-term price trend due to structural
changes in food and energy production and distribution, and, in
the case of utilities, a gradual removal of remaining price
controls.
With the exception of Turkey, credit growth in SEE is very
weak, as both banks and their customers are in the process of
repairing their balance sheets. This kind of adjustment after the
bursting of credit and asset price bubbles is normal and in my
view does not reflect rigidities in financial intermediation.
Households and firms have to reduce their debt to more
sustainable levels before they get in a position in which they can
start borrowing again. And banks have to strengthen their capital
and start cleaning up their balance sheets from nonperforming
assets before they can resume lending. The faster this adjustment
takes place, the sooner banks will begin to lend again.
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Long delays in payments to suppliers––for instance, government
institutions’ payments to SMEs for goods and services
delivered––are arguably a bigger corporate liquidity issue in
some SEE countries than firms’ access to bank credit. Rather
than devising schemes to encourage banks to lend, governments
could issue debt to repay promptly what they owe to the private
sector. This would leave the public-debt level largely unchanged
but would prevent many SMEs in SEE from going under, thus
stimulating private sector activity and growth of the tax base––
all this without increasing private sector debt.
External risks
The risk that SEE gets pushed back into crisis as a result of
exogenous shocks is in my view relatively small. Political
conflict and instability, notably in relations between Russia and
the Ukraine, is clearly weighing on the outlook. But we lack
empirical benchmarks to assess the potential economic impact of
such idiosyncratic shocks, whose effects depend crucially on the
nature and duration of the conflict.
Regarding political risks, the impact of any particular national
election on market volatility is likely to be temporary. More
generally, the impact of political developments in individual
countries on trend investment is likely to be small, as investment
rates have already been on a declining trend for some time for
reasons not well understood. And political gridlock in some SEE
countries reflects perhaps more the inability of institutions to
adapt to changing circumstances than any particular election
outcome.
Weaker economic performance in Europe clearly does not help
the already slow recovery in SEE. But a number of European
markets are expanding: the United Kingdom is currently the
fastest growing advanced economy; Nordic economies and
Switzerland are also performing well; and Germany’s growth
foundations remain sound despite some slowdown in mid-2014.
Unless the slowdown in Europe is widespread and prolonged––
which doesn’t seem to be the case based on current consensus

190
forecasts and vulnerability assessments––it is not likely to lead
to another crisis in SEE.
Weaker economic performance outside Europe is a significant
external risk. But based on the current outlook, the U.S. and
Chinese economies are unlikely to be hit by macroeconomic or
financial market shocks large enough to tip Europe into a new
recession or a financial crisis.
SEE countries could be more affected by contagion from a
possible wider emerging-market turmoil. One source of
contagion could be loss of confidence in EME local currency
debt, which has become an important segment of global financial
markets over the past few years. In particular, many
multinational corporations from EMEs have reportedly become
quasi-financial institutions: their overseas operations issue bonds
in international markets, typically in U.S. dollars, and buy
financial products in their own countries’ market instead of
expanding their business. Low volatility, cheap funding costs,
and strong demand for emerging market corporate bonds by
global investors have supported such carry-trade type strategies.
However, once U.S. interest rates start to rise, some EMEs could
experience large capital outflows. Investor sentiment towards
SEE assets could also deteriorate by association with emerging
market debt. This effect is likely to be temporary; however,
global investors have demonstrated on several occasions over the
past few years that they quickly start to discriminate among
emerging market debtors in periods of turmoil. For instance,
SEE assets were generally not affected by the financial market
“taper tantrum” of May–August 2013, unlike assets from Asian
and Latin American EMEs.
Another potential external shock in the period ahead relates to
greater exchange-rate volatility. As monetary policies in the
United States and the United Kingdom get normalized while the
ECB and the Bank of Japan maintain their highly
accommodative policies, exchange-rate volatility among major
currencies is likely to increase. But with current monetary policy
settings––and other things equal––the euro would tend to
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weaken against the dollar in the near term, which would help
euro area and SEE countries with exports and low inflation. But,
depending on the composition of external assets and liabilities, it
could also lead to valuation losses on SEE countries’ external
balance sheets.
Risk of repeating past mistakes
In addition to domestic and external risks discussed above, there
is also a risk of repeating past mistakes once growth in the region
finally gains traction. In the private sector, this risk would arise
if households, firms, and financial institutions resumed the
borrowing, lending, investment, employment, and consumption
decisions that resulted in misallocation of resources before the
crisis. In the public sector, the main policy mistakes that could
lead to a new crisis would be to abandon fiscal consolidation and
structural reforms.
With firms and households in most SEE countries still
deleveraging and banks continuing to restructure their balance
sheets, we are probably several years away from the start of a
new credit cycle. The possibility that the economic recovery in
SEE could lead to a new crisis via another credit and asset price
boom, a surge in cross-border lending, and loss of
competitiveness through wage inflation and real exchange-rate
appreciation seems remote at the moment. The strengthening of
global bank regulation and the experience that the authorities in
SEE have gained with the use of macroprudential policies also
provide reassurance that the most egregious consequences of a
new credit boom could be avoided.
The main concern would rather seem to be the public sector. One
issue is that governments of highly indebted economies in the
euro area and SEE are generally not doing enough to reduce
public debt. Availability of cheap funding, since the sovereign
debt crisis in the euro area was contained in August 2013, has
reduced incentives for fiscal adjustment. Once global financing
conditions start to tighten with the rise in dollar funding costs,
concerns about debt sustainability will likely reemerge and make
access to market funding much more difficult and expensive.
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This could easily threaten the incipient recovery in the private
sector.
Another concern is that structural reforms remain incomplete and
get postponed for some “better times.” This is particularly the
case with health care and education reforms. These areas account
for a significant share of public expenditure and are complicated
to reform because they involve a large number of stakeholders
with different interests, operating in environments often
characterized by market failure. Most SEE countries also need to
strengthen significantly their legal systems and judiciary, which
are essential for improving the business climate.
From the perspective of long-term economic growth, reforms of
education—from primary and secondary school systems through
universities—are crucial. Former socialist countries started their
transition to a market economy with relatively solid human
capital stock in industries such as energy, mining, manufacturing
and construction, or in services such as health care. But after
becoming successful low-cost manufacturing and outsourcing
destinations for western European firms, these economies have
so far largely failed to develop successful domestic industries
based on homegrown entrepreneurship and innovation. To make
this transition, it is essential to reform the often antiquated
school and university curricula, especially in public
administration, finance, economics, and business management.
Due to bottlenecks in these areas, new EU member countries
consistently fail even to spend all the EU funds that are allocated
to them––unlike, in the past, the southern European countries
such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which otherwise face
similar structural challenges. At the same time, widespread
corruption and lack of competition are raising the costs of
projects that are being undertaken, for instance, in transportation
infrastructure. Not least because of these deficiencies, the
convergence process in SEE has stalled since 2008 (Figure 2).
To respond to these challenges, it would be important for
governments in SEE not to repeat the mistakes of their
counterparts in southern Europe, who avoided the hard reforms
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Figure 2. GDP per Capita at Current Prices, in U.S. Dollars
(South-Eastern Europe as a percent of EU-10)
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Sources: IMF, WEO, October 2014; author’s calculations.
Note:
SEE: simple average of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey.
EU-10: simple average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

of public administration and legal and educational systems after
joining the EU. Otherwise, SEE countries risk remaining on the
periphery of European economic development, where they have
been for much of their recent history––except for the brief catchup phase from the mid-1990s to 2008.
It is interesting to note in this context that central banks in SEE
have generally managed the transition to best practices far better
than their counterparts in government. But monetary policy is
clearly not the answer to structural problems. Only prudent
macroeconomic and financial stability policies and consistent
implementation of structural reforms on the part of both
government institutions and the private sector will make a
difference.
Panelist 3: Daniel Hardy, Advisor, Monetary and Capital
Markets Department, IMF
Especially the central bankers in this room appreciate the
importance of choosing your words carefully: we would all like
to revive growth and credit, but we do not want to revive growth
in indebtedness. Adopting one expression rather than the other
and using synonyms can convey very different impressions.
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Indeed, growth in indebtedness is the single most reliable
indicator of susceptibility to a financial crisis. Hence, it is quite
meet and proper to discuss not only how to revive credit growth,
but also whether to be concerned that these efforts may, in fact,
increase vulnerabilities over time.
In addition, right from the start, it is useful to be clear on time
frame that we are talking about, and on the nature of a (financial)
crisis. First, the probability of a crisis occurring in 2015 may
differ greatly from the probabilities of crisis in 2016, 2017, etc.
Second, the occurrence of a crisis requires both a trigger and a
relevant vulnerability; one system may suffer a particular shock
but survive it much better than another system with different
characteristics. Here we are going to discuss both aspects, but
policy can and should work more on increasing resilience than
on reducing the probability of exogenous shocks that, inevitably,
come as surprises. Eventually, some shock will occur, so we
should be prepared. As the footballers say, after the game is
before the game. Once we have gotten past one crisis, we need to
start training and revise our tactics for the next crisis, and
hopefully we can score 7:1 next time.
Turning to near-term vulnerabilities, in some ways the situation
of the financial system in Europe—and the CESEE countries, in
particular—is less crisis-prone than it was in the mid-part of the
past decade before the global crisis. There is a greater reliance on
local financing, dollarization or euroization is less pronounced,
many asset markets including real-estate markets are rather
subdued, and many banks have built up substantial liquidity
cushions. Part of this improvement reflects policy actions
including the implementation of prudential measures in the
financial sector and also central bank action. It is also
noteworthy that the macro imbalances are less, and especially
that current-account deficits are smaller; vulnerability to a
combined external and financial crisis is reduced. There is also a
greater confidence that the policymakers are willing to do
whatever it takes to prevent an out-and-out collapse. That has
been demonstrated quite forcefully.
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As to the risk factors, some have already been mentioned.
Obviously, political risk affects the CESEE region. This risk
might be realized through a hike in energy prices and even a
curtailment of supply. Another factor is the possibility of a
slowdown in emerging markets. One of the more successful
areas of the European economy in recent years has been the
export sector, particularly towards the emerging markets. Even if
countries like Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic do not
export much directly to these markets, they are integrated into
the export sector of, say, Germany, and thus are linked indirectly
to demand conditions in emerging markets.
While concern about high valuations in asset markets is absent in
most of Europe, there are some exceptions. Policy actions have
been taken and may have been successful in taking the edge off
asset prices, such as in certain real estate markets. But what is
more exceptional now is the extraordinary low spreads on some
sovereign bonds, including those for Spain and Slovenia, which
are perhaps a reflection of the great abundance of liquidity in the
market and the lack of alternative investments, rather than an
assessment of medium-term credit risks. This situation is
unlikely to persist and could adjust back sharply; a reversal at
least over the medium term is highly likely and could revive
pressures on sovereigns and corporate borrowers.
Mention has already been made of the danger that a prolonged
period of low growth and even deflation, combined perhaps with
future attempts to stimulate the economy with ever greater
amount of liquidity, could in fact increase vulnerability to
exogenous shocks. First, some signs can be detected of “search
for yield” on a global scale, whereby assets move towards
investments outside Europe that may look fine during times of
ample liquidity and low interest rates but which could be
revealed as much more risky when conditions revert to normal.
Second, very low interest rates make high indebtedness
sustainable even in a slow growth environment, but it is difficult
to reduce those stocks. When, in due course, rates and risk
premia revert back to normal levels, credit risk will re-intensify.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as mentioned yesterday,
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profitability is so low for many European financial institutions—
not just in banking but also in some other sectors, such as life
insurance—that it is very hard to build up the stocks of capital
that are needed to achieve true, sustained resilience. Adequate
profitability is a prerequisite to being able to recover from a
series shocks, and not just from a one-off hit. This low
profitability is partly a matter of the inherited stock of poorly
performing loans, that is, of having to make hefty provisions, but
reflects also low spreads, a very flat term structure, and low fee
income.
Let us consider now some relevant developments and potential
risk factors outside Europe. Several significant trends can be
identified. One is that, although markets individually do not look
far out of balance, the synchronicity of unusual phenomenon is
unsettling. Thus, we see exceptionally low volatility in many
financial markets at the moment (and it is worth bearing in mind
that emerging market debt is particularly susceptible to
fluctuations in volatility); at the same time we see very high
equity valuations in the United States compared to projected
covered earnings; and also corporate bond yields are very low,
such that the spreads do not currently compensate for typical
through the cycle loss rates. Again, no one phenomenon
represents a massive anomaly, but many parts are coming
together.
More structurally, the years since the crisis have witnessed
strong growth in the assets managed by mutual funds, and the
increasing concentration of mutual funds, often with rather
similar portfolios. The top 10 largest family asset managers
control, it is estimated, about US$19 trillion of assets, which is a
fair amount of money even by world standards. Many of these
funds are very “benchmark sensitive,” as in the case of
exchange-rated funds. Many may also incur more liquidity risk
than is commonly appreciated; especially should overall market
conditions tighten. The exposure arises because it is easy for an
investor to withdraw savings, but if many of these funds have to
redeem a lot in a hurry, markets would be affected and prices
would start falling. The markets for the securities held by these
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funds may be liquid on the margin, but may be disrupted by
large coincident portfolio shifts.
Asset holdings by the public sector, namely central banks and
sovereign wealth funds, show comparable similarities.
Concentrated holdings in a few asset classes and homogenous
behavior are often warning signs in financial markets. When
people start behaving in the same way, they may also change
behavior in the same way and provoke a sudden shift. And if you
are anticipating that the others will change their behavior, you
may want to front-run that change and accelerate the shift.
In these circumstances, policymakers face a policy balancing act:
if they undertake too little stimulus, the result may be low
growth, heavy indebtedness, low profitability, and no (real
sector) risk-taking by financial institutions. Vulnerability is
increased because of what might be termed market rigidities.
However, if the authorities undertake too much stimulus, then
one may see imprudent search for yield, too much leveraging of
balance sheets, and too much financial risk-taking. Vulnerability
to an eventual sudden rebalance is increased.
To sum up, exogenous shocks may well occur, though there is
not much that policymakers in this region can do about them. In
the short term, it seems that endogenous risks in this region are
low. However, resilience is now not as good as we would like,
and resilience may not be being built up as quickly as we would
like.
So we come back to some rather familiar themes in policy advice
aimed at reducing vulnerability to a new crisis. Number one is
the urgent necessity of tackling the inherited stock of poorquality corporate debt. The second is the development of
macroprudential instruments for both boom and bust conditions
that are truly usable. Many efforts are going into that but the
usability of some instruments is still an open question. And the
third theme relates to the need to eliminate excess capacities in
the banking system in an orderly manner, so that banks can
restore their profitability and therefore contribute to both
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sustained financial sector resilience and reliable intermediation.
Thank you.

C. Discussions
Following the presentations, participants from the floor raised
important issues for discussion by the members of the panel.


There was broad consensus among participants that the
CESEE financial sector remains vulnerable because of
(i) generally weak macroeconomic conditions in the
region and in Europe more widely, and (ii) incomplete
recovery from the global crisis. The persistence of
sluggish growth was seen to be at the heart of this
vulnerability.



A major endogenous shock arising within the region was
viewed as unlikely to occur in the near term, with only a
slight risk of a boom-and-bust cycle. Rather, participants
believed that shocks were more likely to come from
outside, in the form of: (i) geopolitical developments
leading to a disruption in trade; (ii) a revival in concerns
over sovereign risk; or (iii) a rapid increase in (U.S.)
interest rates.



One participant wondered whether EMEs have now
reached a size where they can play a major stabilizing
role in the world economy.



Returning to Europe, views were exchanged on the
connection between structural reforms, investment, and
fiscal policy. There was agreement on the need for
structural reforms in Europe in order to raise the trend
growth rate and address structural unemployment. It was
noted that the United States still has a big advantage in
the availability of venture capital, flexibility in labor
markets, and the dynamism of the high-tech sector.
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Several participants remarked that sovereign bond
spreads, and bond spreads generally, were very low,
with markets seeming to attach almost zero probability
to the chance of a euro area break-up or sovereign credit
event. They were concerned that this attitude was
excessively sanguine and could be reversed abruptly.

Panelists’ responses to questions and comments
Vulnerabilities. One panelist observed that the major
vulnerability was the overhang of government debt in many
countries and, in some cases, the corporate or household debt
overhang. The overhangs also put a drag on growth and limit the
scope for fiscal policy activism. A negative feedback loop exists:
high indebtedness discourages investment and growth; but. In
their absence, it is difficult to reduce indebtedness. The situation
is currently sustainable in an environment of very low interest
rates, ample central bank liquidity, and limited demand for new
credit. The absolute level of rates is low by historical standards,
and recently spreads have been compressed. For now, borrowers
can roll over debt cheaply, and the pressure for adjustment is
lessened. Hence, the situation could deteriorate rapidly if all
rates and, in particular, risk spreads rise rapidly.
A factor contributing to vulnerabilities is that low interest rates
increase the attractiveness of debt financing, rather than the use
of equity. Certain sectors are clearly overleveraged, although it is
difficult to establish empirically what would be an optimal level
of leverage for households, corporates, and the public sector in
the various CESEE countries. The lower prospects for growth
and inflation in much of the region, and, arguably, greater longterm uncertainties suggest that the optimum has shifted towards
greater reliance on equity.
Role of EMEs. Panelists responded to the question on the role
EMEs can play in stabilizing the world economy. In the past, the
EMEs were very prone to contagion from adverse developments
in advanced economies and especially U.S. monetary policy.
Massive capital inflows would overheat their economies, which
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would then be plunged back into crisis when U.S. policy
tightened and the capital flows stopped or even reversed. The
biggest EMEs now have large domestic economies, and many
are less dependent on capital inflows and have built up large
buffers. Thus, as seen to some extent already in 2008, a truly
global recession is less likely than in the past because the EMEs
are more robust to the developments in advanced economies.
Structural reforms, investment, and fiscal policy. One panelist
suggested that structural reforms, which impose extra costs on
certain sections of the population at least in the short term,
should be accompanied by a fiscal stimulus and, at a minimum, a
strengthened social safety net. Another argued that there was
currently no “fiscal room” for such measures in most CESEE
countries. Indeed, current account spending in the small open
economies of the region has a multiplier close to zero, and past
experience suggests that structural deficits were consistently
underestimated because they were masked by unsustainable
cyclical effects. Hence, what could help is an expansion in public
sector investment, and possibly the promotion of private sector
investment, even while overall fiscal consolidation is pursued.
The situation in Europe. The discussion ended on a positive
note, based on the view that the EBA/ECB-led stress testing
exercise and AQR were being conducted to high standards. The
publication of results (at the time forthcoming) would reassure
markets and the public at large that the European banks are
generally robust and that the authorities have in place measures
to deal with remaining weaknesses. The Single Supervisory
Mechanism should, over time, enhance the resilience and
efficiency of the banking system in the euro area and Europe
more generally.
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VIII. KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

A. European Perspective
Benoit Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board, ECB
What is needed is to revive the euro area economy
recapitalization and also to repair private-sector balance sheets.
The banking sector is undergoing a necessary process of
structural reforms. With the conclusion of the comprehensive
assessment, there is potential to ensure that credit supply
constraints diminish and the cycle turns.
For a stronger rebound in investment, the private nonfinancial
sector needs to raise equity. One instrument especially for SMEs
is to allow EU investment funds to be distributed in the form of
equity and not only in the form of debt, as the EBRD and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) already do in many
countries. Also, the fragmentation in venture capital markets
should be reduced.
For smaller firms with the need to deleverage, debt-for-equity
swaps—possibly fostered by tax incentives—could facilitate
private-debt workouts.
What is also needed is to raise productivity. An “upward shock”
to total factor productivity is needed but only possible in highly
competitive markets.
Introduction
Across Europe credit growth is weak. In most central and eastern
European countries, credit is either stagnant or growing at low
rates. In many countries of the euro area, credit to the private
sector is even in negative territory. The reasons for this are
several; but at the heart is a vicious circle of low growth, low
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investment and low credit. And
policymakers today is how to break it.

the

challenge

facing

The current policy debate is largely focused on the credit
dimension. And indeed, there is evidence that creditless
recoveries, while not as rare as sometimes contemplated, are
much less common in high income, financially developed
economies than in low income countries. As European
economies heavily depend on bank loans, it stands to reason that
the recent weak credit performance of Europe is contributing low
economic growth rates.
It is, nevertheless, important that reinvigorating credit growth is
not seen as an end in itself. Research based on international
evidence suggests that a fast-growing banking sector can be
detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. And we have seen
in the euro area that credit growth that leads to the wrong type of
investment creates financial imbalances eventually leading to
crises, while doing little to support long-term economic
performance.
Indeed, the 1999–2007 period saw a positive correlation between
the initial level of GDP per capita and average total factor
productivity (TFP) growth rates. The highest TFP growth rates
were found in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland,
while in the “catching-up” economies (Spain, Greece, Portugal,
and Ireland) TFP actually declined. An important explanation for
this is that capital in the latter economies flowed
disproportionately into the nontradable/services sector, which in
general has lower productivity growth. Investment was highest
in the construction and real-estate sectors, closely followed by
retail, transport, and leisure.
This experience shows us that the quality of credit matters as
much as the quantity and it implies that policymakers should
focus on a broader question than just reviving credit––namely,
“how can we channel savings towards productive investment?”
This focus on investment is warranted because, in the short run,
it is key to boosting demand and creating a self-sustaining
recovery. And over the longer run, ensuring that investment is
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efficiently allocated helps create a virtuous circle between
productivity and credit, thus avoiding mistakes of the past.
Achieving this requires a policy agenda that encompasses both
credit supply and demand factors. It requires that we unclog and
diversify the channels of financial intermediation in the euro
area; that we recapitalize the economy through both reducing
debt and raising equity; and that we have a policy mix that
makes borrowing to invest worthwhile.
In other words, it requires a comprehensive approach. And what
I would like to do this afternoon is to sketch out for you what
such a comprehensive approach could look like, drawing on the
lessons learned from the crisis and the post-crisis adjustment.
Fixing the credit channel
The starting point is logically the financial sector, and here we
are confronting a changing landscape: the European banking
sector is undergoing a necessary and largely unavoidable process
of structural change. Banks are adopting less-risky business
models, moving to more deposit-based funding strategies, and
strengthening their equity capital. As a result, there is a clear
trend towards an overall smaller and less-leveraged banking
industry.
While there are several benefits to this process, it also presents
an important question, which is how we can have more credit for
productive firms, but less leveraged banks.
The medium-term solution is for both banks and capital markets
to adapt to the new environment. For banks, this means
refocusing their business models and taking advantage of IT
developments to improve risk management and lower operating
costs. We will always need strong banks in the euro area, as they
play an essential role in situations where information cannot be
standardized or where state verification is costly, for example, in
lending to SMEs.
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The main challenge in capital markets is to expand market access
for firms across the euro area. This is to some extent already
happening organically, as firms that can issue diversify their
funding sources, but it is uneven: bond issuance is strongly
concentrated in countries and among firms where bank lending
constraints are lowest. As the ECB has argued on several
occasions, this is one reason why we need to urgently focus on
creating the legal and regulatory framework for a genuine single
market in capital in Europe.
Essentially, what we are aiming for is a more balanced financing
mix in which firms have a greater ability to substitute bank and
market finance, and hence intermediation becomes more
contestable and resilient. I would, however, emphasize that
balance is key; we should not view market finance as a cure-all.
Indeed, there is some research to suggest that too much
substitution towards market finance may lead to less total
borrowing, as firms that replace bank loans with bond issuance
internalize the fact that this type of borrowing will be harder to
restructure in bad times. Besides, Europe does not have a set of
institutions consistent with a fully market-based allocation of
savings, such as funded pension schemes.
In any event, a more diversified financing mix is realistically a
project for tomorrow. We are now seeing signs that credit
demand is picking up, making it imperative that nascent demand
is not choked off by credit supply constraints. Our focus today
therefore has to be on bank finance, namely ensuring that it can
continue to fund the real economy even as banks downsize and
restructure. And this is where two current policy initiatives come
in.
The first is the comprehensive assessment of bank balance
sheets, which has the potential to ensure that supply constraints
diminish as the cycle turns this year. One purpose of the
assessment is to steer the deleveraging process towards a “good”
form––i.e., banks quickly carving out nonperforming assets and
raising equity—which international experience suggests leads to
a faster rebound in credit to viable firms. Indeed, empirical
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research suggests that the oft-heard view that higher bank capital
leads to lower loan supply is not accurate. Long-run evidence for
Germany, for example, finds that higher bank capital tends to be
associated with higher business loan volume, with no evidence
of a negative effect.
While the exercise will only conclude next month, we can
already see signs that it has affected both the speed and quality
of deleveraging. Whereas from 2011 to 2012 asset deleveraging
accounted for only 0.1 percentage point of a 1.3 percent increase
in banks’ Core Tier 1 ratios, from 2012 to 2013 (i.e., after the
assessment was launched) it accounted for 1.0 percentage point
of the overall increase of 1.2 percent. Capital increases
accounted for about half the increase over the two years. This
acceleration of the process suggests that, once the final results
are known and residual uncertainty is removed, banks will be in
a stronger position to resume new lending.
The second ongoing initiative is the full roll-out of the ECB’s
credit easing package, which aims to encourage banks to use
their new balance sheet space for lending to the real economy.
The TLTROs have a built-in incentive mechanism to encourage
loans to firms and households, and we expect a stronger take-up
from banks in the December 2014 operation and in the six
subsequent installments until June 2016. And our programs to
purchase outright high-quality ABS and covered bonds
complement this by providing market incentives for banks to
originate more saleable securities, and thus more loans to
collateralize them.
In short, the combination of these two initiatives results in a
confluence of factors––improved incentives and higher capital––
that should allow loan supply to expand elastically to meet loan
demand. And to the extent that credit supply and demand are
endogenous—for instance, through the effect of supply
constraints on macroeconomic risk—we could see the
beginnings of a self-sustaining credit recovery.
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I would, nonetheless, question whether a credit recovery is
enough to achieve an investment recovery, and hence a sustained
recovery for the economy. If we look at the breakdown of credit
demand components in the survey data, fixed investment is only
having a mildly positive effect on demand after 11 quarters of
negative effects. And this demand may well be “backwardlooking”––that is, delayed projects coming back online. From a
“forward-looking” perspective, there are reasons to be cautious
about the degree of pent-up investment demand.
Principal among these is that, while banks might have
deleveraged, not all of their customers have. In several euro area
countries firms still face a debt overhang that affects the
economics of taking on new credit.
Real interest rates in the euro area are expected to decrease, as
nominal interest rates will remain low for a long period while
inflation is expected to gradually rise back towards 2 percent.
But the issue for over-indebted firms is that long-term real
interest rates probably cannot go low enough to make new
investment attractive: any profits generated will be absorbed by
servicing existing debt. Indeed, we see a clear negative
correlation––with a coefficient of 0.48 between corporate debtto-GDP levels in different countries at the beginning of the crisis
and the evolution of nonresidential investment since.
Repairing private-sector balance sheets
If we want to see a stronger rebound in investment across the
euro area, the next step therefore has to be repairing nonfinancial
private-sector balance sheets. And as this process will take place
against the backdrop of low inflation and, in the most affected
countries, limited fiscal space, it will have to involve reductions
in nominal debt.
The rebooting of the financial sector that has already taken place
puts us in a better position to achieve this. When the
comprehensive assessment concludes, banks will acknowledge
losses and raise provisions and capital. After the disclosure of
the results, capital shortfalls are expected to be covered within
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six months for the AQR or the baseline stress test scenario, and
within nine months for the adverse stress test scenario. Thus,
from the bank side, restructuring loans to distressed borrowers
should become more feasible.
What we need going forward is more efficient debt restructuring
and insolvency regimes for firms, which at present vary widely
between euro area countries. The effectiveness of the
restructuring regimes is often hampered by sluggish creditor
coordination, a lack of new financing for viable companies
undergoing restructuring and an overburdened judicial system.
For example, according to the World Bank, to resolve insolvency
in Italy takes 1.8 years compared with just 0.4 years in Ireland.
A number of stressed countries have already begun to take
initiatives to improve restructuring and insolvency proceedings.
In Greece, for example, facilitating debt workouts for viable
companies is being made simpler by two new out-of-court debt
restructuring tools: one for larger enterprises that includes a
multi-creditor coordination mechanism inspired by international
standards; and one for SMEs that employs standardized
templates.
In Spain, the substantial amendment to the Insolvency Law
earlier this year, among other things, makes facilitating out-ofcourt settlements easier while also making in-court settlements
more effective. Court approved refinancing agreements now
have lower majority requirements and permit the extension of
maturities on bank loans, negotiating haircuts and arranging
debt-for-equity swaps. Ireland and Portugal have also introduced
various measures targeted at enterprises, SMEs, and households.
In most cases, however, restructuring and insolvency regimes
could be made more efficient still by adopting best practice more
broadly. This would include, inter alia, strengthening measures
to facilitate out-of-court settlements for viable firms; introducing
centralized guidelines for voluntary debt workouts coupled with
independent intermediation for larger companies; and
establishing standardized voluntary workouts for SMEs.
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The deleveraging of European firms is, however, not only about
reducing debt; it is first and foremost about raising equity. We
have in fact already seen a significant decline in debt-to-equity
ratios for larger euro area corporates since end-2009 due to
valuation gains in equity markets, supported by low interest
rates. To the extent that our new monetary policy measures
affect the relative supply of financial assets and initiate further
portfolio rebalancing, we may see further spillovers to equity
markets that continue this trend.
For smaller firms, however, these channels are less powerful, as
equity markets are largely underdeveloped. Raising equity
therefore has to be a more proactive process.
One way to achieve this is to use debt-for-equity swaps (fostered
possibly through tax incentives) to facilitate private debt
workouts. Another is for EU investment funds to be distributed
in the form of equity as well as debt, as the EBRD and IFC
already do in many countries, and as I called for in a recent
article. A third, more medium-term aim is reducing
fragmentation in European venture capital markets to increase
the depth of private equity markets.
This last point is another example of where advancing towards a
single market in capital would be beneficial for the euro area; it
would not only help strengthen capital markets relative to banks,
but also help strengthen equity funding relative to debt. This
would also have positive structural effects for the euro area:
cross-country integration through equity improves risk-sharing
and, as it is harder for investors to “cut and run,” would most
likely provide more resilience in a crisis than integration through
interbank lending and fixed income investment. New research
shows that the vulnerability of the euro area to a “sudden stop”
worsened the crisis by further constraining the fiscal reaction of
governments during the downturn.
While such options to increase equity funding are being
developed, a strategy that can improve debt dynamics for all
firms is to raise “implied equity”––the outlook for future income.
If firms expect higher income, it improves their debt-to-income
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ratios and debt service capacity, which in turn creates space for
new investment. In this sense, raising both the level and trend of
potential growth is an integral part of recapitalizing European
firms, and indeed of the economy as whole.
We face, however, a circular problem in the euro area. We need
higher potential growth to work through the debt overhang so
that firms can begin investing again; but that investment is itself
necessary to raise potential growth. And this circle is potentially
vicious; if low potential growth leads to lower investment, then it
further lowers potential growth.
A policy mix to lift investment demand
This is where the next part of a comprehensive approach comes
in––getting the policy mix right on the supply side of the
economy to lift investment demand.
In a basic Solow growth model, investment grows at the growth
rate of productivity plus the growth rate of hours worked along
the steady state path of the economy. As we can only expect
limited labor participation gains in an ageing society, to raise
investment demand, we therefore have to raise productivity.
Indeed, achieving an upward shock to TFP seems to me essential
to trigger, in a sustainable way, a positive accelerator effect
between productivity, investment and credit.
But it requires an environment characterized by two things—
competition and certainty.
Competitive markets are necessary to ensure that investment and
productivity are indeed mutually enhancing, which as I said
earlier is not a given: high investment in several euro area
countries in the pre-crisis period did not lead to a convergence in
TFP. Certainly, an important reason for this was that too much
capital flowed into real estate. But misallocation also resulted
from low levels of competition in the non-tradable/services
sector more generally, which distorted price signals. As some
firms could capture excess rents, a falling marginal product of
capital was counterbalanced by rising profit margins, meaning
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that total compensation from investing in these sectors remained
high.
So the flipside of productive investment is more competitive
markets that produce more accurate price signals, thus drawing
resources to where they are most efficiently employed.
Achieving this requires not only product and labor market
reforms that accelerate the “churn” process within and across
sectors, but also reducing unnecessary regulations that hinder the
allocation and reallocation of resources.
The World Bank’s “Doing Business” report gives examples such
obstacles.18 If an entrepreneur wants to start a new business in
Spain, she has to go through 10 separate procedures, while doing
so in Slovenia requires only 2. If a firm wants to launch a greenfield investment, it would have to wait 200 calendar days in
Ireland before a new warehouse gets electricity; in Germany, it
would have to wait only 17 days.
There are reasons to be optimistic about the effects of a reform
process in the euro area. Recent micro-level research from the
euro system’s Competitiveness Network, for instance, shows that
there is a large and skewed distribution between the most and
least productive firms in individual euro area countries. Far from
being normally distributed, there are a few highly productive
firms and many which have low productivity. This implies that a
faster and more efficient reallocation across firms and sectors
could be quite powerful.
Where certainty complements this process is by fixing
expectations: the more that firms trust that structural reforms will
be followed through vigorously, the more they will be inclined to

18 World Bank (2013), Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small- and Medium-

Sized Enterprises.
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invest on that basis. Put differently, certainty allows the positive
medium-term effects of structural reforms to be brought forward
into the present. The fact that euro area corporates are currently
holding record amounts of cash, rather than investing, suggests
that plans for structural reforms are not yet credible enough to
reap this “certainty dividend.”
Certainty also extends to tax policy. Remember that what matters
for firms when deciding whether to invest is the after-tax return
on investment. Thus, if firms expect the burden of future taxation
to rise, the internal rate of return on a given project is lowered,
effectively canceling out the stimulating effect of lower interest
rates on investment. And by contrast, a lower expected tax
burden increases the effectiveness of any monetary policy
measures.
But certainty means also that we stick to our commitments.
Indeed, sticking to our own commitments has to become the
hallmark of the euro area. The ECB will continue to provide a
nominal anchor to the euro area recovery by delivering its
primary mandate to bring inflation back to a growth rate of
below but close to 2 percent. It is essential that, in parallel, all
countries follow the rules outlined in the Stability and Growth
Pact and in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure and that
these rules are not stretched to the point where they would lose
credibility.
Conclusion
My main message today is simple: we need to focus on the
quality of credit, not only the quantity.
To create an environment where credit flows to productive
investment requires a coherent and comprehensive approach. It
requires managing the bank deleveraging process while the euro
area transitions to a more-balanced financing mix. It requires
finding workable solutions to reduce the debt overhang involving
both reducing debt and raising equity. And it requires acting on
the basic determinants of investment demand, namely
productivity.
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Fortunately, all the pieces of the jigsaw are now in place to
achieve such an approach. Banks are approaching the end of
their deleveraging. This is creating a better-capitalized sector
that can facilitate restructuring. And we have an emerging
consensus on the importance of supply-side policies to boost
growth potential. We now simply need to put those pieces
together.

B. Outside Perspective/Lessons from Other Parts of
the World
Guillermo Ortiz, Former Central Bank Governor and
Minister of Finance of Mexico
Introduction
Good evening. I would like to thank the Bank of Slovenia, in
particular Governor Jazbec, as well as the International
Monetary Fund for the invitation to participate in this seminar on
Reinvigorating Credit Growth in Central, Eastern, and Southern
European Economies. It is a pleasure for me to share with you
the challenges we had to face in Mexico, during and after the
financial crisis known as the Tequila Crisis. I hope the lessons
we learned in Mexico can be useful for your own reflections.
Although the structures of our real economies are indeed very
different, I think our financial systems share to some extent, for
good and for bad, the costs and benefits of being directly
integrated with much larger neighboring ones: the United States
in our case, and the core EU in yours. And those similarities may
induce common challenges for policy making.
The Tequila Crisis: the Short-Run Response
In my view, the “Mexican Tequila Crisis” of 1994 to 1995,
which as you know had nothing to do with Tequila, began with
Mexico’s “Original Sin.” Of course, “Original Sin” is not meant
here in a biblical sense, but in the way Eichengreen and
Haussman defined it 15 years ago, as the inability of emerging
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economies to fund themselves in their own currency.19 That sin
eventually led to high external-debt ratios, engendered currency
mismatches and eventually ended up in a financial crisis.
A financial crisis involves macroeconomic stock disequilibria
and national balance-sheet imbalances. This is essentially
different from standard balance-of-payment crises, which
involve just flow disequilibria and normally require only
exchange-rate adjustments and supportive macro policies. As a
consequence, a financial crisis typically involves: strong
movements in credit volumes and asset prices; severe disruptions
in financial intermediation leading to liquidity deterioration;
forced asset sales at fire-sale discounts; large-scale balance sheet
problems of firms, households, intermediaries and/or the
sovereign; and large-scale public liquidity support and
recapitalization.20
Unfortunately, as Reinhart and Rogoff21 as well as others have
argued, it takes a long time for output to return to pre-crisis
levels in the wake of a financial crisis. Therefore, the economy is
expected to have a slow-paced recovery. This was the case in
Mexico in the mid-1990s and in Europe in the post-Lehman
crisis.
The Tequila crisis was a classic case of a sudden stop. In Mexico
at the beginning of the 1990s, a fixed exchange rate and a very
positive economic outlook fostered by NAFTA, together with a
set of market-friendly reforms, led to an abundance of capital
flows, allowing Mexican banks to tap international markets in
large amounts. The combination of abundant liquidity,
macroeconomic stability, financial deregulation, lack of proper

19 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002).
20 See Ortiz (2014).
21 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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supervision, and eager-but-inexperienced private-sector bankers
proved to be fatal. Banks extended large numbers of loans
without sufficient credit analysis and with both currency and
maturity mismatches.
In 1994, the financial framework was weakening and the country
suffered two major shocks: (i) on the domestic front, the leading
candidate in the presidential election was assassinated; and
(ii) on the foreign front, the Federal Funds rate increased from 3
to 6 percent. Both events triggered large capital outflows.
As a result, the fixed exchange rate regime prevailing at that time
did not provide the government with much room to maneuver.
The peso-dollar exchange rate depreciated 92 percent by midMarch 1995. Borrowers stopped servicing their debts and
depositors withdrew resources from the financial system on a
large scale, although annual interest rates spiked at 80 percent.
The result was the collapse of the banking system and a very
deep recession.
The severity of the crisis forced the authorities to act quickly to
stabilize the exchange rate and to reduce the risk of bank runs. In
this context, I want to highlight six actions:
1) The Mexican government sought international
support,
and
achieved
an
unprecedented
US$50 billion rescue package, consisting of
US$20 billion from the U.S. government,
US$17.5 billion from the IMF, and the rest from
other international organizations.
2) As the central bank had run out of reserves, we had
to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime—80 percent
of government liabilities were foreign.
3) A very restrictive fiscal austerity package was put in
place to close the balance-of-payment deficit and
regain investors’ confidence.
4) A U.S. dollar liquidity window was created to help
banks service their obligations.
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5) A temporary capitalization program was introduced
to allow several banks to improve their capital-asset
ratio, as well as capitalization and loan purchase
mechanisms; several banks were intervened.
6) Finally, support programs for debtors were put in
place to help borrowers reschedule their debts, and
to avoid the costly consequences of the proliferation
of a so-called “nonpayment culture.”
The last three actions were explicitly directed to support the
banking system.
In sum, the short-run program adopted by Mexico during the
Tequila Crisis was characterized by an overshooting both in
adjustment and finance. The main features of the program
eventually became a model by the IMF for dealing with
subsequent financial crisis.
The aftermath of the Tequila Crisis: strengthening the
institutional framework
Once the worst part of the crisis was over, the government
embarked on a series of deep modifications to achieve the
recovery on the basis of three basic pillars: (i) a sustainable fiscal
policy; (ii) credible monetary and exchange rate policies; and
(iii) a stronger financial sector.
Pillar One: a sustainable fiscal policy
On the fiscal side, the Mexican government achieved quite low
fiscal deficits, going from more than 5 percent of GDP in the late
1990s to a balanced budget by the mid-2000s. In addition, in
recent years fiscal responsibility laws have been passed aimed at
achieving fiscal balance over the economic cycle.
Pillar Two: credible monetary and exchange rate policies
At the beginning, some controversy took place within the
Mexican government as to whether a truly free-floating
exchange rate regime was feasible at all, since no other EM
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country had adopted such a regime at the time, and there were
widespread fears that the deep financial integration with the
United States could be a special source of instability. Once the
‘yes’ side came through, we were able to develop a monetary
policy and exchange-rate framework that included: (i) an
independent central bank whose main objective was to reduce
inflation and gain credibility; (ii) the establishment of an
inflation-target framework; and (iii) a mostly hands-off approach
to achieve a fully flexible exchange rate regime. This allowed
the country to experience single-digit inflation in the year 2000,
and it then became a stationary process in 2001.22
Moreover, the Foreign Exchange Commission––formed by the
central bank and the Ministry of Finance––in charge of FX
policy, adopted an almost hands-free approach towards the
exchange rate. I say “almost” because, in stormy times of higher
global volatility, the authority implemented preannounced and
predictable interventions to restore U.S. dollar/Mexican peso
market liquidity, but not to set a level for the exchange rate. On
top of that, the central bank accumulated foreign reserves, which
surged from less than US$10 billion by year-end 1995, to nearly
US$200 billion in August 2014.23
Probably, the most unexpected consequence of the free-floating
regime was the extraordinary depth and liquidity that the FX
market acquired in the course of just a few years. For instance,
the daily global turnover in the Mexican peso market increased
from below US$5 billion in 1994 to US$135 billion in 2013,
making the Mexican peso the eighth most-traded currency
according to BIS statistics.24

22

See Chiquiar, Noriega, and Ramos Francia (2007).

23 Source: Banco de México.
24

See BIS (2014).
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Pillar three: a stronger financial sector
Healthy public finances and responsible monetary policy
allowed for the development of a liquid local-currencydenominated bond market––ending up with the Original Sin. The
government strategy to develop this market started with the
issuance of a three-year fixed-rate, peso-denominated bond back
in year 2000––the birth of “Mbonos.” At the same time,
“Formadores de Mercado” or primary dealers were created in
order to provide liquidity in the secondary market. With a very
well-defined coupon payment and issuance calendar structure,
and a gradual approach towards increasing the maturities
according to market conditions, the government was able to
increase the average maturity of local debt from 200 days in
1994, to almost 8 years currently. This is above the U.S. debt
maturity profile.
In this context, the ratio of external debt to Mexican GDP went
from the aforementioned 80 percent, to its current ratio of
30 percent. Mexico experienced a “baptism of fire” and
redemption from the “Original Sin” in October 2006, when a 30year Mbono was successfully issued. There is now a welldefined yield curve that spans up to 30-year maturities. The span
of the curve and the total convertibility of the peso are almost
unique features among large EMEs and a strong source of
demand from global asset managers. Their long position on
Mbonos has induced a vibrant market for peso-denominated
interest rate swaps; for instance, although trades in peso
instruments are not yet required by Dodd-Frank legislation to be
centrally cleared, the CME opened such a clearing facility at the
end of last year and the open interest in peso IRS has already
reached US$14 billion. Another interesting feature that attracted
more foreign investors in their global search for yield was that
Mbonos are now euro-clearable.
The government reformed the pension fund system, from a payas-you-go, to an individual account fully-funded system in 1993.
Later on, the investment regime of these funds, called Afores,
has been changed several times to allow the managers to
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diversify the pensioners’ portfolios, from only investing in
government bonds to a more diversified financial instruments
portfolio. Today the Afores have 12.5 percent of GDP of assets
under management and are the most important institutional
component of the local buy side of the financial markets.
Financial regulation and supervision also played a very
important role in maintaining a complete macrostability
framework. In this context, having restrictive but effective
regulation and supervision schemes, it was relatively easy to
implement Basel II and, later on, Basel III capital requirements.
Another important feature was foreign bank participation.
Financial restrictions to acquire large Mexican financial
institutions were lifted in 1998. In this context, the foreign bank
participation rate in Mexico increased from 2 percent in 1995, to
82 percent by 2002. For some policymakers, it made sense to
leave the Mexican financial system in the hands of foreigners,
particularly because of what had happened during the 1994–95
painful episode. In addition, they also considered other potential
benefits in terms of innovation, better risk management and
access to capital. Nevertheless, several formal studies have found
evidence that––even though some benefits have been achieved––
it has been at the expense of leaving several population groups
out of the banking sector reach.25
In summary, achieving a healthy fiscal stance, with responsible
monetary policy in a full-fledged flexible exchange rate regime,
with a strong financial regulation scheme, along the same lines
as the creation of a liquid peso-denominated debt market, are in
my view responsible for the rock-solid macroeconomic
framework Mexico currently enjoys.

25

See Stiglitz (2005), and Beck and Martínez Peria (2008).
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In fact, the aforementioned new institutional framework was
recently put to the test by the 2008–09 global financial crisis.
Even though Mexico’s GDP fell 4.7 percent in 2009, no banks
filed for bankruptcy. In addition, the peso depreciated around
50 percent at some point, and inflation did not surpass
6.3 percent; because, for the first time in our economic history,
inflation expectations remained well anchored in the face of a
sharp devaluation. Consequently, the economy recovered quite
quickly. This was probably the most effective test of the
resilience of our new exchange rate regime and financial
institutions.
The negative legacy of the Tequila Crisis: creditless low growth
In the aftermath of the Tequila Crisis, Mexico experienced a
creditless recovery, which has proved to be a lasting legacy and
has contributed to a growth rate below potential. Commercial
bank credit to the (nonfinancial) private sector, as a percentage
of GDP, fell from nearly 30 percent in 1994 on the brink of the
crisis to a level below 7 percent by 2002. Later on, Mexico has
observed a slow process of gradual credit penetration increase.
Today, Mexico’s commercial bank credit to the nonfinancial
private sector is currently about 15 percent of GDP.26 This is not
only considerably below developed economies’ standards; but it
is also well below emerging markets’ credit ratios, even in Latin
America (for instance, 72 percent in Chile, 46 percent in Brazil,
or 41 percent in Colombia.)27
I believe low credit penetration levels stem from two features of
the Mexican economy: (i) the large number of individuals and
firms working in the informal sector; and (ii) the difficulties
faced by banks to recover collateral. As a result, commercial

26 Source: Banco de México.
27

Source: World Bank.
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banks are not able to lend to a plethora of sectors, particularly
SMEs and low-income families that either operate in the
informal sector, or that are high-risk potential clients, whose
assets (if any), are not easy to repossess. Therefore, alternative
sources of financing arise.
Low credit penetration is clearly related to a low productivity
vicious cycle. Consumers usually borrow money from “loan
sharks” and resort to small-appliance-related credits, in a small
weekly-payment program with astronomical annual interest rates
of 150 percent or more. Firms, SMEs, and even large companies
mainly use supplier credit. According to the latest Banco de
México survey, nearly 83 percent of the surveyed firms said that
they use supplier credit as their main source of financing, while
only 40 percent responded that they used some sort of
commercial bank credit.28
The high interest rates that SMEs and individuals—usually
working in the informal sector—have to face and the hassle to
obtain loans from informal sources subtract from productivity.
SMEs’ and individuals’ low productivity keeps them from going
formal, so their access to commercial bank credit continues to be
limited, leading them to continue using alternative sources of
funding, forming an unfortunate vicious cycle.
Fortunately, the government has recently achieved approval for a
bank-lending reform. This reform is based upon a two-axis
structure: (i) a full improvement of the collateral-recovery
processes, creating specialized courts and fostering the
development of specialized judges, as well as easing the
guarantee-execution procedures; and (ii) the allowance for
government-owned development banks to significantly increase

28

See Banxico (2014).
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the amount and number of guarantees for commercial banks to
lend to SMEs.
In this context, using quite conservative assumptions
for Mexico––such as GDP annual growth rates of 2.5 percent to
3 percent––credit-to-GDP ratios could easily reach 20 percent in
five years and are projected to increase up to 40 percent by
2025.29
CESEE parallelisms with the Mexican experience
The CESEE countries face important challenges in their banking
system. After having a buoyant period before the global crisis,
with the entry of foreign banks and foreign investment, the
situation has changed dramatically. After the crisis, European
authorities decided to implement a stricter regulatory framework
that forced European banks to increase their capitalization ratios.
This created a process of strong deleveraging that has left
CESEE countries with high levels of NPLs and, in some cases,
has constrained private-sector balance sheets.
These factors are holding back domestic demand and credit.
According to IMF data, credit growth to nonfinancial firms (in
nominal exchange-rate-adjusted terms), has been negative in the
Baltic States, CEE, and SEE through end-2013, though there are
some signs of a relaxation in credit standards. Furthermore, in
SEE countries, private-sector balance-sheet weakness, high
NPLs, and fiscal and structural challenges continue to constrain
the recovery in domestic demand.
The recent situation has become riskier for the region as it
reflects a possible protracted period of weak growth in the
eurozone, surges in financial market volatility along the path

29

Source: Banorte-Ixe.
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towards higher interest rates globally, an escalation of
geopolitical tensions in the region, as well as delayed resolution
of crisis legacies.
At first glance, the current situation of the CESEE region looks
familiar to me. The possibility of a sudden stop in capital flows,
the financial fragility experienced in the last few years, and a
tighter regulation for capitalization in Europe create certain
parallelisms with the Mexican experience. That is why I would
like to share with you the most important policy components,
which in my view have helped Mexico to achieve a more stable
and resilient financial system, as well as the challenges we are
still facing.
1) Act quickly. In the case of a financial crisis, it is
necessary for the authorities to respond
expeditiously with short-term measures intended to
contain liquidity and capitalization problems.
2) Achieve monetary and fiscal stability. Rebuilding
fiscal policy space not only restores investors’
confidence, but allows any country to respond in
case of external shocks.
3) Develop a domestic securities market. To reduce
reliance on foreign funding, which I understand is an
important concern for many of the CESEE countries,
it is necessary to adopt several measures to increase
the liquidity and depth of domestic markets. In the
case of Mexico, the development of institutional
investors and the secondary market’s liquidity
enhancements have been key to achieving it. On the
fiscal side, by reducing the vulnerability of public
finances to adverse interest and exchange rate
movements, the government has been able to
actively manage its debt and improve its
amortization schedule. On the other hand, deeper
and more-developed financial markets have allowed
agents to pool and diversify risk in a more efficient
fashion, and have facilitated the allocation of savings
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to more productive uses, thereby making the
economy less vulnerable to adverse shocks.
4) Create a more resilient banking system. A stricter
regulation can help to align the incentives of debtors,
bank creditors, and shareholders. For instance, in the
case of foreign banks, it is essential to encourage
cooperation among supervisors, central banks, and
finance ministries from the countries involved in
extensive cross-border banking. For example, the
subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions in
Mexico have rigorous limits on credit to related
parties, which restrict the possibility of domestic
banks being asked to provide liquidity support to
their parent banks. Also, the Mexican banking
system is well-capitalized, with adequate leverage
ratios.
5) Adopt a free-floating exchange rate and
accumulate reserves to serve as a shock absorber.
This was very important for Mexico. I understand
several CESEE economies are either part of the
EMU or thinking seriously about joining. A
monetary union has a number of political, monetary,
and banking advantages. However, we have seen the
difficulties experienced by the eurozone countries in
the absence of a political, fiscal, and Banking Union.
In Mexico’s case, the free-floating exchange rate has
served a very useful purpose as a shock absorber and
also as a key element to achieve a complete and
strong macro structure.
Finally, it is fundamental for Mexico and other EMEs to
implement the necessary structural reforms for creating a more
inclusive and efficient financial system. Those reforms will be
able to create a more competitive and productive economy, and
increase economic growth.
Thank you very much for your time.
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IX. CASE STUDIES

A. The Case of Slovenia
Daria Zakharova, European Department, IMF
Slovenia experienced a deep and protracted recession following
the crisis. Output dropped by 11¼ percent from its peak in
2008:Q2 to its trough in 2012:Q4. This was the largest output
loss among euro area members after Greece. Real GDP still
remains some 10 percent below its pre-crisis peak.
The economy is now recovering, but credit continues to contract.
Quarterly GDP growth turned positive in 2013:Q2, helped by
recovering euro area demand. Meanwhile, credit is still
contracting.
Should we be worried about a creditless recovery? Recent
studies find that creditless recoveries tend to be weaker than
those supported by stronger lending. And many such recoveries
are more likely to be followed by mediocre growth, reflecting
the long-term adverse effects of lower investment and weaker
productivity. The figures below show the evolution of output and
credit in creditless and normal recoveries in advanced
economies. Following Everaert and Tereanu (2014), a creditless
recovery is defined as one where the average year-on-year
growth rate of real credit—defined as the stock of nominal credit
in national currency deflated by the GDP deflator—is negative.
Economic growth is about 20 percent lower in a creditless
recovery compared with a normal recovery—arguably a poor
prospect for Slovenia.
What holds credit back? In this presentation, I will argue that in
Slovenia both supply and demand factors are important in
explaining the contraction in credit. Reforms would therefore
need to tackle both supply- and demand-side constraints in order
to revive credit.

225
Figure 1. Slovenia: Real Output and Real Credit Developments
(y-o-y percent change)
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Supply-side issues
On the supply side, banks are burdened with NPLs. Following
the crisis, NPLs increased rapidly from under 3 percent of total
assets at the end of 2007, to over 18 percent in November 2013.
Even after the transfer of a portion of NPLs to the bank asset
management company in December 2013, NPLs have remained
high, standing at over 15 percent of total assets in June. NPLs are
particularly high in domestic banks. And the worst affected
sectors are construction, food and accommodation services, and
financial holding companies.
High NPLs are a problem, because they keep lending rates high.
The text figure shows a strong correlation between the level of
NPLs and lending rates across different types of banks. This
should not come as a surprise. High NPLs divert bank resources
from core activities to NPL workouts, weigh on banks’
profitability, hinder extension of credit, and push up interest
rates on new loans.
Demand-side issues
On the demand side, corporates are overextended with leverage.
Slovenia has one of the highest debt-to-equity ratios in the EU.
This is largely a result of scarce equity, rather than high debt. In
part, the relative scarcity of equity reflects low foreign direct
investment (FDI), which is a key source of potential equity in a
small open economy. FDI into Slovenia has averaged 1½ percent
of GDP per year since euro adoption, compared to an average for
the euro area of 29½ percent of GDP.
Corporate leverage weighs on credit growth, investment, and
economic recovery. The next figure illustrates the positive
correlation between corporate leverage and the decline in the
investment-to-GDP ratio in the post-crisis period. Companies use
any available resources to repay debt, rather than invest. As a
result, investment continues to decline, undermining economic
recovery. This is evident in Slovenia’s own experience.
Slovenia’s investment-to-GDP ratio declined to 18 percent in
2013—the lowest recorded in the country’s history.
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Figure 2. Output and Credit Growth in Normal and Creditless
Recoveries
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High corporate leverage in the context of a prolonged recession
also translated into high corporate NPLs. The share of NPLs in
loans to nonfinancial companies peaked at 28 percent in
November 2013. Corporate NPLs are also highly concentrated.
The 50 corporates with the largest exposure in arrears accounted
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for some 43 percent of all banking sector arrears in
November 2013. This share shrank only moderately to
36 percent post-bank asset management company (BAMC)
transfer.

Lending rate, loans > EUR 1 million

Figure 3. Slovenia: NPLs and Arrears in Banks
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Figure 3 (Concluded). Slovenia: NPLs and Arrears in Banks
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Financial stress is widespread. Firms that cannot cover their
interest bill through their earnings account for 16 percent of total
employment in Slovenia. In addition to large companies, the
ratio of financial debt to earnings is particularly high in micro
companies—those with fewer than 10 employees. This sort of bimodal distribution of debt distress could hold some clues as to
what restructuring frameworks are best suited for Slovenia.
Slovenia’s recent actions
A lot has been done in Slovenia to address the problems in the
banking and corporate sectors.
In 2013, the Bank of Slovenia carried out a comprehensive AQR
and stress tests in banks to determine capital needs and establish
the price for the transfer of NPLs to a newly established BAMC.
In December 2013, NPLs with a face value of EUR 4.6 billion
were transferred to the BAMC, reducing the average NPL ratio
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Figure 4. Corporate Leverage and FDI in a Cross-Country
Perspective
Corporate Leverage, 2012
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in the system from 18 to 13 percent. The government also
injected some EUR 3.7 billion in fresh capital into the three
largest domestic banks.
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To facilitate corporate restructuring, the bankruptcy law was
amended in line with international best standards to introduce a
simplified pre-insolvency regime and an enhanced compulsory
settlement procedure.
But more is needed to complete the restructuring of banks and
corporates and unlock credit flows.
Strengthening the demand side
On the demand side, the focus should be on accelerating
corporate restructuring.
Let’s look at the supply side first. As I mentioned earlier, NPLs
remain high, even post-BAMC transfer. This is not conducive to
a revival of credit supply. Thus, additional transfers of problem
loans to BAMC are in order. This is necessary both to further
cleanse banks’ balance sheets from legacy problem loans and to
strengthen BAMC’s capacity to act as a catalyst for the muchneeded corporate restructuring. The ongoing comprehensive risk
assessment by the ECB offers an opportunity to determine the
value of the assets for the transfer and to quantify the size of the
existing capital buffers in the two largest domestic banks.
Going forward, there is a need to strengthen bank governance
and supervision to prevent the reemergence of the same
vulnerabilities that led to the crisis. Governance can be improved
through privatization. The government currently owns 62 percent
of the banking system capital. Privatizing the intervened banks
would ensure that their management responds solely to
commercial motives. It would also weaken the link between the
creditworthiness of the government and the banks—a key source
of vulnerability.
Finally, further bank consolidation may be needed to exploit
economies of scale, reduce administrative costs, and shore up
banks’ profitability.
First, the apparent concentration of problems in large Slovenian
corporates implies that a large reduction of leverage can be
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Figure 5. Corporate Leverage and Investment
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achieved by involving only a few parties in restructuring
negotiations. The BAMC can be instrumental in this regard
since, by collecting claims from the three largest banks, it can
potentially drastically reduce creditor coordination problems.
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Figure 6. Leverage and Debt Repayment Capacity by Corporate Size
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Second, equity injections are key to revitalizing the corporate
sector in Slovenia. Foreign capital can play an important role
here and FDI should be encouraged.
Third, given the bi-modal distribution of financial stress in
Slovenia, care should be taken to address the specific needs
of microenterprises. Here, standardized approaches for
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restructurings (used in Iceland (2011) and Turkey (2001)) can
help simplify negotiations by providing simple tests for viability
and a set of harmonized restructuring terms.
And finally, to the extent that banks are the factor that constrains
credit to domestic firms, it could be useful to explore the scope
for nonbank financing. For larger corporates, direct access to
capital markets may be a good alternative. Smaller companies
could take advantage of minibonds (as was done in Italy) or debt
securitization.

B. Austrian Banks in CESEE
Thomas Reininger and Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, OeNB30
Travelers to CESEE countries, but also investors and
entrepreneurs doing business in the CESEE region, quickly
notice the strong presence of Austrian banks in the CESEE
region. How did this come about? The comparatively low
interest margin in Austria pushed Austrian banks to expand their
business abroad. Looking for alternatives––preferably nearby––
they seized the historic opportunities to focus on the CESEE
region, given the geographical proximity and cultural ties.
Interestingly, the difference between the Austrian and the euro
area interest rate margin has remained broadly constant between
2004 and 2014 (Figure 1). This is mainly ascribable to the
competitive pressure resulting from the high number of Austrian
banks (end-2013: 790 registered banks), given the prominent
role of decentralized bank groups (in particular, the Raiffeisen
sector). To adjust the cost structure, banks have responded to the

30 Thomas Reininger is Senior Expert in the OeNB’s Foreign Research Division and Doris
Ritzberger-Grünwald is Chief Economist and Director of the OeNB’s Economics Department. The
presenters want to thank Andreas Greiner and Alexandra Schober-Rhomberg, Head of Unit in the
OeNB’s Financial Stability Department, for valuable support.
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relatively low domestic net interest income with ongoing
restructuring and redimensioning, and the number of banks has
been on a continuous decline. Over the past two years, the
interest margin on new lending has risen, but on the basis of
relatively small volumes, so that the margin on the outstanding
stock did not increase substantially. Moreover, this hardly
changed the relative position of Austrian banks, given the
parallel rise in the euro area.
Domestic Interest Margin and Consolidated Profitability of
the Austrian Banking Sector
Figure 1. Interest Margin, New Lending to Nonbanks
(In percentage points)
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Overall, Austrian banks’ eastward orientation, i.e., their so-called
CESEE strategy, may be considered a win-win story. On the one
hand, it provided financing for transition processes as well as
catch-up growth, and it supported export-oriented FDI inflows.
On the other hand, it markedly increased the profitability of the
Austrian banking sector. The return on assets (ROA) of the
consolidated banking sector was close to 1.0 percent in 2006; in
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2007, the year before the crisis, it still came to 0.8 percent
(Figure 2). Clearly, these results were driven by the net profits of
Austrian bank subsidiaries in CESEE, which posted ROA ratios
between 1.2 percent and 1.7 percent from 2003 to 2008
(Figure 5). However, it would be too rosy a picture if we did not
mention that, during this period, banks to some extent also
pursued ill-considered business strategies—such as lending
based on insufficiently strict lending standards coupled with
overreliance on funding from parent banks abroad, even though
the supervisory authorities of several host countries issued some
explicit warnings.
Figure 2. Earning Power of the Austrian Banking System—Return
on Asset (RoA), Consolidated
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In 2008, the ROA of the consolidated Austrian banking sector
dropped significantly and then remained at a lower level, which
may be explained by the legacy problems of past excesses and
the weak growth in the euro area and its impact on the CESEE
region. In 2013, the ROA became negative (-0.04 percent) for
the first time (Figure 2). This was attributable––apart from a
moderate decline in the net interest income resulting from weak
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growth and the low interest rate environment––to two major oneoff effects, namely the losses of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank
International AG and the write-downs of goodwill linked to the
CESEE subsidiaries of one major bank. In absolute terms, the net
loss amounted to EUR 1 billion. Without these one-off effects,
the RoA would have amounted to about 0.2 percent.
Exposure to CESEE
Against the background of relatively low interest margins at
home, Austrian banks were among the first to take advantage of
the opportunities in CESEE and to become major players in the
region. Banks expanded their activities in parallel with
nonfinancial companies entering the CESEE markets after the
Iron Curtain had come down, partly following them and partly
paving the way for them. In 2014, majority domestically owned
Austrian banks held a share of 20 percent in the total exposure of
EU-15banks to CESEE (Figure 3). If we also included Bank
Austria, which is majority owned by the Italian UniCredit
Banking Group, in this category, this share would increase to
about 30 percent (and the share of Italy would decline
correspondingly).
Since the crisis of 2008/09, Austrian banks’ exposure to the
aggregate CESEE region and their share in total EU-15 banks’
CESEE exposure has remained remarkably stable. Still, the crisis
has impacted––not immediately, but definitely step by step––the
structure of Austrian banks’ CESEE exposure. At the peak of the
crisis, banks avoided falling into the trap of the rush to the exit
and prevented the loan supply from collapsing not only on
aggregate in the region, but also in almost all individual host
countries. In this context, the private-public Vienna Initiative
played a rather important role. Later on, the exposure developed
in a more heterogeneous way, with country-specific differences
emerging, depending on factors like real growth, credit demand,
the size of legacy problems, and the economic policy approach.
A country-by-country analysis shows that the exposure remained
quite stable, for instance, in the Czech Republic (after some
further increase) and in Romania. By contrast, the exposure
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shrank significantly in particular in Hungary and the Ukraine,
mostly due to unfavorable political conditions. In Turkey and
Russia, the exposure grew strongly until the fourth quarter of
2013. However, during 2014, the exposure to Russia contracted
markedly (Figure 4). Indeed, the increases in some countries,
e.g., the Czech Republic, Turkey, Russia and––via acquisition––
in Poland, helped maintain the exposure to the total CESEE
region stable after the crisis of 2008/09. Interestingly, there is
also evidence that Austrian banks do not stay under all
circumstances, as Bank Austria left Kazakhstan.
Since the crisis of 2008/09, Austrian banks’ exposure to the
aggregate CESEE region and their share in total EU-15 banks’
CESEE exposure has remained remarkably stable. Still, the crisis
has impacted––not immediately, but definitely step by step––the
structure of Austrian banks’ CESEE exposure. At the peak of the
crisis, banks avoided falling into the trap of the rush to the exit
and prevented the loan supply from collapsing not only on
aggregate in the region, but also in almost all individual host
countries. In this context, the private-public Vienna Initiative
played a rather important role. Later on, the exposure developed
in a more heterogeneous way, with country-specific differences
emerging, depending on factors like real growth, credit demand,
the size of legacy problems, and the economic policy approach.
A country-by-country analysis shows that the exposure remained
quite stable, for instance, in the Czech Republic (after some
further increase) and in Romania. By contrast, the exposure
shrank significantly in particular in Hungary and the Ukraine,
mostly due to unfavorable political conditions. In Turkey and
Russia, the exposure grew strongly until the fourth quarter of
2013. However, during 2014, the exposure to Russia contracted
markedly (Figure 4). Indeed, the increases in some countries,
e.g., the Czech Republic, Turkey, Russia and––via acquisition––
in Poland, helped maintain the exposure to the total CESEE
region stable after the crisis of 2008/09. Interestingly, there is
also evidence that Austrian banks do not stay under all
circumstances, as Bank Austria left Kazakhstan.
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Figure 3. Home Countries’ Shares in Total EU-15 Banks’ Exposure to
CESEE
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Figure 4. Development of Austrian Banks’ Exposure to CESEE
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Profitability of Austrian bank subsidiaries
A closer look at the profitability of Austrian bank subsidiaries in
the CESEE region reveals why Austrian banks stayed in the
region, although economic conditions were less favorable than
before the crisis of 2008–09. In the post-crisis period, the ROA
of CESEE subsidiaries was only half the pre-crisis level, coming
in at 0.8 percent in 2013 (Figure 5). This ROA ratio, however,
still exceeds the ROA recorded by Austrian banks in their
domestic market. Moreover, this profitability level has remained
remarkably stable throughout the post-crisis period.
Earning Power of Austrian Subsidiaries in CESEE
Figure 5. Return on Assets (ROA)
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Similar to the changing structure of the (otherwise stable
aggregate) CESEE exposure, the CESEE subsidiaries’ stable
profitability level of recent years masks a change in the structure
of Austrian banks’ net profits in CESEE (after credit
risk provisioning and taxes). In fact, the changing profit structure
reflects a growing concentration of profits on a few countries. In
2008, the total profit of CESEE subsidiaries was characterized
by a more equal allocation over a larger number of CESEE
countries. In 2013, this profit was concentrated on Russia, the
Czech Republic, and—to a lesser extent—Slovakia; while the
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activities in Hungary and Slovenia even resulted in small losses
(Figure 6).31 As a matter of fact, the increased concentration of
profit sources implies a higher risk for the Austrian banking
sector.
Figure 6. Profit/Loss After Taxes
(In billions of euros)
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A key factor for lower CESEE profitability in the post-crisis
period was the rise of NPLs and the resulting substantial credit
risk provisioning––basically a legacy problem of boom-related
exuberance. In the domestic market, the NPL ratio of Austrian
banks (i.e., the unconsolidated NPL ratio) increased from a low
level to about 4 percent in the first quarter of 2009, but has since
then remained stable. By contrast, the loan quality in CESEE
continued to weigh down group figures. For CESEE subsidiaries,

31 Note that the positive results for Turkey are not included in Figure 6, as a significant joint venture

in Turkey had not been covered separately by the Austrian supervisory reporting framework up to
2013.
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the NPL ratio climbed from 7 percent (early in the crisis) up to
15 percent in mid-2014. As a result, the NPL ratio of the
consolidated Austrian banking sector increased to 8.6 percent.
Whereas the unconsolidated loan loss provision (LLP) ratio was
3.6 percent in mid-2014, the consolidated ratio (taking CESEE
subsidiaries into account) stood at 4.8 percent. Overall, the LLP
ratio kept pace with the NPL ratio, preventing the coverage ratio
from deteriorating. Moreover, the good news is, that after the
steep rise of the NPL ratio in CESEE from 2009 to 2012, it
leveled off and even declined slightly (Figures 7 and 8).
To what extent has credit growth recovered?
CESEE aggregate credit growth recovered from the crisis, with a
smaller role for foreign currency lending. Indeed, net new
foreign currency lending to households virtually disappeared.
Figure 9 shows this development in detail in terms of credit
growth by economic sector and currency relative to annual GDP.
Before the crisis, the CESEE economies on aggregate recorded
very high credit growth of more than 14 percentage points of
annual GDP. In this situation, foreign currency loans played a
significant role for both households and nonfinancial companies.
Cross-border credit to the corporate sector, denominated almost
entirely in foreign currency, was used intensively to meet the
demand for credit, as investment activities were high and their
financing was not always fully met by (foreign-owned) domestic
banks. Instead, parent banks stepped in and financed, in
particular, bigger projects.
In 2009, domestic and cross-border credit growth came to a
standstill, with very small increases in national currency loans
canceled out by decreases in foreign currency loans to
nonfinancial companies. Thereafter, domestic credit growth
revived to a moderate level. However, within domestic credit,
foreign currency lending to households did not reemerge on an
aggregate level, as it was restricted in various ways by banks’
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Figure 7. LLP Ratio
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Figure 8. NPL Ratio
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internal rules or supervisory authorities’ new requirements in
most countries. As a case in point, nowadays a customer will
quite frequently have to provide proof of foreign currency
earnings as a hedge against the inherent exchange rate risk in
order to get a foreign currency loan. In some countries, e.g., the
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Figure 9. CESEE: Changes in Outstanding Stocks of Domestic Credit
and Cross-Border Credit to Private Nonbanks by Sector and Currency
Annual change (after adjustment for exchange rate changes), in percent of CESEE
annual GDP (all banks, not only Austrian banks).
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Sources: ECB, Eurostat, national central banks, national statistical offices, OeNB.
Note: Domestic credit comprises loans to households and to nonfinancial companies (NFCs), except for
Russia where it includes also loans to other financial institutions (OFIs). Domestic foreign currency loans
include also exchange rate-linked loans denominated in national currency. Cross-border credit to the
corporate sector comprises cross-border credit to 'other sectors' (including OFIs), including portfolio debt
securities held abroad by nonbanks, but excluding trade credit and intra-company loans. CESEE: EU-MS in
CESEE, plus Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey.

Ukraine, the supervisory authorities have prohibited new foreign
currency lending. In other words, both banks and supervisory
bodies have learned their lesson and started to limit this risky
business.
In the pre-crisis period, CESEE aggregate credit growth was
fueled by most countries across the region. However, it is
important to highlight that foreign currency lending to
households was not a phenomenon shared by all CESEE
countries. In the post-crisis period, the moderate positive growth
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of CESEE aggregate credit stemmed mainly from a few, but
relatively large countries—notably Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, Poland, Russia and Turkey—while several other
countries suffered from negative credit growth.
Strategy of diversification
Traditionally, Austrian banks in CESEE pursued a risk-reducing
strategy by diversifying their business across many countries of
the region. At the same time, this strategy allowed them to
realize economies of scope by providing added value for
customers operating throughout the region. Up to now, this
strategy has helped Austrian banks weather adverse economic
developments in the region. To some extent, this seems to apply
also to the years 2014 and 2015: GDP growth forecasts for the
CESEE EU member states have been rather stable for these two
years; no major downward revisions have been made so far
(Figure 10).
However, if one adds Ukraine, Russia and Turkey to the sample,
the picture changes completely and a constant downward
revision of growth prospects becomes obvious (Figure 11).
While in recent years, growth in Russia (and Turkey)
compensated for recent years, growth in Russia (and Turkey)
compensated for weak economic growth in the CESEE EU
member states, the latter provide more stability now, dampening
the effect of adverse developments in the former.
Capitalization
Despite lower profitability resulting mainly from higher credit
risk provisioning, Austrian banks responded to increased capital
requirements by both market participants and regulatory bodies
by improving their capitalization. As a result, major Austrian
banks operating in CESEE now have above-average leverage
ratios (defined as Tier 1 capital to total assets). However, given
their business model and the risks inherent in their assets, these
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Figure 10. CESEE EU Member States: Growth Projections for 2014
and 2015
Real GDP growth in percent.
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Note: With the beginning of July 2013, Croatia is included in the CESEE EU member states aggregate.

Figure 11. CESEE (CESEE EU-MS plus UA, RU, TR): Growth
Projections for 2014 and 2015
Real GDP growth in percent
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large Austrian banks record below-average capital ratios
(relative to risk-weighted assets) compared to their peers, with
the total Austrian banking sector having posted a Tier 1 ratio of
11.9 percent at the end of 2013. This may be regarded as a signal
for the need to further buildup high-quality capital. Moreover,
banks have to face several challenges in the coming years: a low
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interest margin, further restructuring, weak economic growth,
and higher political uncertainties. Therefore, additional risk
buffers are required. From another perspective, it is important to
highlight that the capitalization of Austrian subsidiaries in
CESEE is generally well above the respective country minimum
requirements, but in some countries “ring fencing” complicates
reallocation and thus an optimal use of bank group capital.
Recommendations
Against this background, the recommendations by the OeNB to
the Austrian banking sector are:


Banks should continue strengthening their capital levels.



Banks should strive to address structural issues and
improve their cost efficiency.



Banks should strive for sustainable loan-to-local stable
funding ratios at the subsidiary level and for the riskadequate pricing of liquidity transfers.



Banks should further pursue risk-adequate provisioning
and coverage policies to deal with loan-quality issues.



Banks should ensure high standards of risk management
so that risks are properly addressed and effectively
controlled.
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